First Love, Then Marriage, Then a Baby Carriage? by Ross, Jane O. (Author) et al.
 First Love, Then Marriage, Then a Baby Carriage?  
By 
Jane Ross 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Doctor of Philosophy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved March 14, 2012 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee:  
 
John Johnson, Chair 
John Hepburn 
Judith Stinson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY 
May 2012  
i 
 
ABSTRACT  
   
Above all else, this project is about parentage in the modern American 
legal system and culture.  Advanced reproductive technologies require our courts 
to reconsider the long-standing presumption that a child has only one female 
mother and one male father.  We now have children of choice, rather than chance.  
Assisted Reproductive Technology and its widespread availability and use and 
changed the landscape of parentage maybe forever.  And the children of such 
efforts remain largely unprotected by our current legal system that favors 
reproduction by chance within a recognized marriage or at the least, a traditional 
two-parent paradigm.  However, assisted reproduction calls into question the 
current legal framework for determinations of parentage based in marriage and/or 
biology.   
Based on a long and convoluted history, our current legal system conflates 
marriage and parentage.  Moreover, in many circumstances the law restricts both 
the number and gender of the parties to a marriage or possible parents.   One of 
the more compelling historical and still salient justifications for doing so is to 
accord the “Best Interest of the Child” standard which purports to underpin all 
such determinations.  Unfortunately, that standard cannot best be met when 
weighed in a balance against a constitutionally protected exclusive right to parent 
vested in an adult either by a determination of a genetic link to the child or 
marriage to another parent.   Children of choice, who result from the affirmative 
ii 
and purposive engagement in assisted reproduction, should be entitled to the same 
protections as children of chance born to a man and woman who are married.   
Once we look beyond marriage and biology as determiners of parentage, a 
better way for our legal system to serve the best interests of children, and their 
parents, is to identify and protect those adult relationships that are parental in 
nature and that benefit the child irrespective of a marriage between parents or 
genetic links to the child.   Fortunately, the tools to accomplish this paradigm shift 
already are in existence.   
The expansion of our commonly used definitions and broader view of our 
current statutes will allow the legal system to better protect both children of 
choice and children of chance by making better parentage determinations.  To that 
end, this project also takes on the ambitious task of praxis; of applying the 
theories to the law as it stands and demonstrating how the new paradigm might 
look as it is implemented with all of its far-reaching tentacles.      
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First comes love, then comes marriage, then comes Mommy with a baby 
carriage. 
  
 
CHAPTER 1: Introduction  
 
 So goes the children’s rhyme, but today’s experiences do not support it.  It 
is no longer, if it was ever, the norm.  Infertility among the married, failed birth 
control among the passionate unwed, and modern advances in reproductive 
technology among other things might all be to blame.  In today’s reality, the 
arrival of the baby carriage is just as likely to precede marriage and sometimes 
even love.  Parenthood by chance? The result of a biological “accident” and 
parenthood by choice – the result of a thoughtful process of reconciling deep 
emotions with reasonable choices to come to a purposeful life-long commitment, 
both happen regularly but not necessarily like the rhyme suggests.  Be that as it 
may, the children’s rhyme suggests and this dissertation assumes, such a 
deliberate commitment.  Parenthood by choice?  Likely is better but, at the very 
least, is just as good for children as parenthood by biological chance.  And that 
has some serious implications for our current family law paradigm.   
 It stands to reason that if a person chooses to be a parent in advance of 
becoming a parent, that person stands a better chance of being a successful parent 
than one who becomes a parent by chance, suddenly.  This is not to say that those 
who engage in parenthood by chance will not rise to the occasion.  But a child 
does not care how it happened that he or she was created, or by whom.  From a 
child’s perspective, the ownership of the egg and sperm that were joined in his or 
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her creation makes very little difference regarding a parentage determination.  But 
it does.  It matters in our current legal regime.  Parentage by chance within a 
marriage produces two legal parents, a mother and a father.  Unfortunately, 
parentage by choice may not.  Because the difference does not matter to the child, 
my goal is to reconcile parentage by choice and by chance and set forth a legal 
framework for parentage determinations that are based entirely in a child’s best 
interest.  Currently such determinations are made by weighing a child’s best 
interest against an adult’s, or the adult’s right(s) regarding his or her genetic 
progeny.  Make no mistake; my project is about children’s interests with regard to 
legal parentage determinations without much regard for those of their biological 
progenitors.  The “Best Interest of the Child” standard is a long-standing and 
ubiquitous doctrine of family law.  
 Family law is of critical concern to me, in part, because family law is 
where our legal system most often touches the ground.  Determinations of 
parentage are routinely made in our family courts and based in family law.  Most 
people will never be criminal defendants or civil litigants and most traffic 
violations are handled in courts of lesser jurisdiction.  Most of us will get married 
though, and of those, about half get divorced.1
                                                 
1 According to our government, our current marriage rate is 6.8 per 1,000 total 
population and the divorce rate is half of that, 3.4 per 1,000 total population.  See 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/divorce.htm. 
  Likewise, most of us will 
reproduce; so our family courts are where most of us have our limited experiences 
and glean our perspectives of the law and of our judicial system.   
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 Family law is strictly a concern of state law, not federal law.  Federal law 
applies in the same way in every state across the United States.  But state law is 
unique to each state and a version of family law is available in each of the 50 
states.  Amazingly, every single one of them purports to hold to the Best Interest 
of the Child standard as its greatest goal and its greatest measure of achievement.  
Unfortunately, a focus on the relationships between adults and the controlling 
interests of those adults over their genetic material – even after that genetic 
“material” has become a separate and distinct person with rights and interests of 
its own.  This focus continues to dominate family law and undermine the interests 
of the children.   
 A genetic link to a child does not make an adult a better parent.  
Successful adoptive parents, undoubtedly, and rightly so, would be outraged by 
the suggestion.  Teenagers, adults who do not know each other very well and 
adults who take on the obligations of parenthood by chance (due to a misplaced 
sense of loyalty to antiquated notions of duty and integrity) often are not the best 
parents.  Our daily news is filled with examples of such people behaving badly.  
Put simply, a biological progenitor does not make a parent.   
 When determining the best interests of the child, not only is a genetic link 
between the child and its’ parent(s) an unnecessary factor but, whether or not the 
parents are married to each other, whether or not the parents are of the same or of 
opposite sexes, and even the number of parents a child has does not seem to 
matter anymore.  Children are being raised in a myriad of familial groups 
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including single parents and, more and more frequently, same-sex parents.2
 Our current parentage determinations are shaped, and wrongly so, on an 
outdated allegiance to marriage as well as genetics.  I argue for a better 
application of our existing family law structures to better protect the best interests 
of children in determining their parentage.  To do this, we need to take a long, 
measured look at not only biological reproduction but also familial connections.  
More specifically, the institution of marriage as it relates to parentage.   
  What 
matters is whether or not each child has at least one adult who is committed, 
willing, and able to be a successful parent.  It is my goal to convince you that if 
two is better than one, maybe even more is better, so long as there remains a 
successful parental unit where “successful parental unit” is defined as a parental 
unit which is beneficial to the child.    
Parentage determinations based on marriage, whether by intent or not, 
continue to be a means of providing for and protecting children by determining 
their parents and those adults that are responsible.  But this method falls short as 
demonstrated by the recent re-emergence of the debate over the proper parameters 
of marriage.  Marriage fails to protect children fully because it is focused is on the 
relationships of the adults rather than focusing directly on the relationships of the 
children with the adults.  As illogical as it sounds, we hope the interests of the 
                                                 
2 As of 2000, one-third of all lesbian couples and about one-fourth of all male 
couples were raising at least one child.  See Monica K. Miller, How Judges 
Decide Whether Social Parents Have Parental Rights: A Five Factor Typology, 
49 Ass'n. Fam. & Conciliation Cts. Fam. Ct. Rev. 72, 73-74  (2011). 
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children will be best served by focusing on the relationships of the adults.  It does 
not appear to be working.  Child poverty is on the rise.  The most recent census 
data shows that nearly 16 million children are living in poverty.3
Our courts still are making parentage determinations where children are 
created by both choice and chance based in a reliance on genetic links and 
marriage.  This has failed to serve our children’s best interests.  These 
shortcomings can be overcome, and without drastic changes to our current 
structure.  My project will present the myriad reasons for, and a model of, new 
legislation with which better parentage determinations can be made.  I start with 
the presupposition that a child’s best interest lies in having parents, or at least a 
parent.  Unfortunately, a discussion of parentage necessarily is bound up with a 
discussion of marriage; or at least their conflation.   
  It is not 
unexpected that this is a bad thing.   
 There are many situations where an adult functions as a parent, even if 
only part-time, and a child benefits from that relationship but, legal recognition 
and protection of that beneficial relationship is uncertain.  Among these uncertain 
relationships are the children of married and unmarried, same sex and opposite 
sex, couples where only one spouse is a biological progenitor of the child, despite 
a deliberate choice by the progenitor and another to co-parent the child.  Other 
uncertain relationships include parents who are not recognized simply because 
they are not married to each other, or may be married to another or others when a 
                                                 
3 See http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty. 
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child is born.  Incidentally, another uncertainty exists, though it is not the major 
focus of this dissertation - where a biological progenitor has made a deliberate 
choice not to be a parent.  The point here is simply that marriage historically 
creates a strong presumption for a finding of parentage. 
 The massive break-down of marriages, about half at last count, 
demonstrates the competency of our family law courts to assign make parentage 
determinations thereby determining the rights of children to parents.  These 
rulings are subject to human error.  It is certainly clear that such judgments can be 
made and are being made every day.  This means that the structure of the laws 
and the procedures needed for making such decisions, and protecting children 
already are in place.   
Family law courts determine whether individual adults are parents when 
they dissolve a marriage from which children have resulted, when they adopt 
children within or without a marriage, and even where no marriage existed but 
progenitors of a child are known to each other and at least one of them wants to 
enforce parental duties on another.  The courts approve adoptions and even 
remove children from parents when they find that the children are at risk.  Our 
family courts routinely determine parentage, custody, visitation, support and daily 
care-giving duties.  Family law courts even give rights to individuals who are not 
“legally” related to a child in order to provide a child with loving, nurturing adults 
to care for him or her.  I take the position that with a little critical consideration, it 
can be better done.  We need to reconfigure the existing institutions so that they 
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better function in light of certain scientific and social realities.  More children can 
be better protected by addressing the scientific and social realities of reproduction 
and child-rearing today.   
 Failure to address our now-existing scientific and social realities leads to 
instability in familial relationships, undermines children’s interests, and maybe 
even violates their rights4
CHAPTER 2:  Marriage  
 by leaving them without legal parents.  In fact, many of 
those who tout marriage equality and support same-sex marriage do so because 
they believe it will better protect children.  It certainly is the responsibility of 
adults to create institutions that protect children, but marriage is no longer 
working.  Recall that half of marriages end in divorce anyway.  The needs of 
children for emotional and financial security will not be met by merely extending 
the right of marriage to more couples regardless of their composition as straight, 
gay, or otherwise.  I do not argue against the fact that it would benefit many, but 
marriage is not a panacea.  It is not a one-size-fits all solution.  But, marriage is 
where this story begins.   
I’m not sure what qualifications a person should have in order to have 
something to say about marriage.  My parents have achieved, I think, seven 
                                                 
4 Tonya Washington argues that, State action –enactment of placement bans—that 
categorically forecloses the most beneficial placement option for children violates 
their substantive due process rights by depriving them of the placement option 
that research identifies as serving their best interests.” See Tanya Washington, 
Suffer Not the Little Children: Prioritizing Children’s Rights in Constitutional 
Challenges to “Same-Sex Adoption Bans,” 39 Cap. U. L. Rev. 231 (2011). 
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marriages between them, as I recall (and I applaud them both)!  This is significant 
because, as a society we understand marriage generally, as a one-time deal, a 
promise made for life so most people do not have either the opportunity or the 
interest to bother to think too much about it.  Those that have and do think about 
it, mostly academics and religious fanatics5
A: The Marriage Debate 
 make some rather fervent, if not 
compelling, arguments about how we all should think about marriage.  This is 
helpful given the current state of question into which the institution of marriage 
has fallen.  Even though almost half of all marriages in America end in 
dissolution, bitter rhetorical battles are being fought over who has a right to 
marry; as if marriage is the best thing since sliced bread!  
The voices in the marriage debate are diverse.  They are the voices of legal 
scholars and social scientists, theologians and philosophers.  More importantly, 
more and more frequently, that list includes the average American voter.  I think 
the most interesting aspect of the ever-present and recently-blossoming discourse 
on marriage is that after pondering quite a lot about what has been said, I think 
that they all are correct.  Yes, you read correctly: none of them seem to be dead 
wrong.  Stripped of their rhetoric, each provides a useful and meaningful piece of 
the bigger picture which, taken as a whole, suggests a new way of thinking about 
the questions and therefore a new possibility for answers to the obvious starting 
                                                 
5 I do not use this term in any sort of pejorative way but, more in the sense of a 
baseball fanatic or history fanatic. 
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point, the grand old question, “What is Marriage?”  Therefore, I will investigate 
the marriage debate in an attempt to shed some light on marriage is and maybe 
even what it is not.  Surely someone who wants to tell us what marriage ought to 
be must know what it is.   
Among the diverse voices of the marriage debate there are some 
commonalities upon which we can begin to build a common definition.  Most 
would agree that there is some essential good to human bonding, in the 
philosophical sense of a good, in and of itself.  Whether, “It Takes a Village”6
Human bonding must be normal, in some sense, and may even be 
essential.  We know that human infants need human interaction to thrive.
 or 
if the modern notion of the nuclear family is sufficient, surely we must all agree 
that, we are a communal species.  We live in groups.  Maybe the best evidence of 
this is the often unspoken question we all entertain upon learning of a hermit who 
shuns society and segregates himself to the point of little or no human interaction, 
“What’s wrong with him?” we say.  Some might even say, “What went wrong 
with his childhood?”   
7
                                                 
6 See HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE: AND OTHER LESSONS 
CHILDREN TEACH US (1996). 
  
 
7 See http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Harlow/love.htm. (an experiment involving 
babies who were fed and had their diapers changed by mechanical devices rather 
than actual humans.) See also 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/salimbene1.html, the 12th century studies 
by Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II who had children raised by wet nurses but 
otherwise not spoken to in an attempt to find humanity’s “original language.”  
The children died of neglect. In his Chronicles, the monk Salimbene di Adam 
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Clearly, if human bonding is good and helps us to thrive, thereby promising, or 
even better, facilitating survival of our species, then it should be encouraged.  In 
particular, it seems most prudent to encourage such bonding that leads to 
successful reproduction and flourishing of the species.  Thus, our proclivity to 
encourage, or privilege, human bonding that leads to, or promises to lead to, 
successful reproduction seems reasonable; even rational and self-interested in a  
good way.8 Marriage can rightly be seen as a means of encouraging successful 
reproduction; a mechanism or tool of social regulation bent on the survival of the 
species.  In fact, marriage rules, and therefore family law, are so culturally 
significant that we even can identify their creation as such at a specific point in 
time.9
Marriage, as a social institution, can be found in every human culture in 
some manner or another.  Although the forms and rules may differ, sometimes 
   
                                                                                                                                     
wrote that Frederick bade "foster-mothers and nurses to suckle and bathe and 
wash the children, but in no ways to prattle or speak with them; for he would have 
learnt whether they would speak the Hebrew language (which had been the first), 
or Greek, or Latin, or Arabic, or perchance the tongue of their parents of whom 
they had been born. But he labored in vain, for the children could not live without 
clapping of the hands, and gestures, and gladness of countenance, and 
blandishments.”   
 
8 John Rawls developed what is called the “Veil of Ignorance” thought 
experiment. He posited that any number of people operating under a veil of 
ignorance, i.e., without knowing anything about their own personal situation, 
would choose to act based on his theory of justice: “The good is the satisfaction of 
rational desire.” See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); see also AYN 
RAND, THE FOUNTAINHEAD (1968) (theory of Rational Egoism).  
 
9 See DAVID BLANKENHORN, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE (2009). 
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dramatically, marriages, or whatever such unions are called, always involve some 
form of socially legitimized pairing of reproductive partners.10
Marriage, in another sense, is what John Austin
  The point to take 
here is that the encouragement, in human cultures, and legitimizing and/or 
regulating reproductive relationships as well as attempting to encourage, 
establish, and enforce long-term bonds between the reproducing partners, is 
ubiquitous.  Given the diversity of human cultures, that fact in itself is 
remarkable.  It also must be evidence that such bonding, if we call it marriage or 
not, is somehow essential, or at least beneficial, to our survival and triumph as a 
species and maybe its encouragement should be continued.  
11 called “a speech act.”12  
Austin asserts, it is a thing that had no existence prior but springs into existence 
suddenly if and when the proper words are spoken by a proper authority and 
recognized by a proper audience;13
                                                 
10 Id. 
 e.g., a priest asks you, within the jurisdiction 
of his granted authority, in front of proper witnesses who acknowledge it, if you 
want to be married and you respond affirmatively, “I do,” therefore it’s something 
we speak into existence; purely manufactured by us; created as if out of whole 
cloth.  This is an important perspective because if it is only what we’ve made it, 
 
11  See JOHN L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1975). 
 
12 See JOHN L. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (Geoffrey J. Warnock and J. O. 
Urmson eds. Oxford 1990) (1961). 
 
13 See also 7 JOHN R. SEARLE, "A TAXONOMY OF ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS," 
LANGUAGE, MIND, AND KNOWLEDGE  (K. Günderson ed. 1975). 
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we could re-make it in whatever manner we may choose so long as enough of us 
could be convinced to choose to do so.  We might even choose to do away with it 
altogether should we find it archaic, obsolete or otherwise no longer useful.  In 
fact, if enough of us were to be convinced that, in addition to no longer serving a 
useful purpose, marriage has become harmful in some way we could, and should, 
eliminate it altogether.  At first blush this may seem ambitiously irreverent but the 
proponents of this position also make some compelling arguments.  
Yet marriage, in still another sense, is a legal contract, or a legal status, or 
maybe both.  There are those who cannot decide.14  Be that as it may, it looks a 
little different if we inspect marriage exclusively through the lens of the law.  
Most who view marriage this way understand it as a set of promises that, once 
made, create certain legal entitlements.15
                                                 
14 In many societies marriage was a means to convey property and title.  Two 
families negotiated and formed the contract of marriage.  In modern societies, the 
individuals formed the contract.  With the rise of industrialization, land/wealth 
transfer was less central to marriage, but common provisions of the contract entail 
sexual monogamy (at least by the woman and publicly) to acknowledge the 
children born to the woman, and a promise of formality in ending the relationship.  
The status conveyed by marriage often is public recognition of having reached 
adulthood with the creation of a new unit of “family.” 
  Whether the legal recognition causes or 
 
15 Among the legal benefits of marriage are the ability to inherit from a spouse 
and include him or her on health insurance policies without tax penalties, take 
federally protected family medical leave from a job to care for the spouse or the 
spouse’s parent and return to a job, the right to make medical decisions for one’s 
spouse without having to make additional legal provisions, the right to inherit the 
spouse’s property if the spouse dies without a will, being able to adopt children 
together and both be legally recognized as the children’s parents, the right to 
collect Social Security benefits based on the others’ employment, the right to sue 
for wrongful death benefits in lawsuits, and numerous others. See 
13 
affects the social institution or vice-versa is an interesting question and it is 
significant within the legal perspective on marriage because the law treats status 
and contract issues in very different ways,16 but that particular question is not 
salient to this investigation at this point.  What is the difference and why it matters 
is interesting in and of itself but a digression of no significant import here.17
So far, I have defined marriage as an essential bond between reproductive 
counterparts, a social institution with strong religious underpinnings, a social 
construction such that we made it and could change it if we so choose, and a legal 
event that may be the equivalent of a contract or status, or both, but either way, 
entitles the participants to certain treatment by both society and the government. 
You will see, if we take all of these definitions as possible correct answers to the 
grand old question, “What is marriage?” none of them seem so utterly ridiculous 
as to deserve to be rejected out of hand.  It also seems to me that none of them 
necessarily are mutually exclusive yet, remarkably, the proponents of the various 
positions seem to treat them as such.  Below, we will look more closely at the 
  
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/marriage-rights-benefits-30190.html. 
 
16 In criminal law, e.g., it is unconstitutional to criminalize the status of “drug 
user” and racial profiling is criticized as a method of wrongly attributing a certain 
status (illegal alien) to racial characteristics thereby connecting the status of a 
person with attributes.  In civil law we allow a remedy for a breach of a contract 
for personal services but we do not force specific performance if it smacks of 
servitude.  The promises made by the parties to a marriage share that flavor.  See 
generally, E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (4th ed. 2004). 
 
17 Almost twenty years ago, Carl Schneider put forward the notion that law 
supports but does not create social institutions.  See Carl E. Schneider, The 
Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 495 (1992). 
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current marriage debate with an eye toward sorting the issues out, at least enough 
to further answer our Grand Question.  
In MARRIAGE, SEXUALITY, AND GENDER, Robin West divided the marriage 
debaters into three broad camps; “’marriage defenders,’ ‘marriage-enders,’ and 
‘marriage benders’ (or if you prefer, ‘marriage menders’)” and suggests they all 
“concur we are at a real decisional crossroads.”18
“Marriage Defenders” are those who believe marriage is an essential, even 
sacred, bond between reproductive counterparts and believe it is a necessary 
social and or religious, even divinely ordained, institution.  They like things the 
way they are and do not want change.  They do not want marriage ended or 
extended beyond its current, traditional parameters; i.e., one man and one woman.  
Those who believe marriage is simply something humanly constructed and 
therefore it can be changed or dismantled would be the “Marriage Enders.”  They 
take the position that marriage is a legal myth that we may, if not must, change 
should we discover or determine that it creates harm or even an undesirable result.  
Those who advocate that we retain marriage because it is either essentially or 
scientifically proven to be a good thing, but in a different form than the religious-
based, reproduction-themed institution we currently have are the “Marriage 
  I agree emphatically.  Because 
West’s framework seems to be helpful in making sense of the cacophony that is 
the current marriage debate respectfully, but without her permission, I will borrow 
her helpful framework. 
                                                 
18 See ROBIN WEST, MARRIAGE, SEXUALITY AND GENDER, 2.1 (2007). 
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Menders” and/or the “Marriage Benders.”  Some members of this group advocate 
extending marriage beyond the one man and one woman paradigm to include 
same-sex couples, poly-amorous couples, and even persons with no expectation 
whatsoever toward sexual relations and/or reproduction, but who see marriage 
simply as a valuable business decision or estate plan.  Because West’s 
classification system fits so well, I will employ it further and thank her for it.  
Still, a closer inspection of the understanding of each of these camps remains 
necessary to answer the question, “What is marriage?” because thus far, I am not 
entirely satisfied, much less impressed.    
Before I delve any further into our grand question, there is yet another 
perspective to consider that helps to shed light on our inquiry.   Catherine 
MacKinnon19 postulated the notion that perhaps we are not really as highly 
civilized as we think we are and that all sexual behavior is driven primarily by 
instinct, maybe even by biophysical determiners, like pheromones and hormones, 
and we have socially constructed everything else we think we know about sex and 
reproduction.  In other words, romance, seduction, love, and marriage may have 
been socially constructed to allow us to believe, or even convince us that, we are 
engaging in something more sophisticated and emotionally profound than just an 
instinctual or biophysical urge to reproduce.20
                                                 
19 See 
   
http://web.law.umich.edu/_facultybiopage/facultybiopagenew.asp?id=219. 
 
20 See generally CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1988). 
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Ms. MacKinnon’s is a fascinating theory.  Just try to imagine how 
different our world might be if we entertained it fully.  Sex might be seen as just 
another natural bodily function.  Maybe it would be a distasteful one like voiding 
waste and we would devise methods for doing it outside of the view of others. 
Perhaps it would be tolerated in public and nobody would think any more or less 
of it than we do when we see people coughing, scratching an itch, or even kissing 
each other in view of others.  What if humans shared the same attitudes about 
sexual relations and reproduction as the duck community in your local pond?  
They do not have marriages and they seem to reproduce and survive successfully.  
But we humans are different.  Our offspring are born much more 
vulnerable and for a much longer time than are the duck's, any other mammal. 
David Blankenhorn says that rearing a human infant to adulthood has got to be the 
hardest job on the planet.21
                                                 
21 David Blankenhorn is founder and president of the 
  Given the reproductive consequences of such 
unnoticed and unregulated sexual couplings, like those ducks, who will care for 
the children that are produced from these unregulated encounters?  This is a 
challenge because of the extreme incapacity of human infants and the degree of 
care they require to survive and to mature into adulthood.  Human infants need 
much more care than a baby duck.  The duckling is ambulatory, can feed himself 
so long as food is available, and needs no additional clothing or protection from 
the elements beyond that with which he is born.  In contrast, someone must 
Institute for American 
Values and the author of THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE (2009) and FATHERLESS 
AMERICA (1995). 
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provide for and care for the human mother so that she can provide for and care for 
the infant.  Our mothers need more help than the duck mothers need.  This is 
monumentally important and you’ll see why later.22
Try to imagine how the marriage debate might be different if our immense 
reproductive vulnerabilities were eliminated.  What if a human being could 
simply choose to reproduce alone and accomplish the task without rendering 
herself dependent upon others in doing so?  Would there still be a marriage 
debate, or even marriage?  I think so because I am loathe believing that “Love”
  
23
                                                 
22 See Understanding Ardi, 
 
is merely a social construction supported by a child’s rhyme.  I also think once we 
discovered that copulation leads to reproduction we would want to control it.  We 
would realize what is at stake; literally survival of our species, and we would 
http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/science/stories/2009/10/11/Sci_Ardi.ART_
ART_10-11-09_G1_VKFALPV.html. The finding of a four million year old 
skeleton suggests that bipedalism is what separates us from the other animals. It is 
possible bipedalism developed because humans needed arms to carry food back to 
the mother and infant so we had to walk upright to do so.  Bipedalism may well 
have been the catalyst of the evolutionary process that separates us from the other 
animals.  
 
23 “Love” is capitalized to invoke Plato’s notion of Love as a Form.  A “Form” is 
a perfect sample.  Plato believed that we cannot know anything about “x” until we 
can answer the question, “what is x?”  From this, he determined that there must be 
some unambiguous example of those things because even though we cannot 
explicitly define them, somehow we know them.  Plato’s theory of these perfect 
examples, his Forms, is that we are born into this world with dim recollections of 
the Forms, such as Love, Justice, Beauty, and that is why we have some 
conception of them and can find examples but yet not be able to easily answer 
questions such as, “What is Justice?” or “What is Love?” See 7 PLATO, REPUBLIC 
(Francis M. Cornford trans. Oxford University Press 1941).  
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want to regulate it.  That just makes sense.  The obvious way to regulate 
reproduction is to regulate mating activity.  Some think that is a good thing and 
others find it overly restrictive, but I think we all would concur that, in fact, 
marriage regulates, or may even be intended [whether by a god, natural science, 
biological nature or something else is still open for debate] to regulate 
reproductive conduct in some way.  And I think that all of the camps in the 
marriage debate would have to agree that marriage, whatever else it may or may 
not be and whether or not it was intended to do so imposes order on reproductive 
conduct.   
Marriage orders sexual relations in the same way that enforceable laws 
generally order human behavior; it defines who may do what without risking 
negative repercussions.  Even if only as in the so-called “animal world” of our 
imaginary duck pond, there are at least rules of engagement as to who mates with 
whom.  In MacKinnon’s world we could presume we would have at least those 
sorts of rules as well.  If MacKinnon is correct, it makes sense that we may even 
have constructed belief systems, such as romance, seduction, and “love 
everlasting,” in order to regulate it.  After all, we do have a long history of trying 
to control mating and reproduction.24
                                                 
24 One such example was the scheme of the State of Virginia forbidding marriage 
between “whites” and “coloreds” to prevent “mongrel breeds.”  The law was 
found to violate due process and equal protection in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 
1 (1967).  Other examples of attempts to control reproduction are compulsory 
sterilization programs legislatively enforced by various states beginning with 
Indiana in 1907.  Those required by law to be sterilized included criminals, the 
  Is it possible that marriage, at its bottom, 
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may be simply a socially-constructed means of regulating mating and 
reproduction?  If so, arguendo, one of those rules might be to engage in 
reproductive conduct/acceptable mating rituals in which you must employ 
techniques such as romance and seduction rather than physical force or 
intimidation.  Moreover, if the mating produces offspring, the male progenitor 
must remain with the female who gives birth to his child until the child reaches a 
stage of development such that the child is not totally dependent upon the female.  
To do this, the two of you will rear the child together in hopes that it survives to 
become a productive adult and does not become a burden on society.   
This answer to the grand old question, “What is Marriage?” is attractive in 
its simplicity but, grossly unattractive if we fully admit all of its far-reaching 
implications.25
                                                                                                                                     
mentally retarded, epileptics, the deaf, the blind, the mentally ill and the 
physically deformed.  See DANIEL KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS GENETICS 
AND THE USE OF HUMAN HEREDITY (1985).  Sterilization for criminals was found 
to be unconstitutional in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 513 (1942), but 
continued into the 1970s for others.  See Paul Lombardo, “Eugenic Sterilization 
Laws,” http://www.eugenicsarchive.org/html/eugenics/essay8text.html.  
  Among those unattractive possibilities is a social structure 
constructed along lines of entitlement that differentiate between those who can 
breed and those who cannot.  But this is a digression I have to leave aside and 
return to what the marriage defenders, enders, and mender-benders would teach 
 
25 For a diverse discussion of the history of laws regarding marriage, legitimacy, 
bastardy and public policy, See Leslie J. Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage 
and the Clash Between Custody and Child Support, 42 IND. L. REV. 611 (2009). 
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us with an ever watchful eye toward the ambitious goal of distilling, “what is 
marriage?”   
The Marriage Defenders take a fairly straight path through history (no pun 
intended) so I will begin with their platform and take up the others in turn.  Here I  
find it useful to return to the work of Robin West,26
The traditionalists believe that marriage is divinely ordained and 
inspired,
 who, like all good legal 
scholars, excels in the arts of examination and classification.  She breaks down 
the marriage defenders camp even further; into three more sub-groups: the 
“neonatural lawyers” the “social utilitarians” and the “virtue theorists.”  I have 
different monikers for them but I draw largely the same distinctions, albeit in 
broad strokes.  What she calls the neonatural lawyers, I call traditionalists and/or 
religious fanatics.  
27
                                                 
26 Robin West is a professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center where 
she teaches in the areas of constitutional law and jurispruence, among others.  
Among her published works are RE-IMAGIING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE 
INTERPRETATIONS OF FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2003); 
RIGHTS (2000); CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997); PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEEN AMENDMENT (1994); NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, 
AND LAW (LAW, MEANING, AND VIOLENCE) (1993).  
 related to reproduction and child-rearing, and therefore rightly limited 
to reproductive pairs of one man and one woman.  They view marriage as not 
 
27 Genesis is a book of the Christian Bible that tells us that Adam and Eve were 
the first of God’s people and one was a man and one was a woman and they were 
married by God and reproduced.  Genesis 2:18-24.  The Wedding of Cana is a 
New Testament reference for the biblical basis of marriage as one of the seven (7) 
Sacraments for Roman Catholics. See John 2:1-11.   
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only necessary but also sufficient to order human reproductive conduct.  For 
them, marriage is worthy of celebration and protection because it is sacred, has 
always been that way, and therefore should continue.  Put shortly, it’s not broken 
and does not need to be fixed.   
West’s Utilitarian’s are “my” social scientists.  They study the grand old 
question, “What is marriage?” by examining human behavior as if analyzing 
subjects in a laboratory.  They have determined simply that marriage works.  It’s 
good for us.  It increases the overall well-being of its participants making them 
happier, healthier and wealthier than their non-married counterparts.28
West’s virtue theorists are “my” philosophers.  Like all good philosophers, 
they have investigated our grand question by looking at the human self and 
whether or not marriage enhances or deteriorates that human self.  They hold to 
  Because of 
its clear-cut utility, marriage should be encouraged.  Some of the members of this 
camp even go so far as to suggest that if it works for one man and one woman 
there is no reason why it will not also work for two women or two men or even 
some sort of polyamorous group of people.  After all, if two is good, maybe more 
is better?   Of course, there are others in this camp that believe their compatriots 
are running amok and that marriage works so well, at least in part if not 
essentially, because it is limited to reproductive pairs.  Reproduction is a sort of 
built-in biological foundation for the coupling and part of why it works for us.  
                                                 
28 See LINDA WAITE AND MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY 
MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY 
(2000). 
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the position that marriage is worthy of defending because it helps to create a 
heightened sense of commitment and responsibility to an “other” human being.  
This commitment entails a like-kind commitment to a larger societal or social 
group, which in turn helps to stave off, or at least suppress, the ultra-selfish, ultra-
individualist self.  This is good because the completely self-interested and socially 
unconnected individualist self is detrimental to the virtuous self, by definition.  
The virtuous self should be encouraged in all of us because it is good, in and of 
itself.   
These subgroups of Marriage Defenders have very different agendas and 
commitments; sometimes even conflicting ones.  Yet, it seems to me, that they all 
fit neatly into the defenders camp because they all see marriage as worthy of not 
only our protection, but also our celebration.  (Strange bed-fellows indeed!)  The 
oddness of this coalition should not be lost on us.  It is as complex as the tension 
in India between the cultural groups that venerate the cow and those that eat beef 
as a food source.  They both want the cow to remain around, albeit for very 
different and mutually exclusive ends.   The Marriage Enders camp is just as 
diverse.  
Among the Marriage Enders is the sub-group I call constitutional theorists.  
They believe that marriage, as both a social and legal institution is infirm when 
measured against some of our most treasured constitutional precepts.  For 
instance, the United States Constitution calls for a separation of church and State.  
There can be no mistake that marriage survived for much of our human history as 
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a device of, and under the control of, churches and as a matter of Canon law.  
Only by a few accidents of history was the Canon law merged with the English 
common law from which our own law developed.  A viable argument exists that 
our constitutional promise of a separation of church and State entails that we must 
correct this mistake and give marriage back to the church.  After all, the 
separation of church and state was so desirable to our constitutional founders 
because it was designed to protect the State from the church; to keep the church 
from imposing its own rule.   
Just because the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that marriage is a 
“fundamental right” albeit, even if only for one heterosexual mating pair, does not 
mean it is correct.  That same judicial body has condoned slavery,29
                                                 
29 See Dredd Scott v. Sandford, 60 
 and the 
U.S. 393 (1857), which held that slaves 
imported into states where slavery was outlawed by their owners did not gain 
freedom, despite the fact that the states where they now resided did not legally 
recognize that one human being could own another. The court specifically held 
that the plaintiff, a man held in slavery but moved to a free state, had no standing 
to sue because he was not a “person” under the law.  Dredd Scott has never been 
expressly overruled, but the Fourteenth Amendment has nullified most of the 
decision's holding. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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internment of U.S. citizens without due process of law,30 and later changed its 
tune.31
Another constitutional argument for the end of marriage, and one that, 
unlike the separation of church and state argument above, may have a little more 
vigor, is that marriage, as it is currently construed, violates our beloved Equal 
Protection clauses.
  
32
                                                 
30 See Korematsu v. United States, 
  The Equal Protection promise of the U.S. Constitution, and 
of most state constitutions, is that persons who are similarly situated must be 
treated similarly under the law.  A law that treats different classes of people 
differently, where the classifications are either irrational or based in malignant 
bias, does not make constitutional muster and must be struck down as infirm.   
323 U.S. 214 (1944), which upheld the 
constitutionality of the executive order permitting the seizing of property and 
internment of Americans of Japanese descent – regardless of age, place of birth, 
and military service – during the Second World War. No charges were brought 
against any of the interred; none were given any due process rights.  Korematsu 
has not been expressly overturned but it has been disavowed information came to 
light in 1983 that the Government had submitted false information to the court. 
 
31 Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that people of color 
could lawfully be segregated from whites.  In this case a man with one great-
grandparent of African descent was arrested for refusing to vacate a train care for 
“white only passengers—because the court found the racially separate train cars 
are not to be a “badge of inferiority.”) with Brown v. Bd. Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954) (finding that “separate educational facilities are inherently unequal” and 
insisting on the desegregation of public schools with “deliberate speed.") 
 
32 The Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
both offer the same promise, due process. See U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV.  
There are two due process clauses because the Fifth Amendment is applicable 
only to the Federal government, while the Fourteenth Amendment applies the 
principle to the various State governments. Id.  
25 
It is clear that married people are treated differently by the government.  
They receive greater benefits than do unmarried people.33
Another sub-group within the “enders” camp is the feminist voice.  These 
advocates, most notably among them Martha Fineman,
  Is this distinction 
appropriate or does it somehow violate the equal protection promise?  For the 
distinction to be sustainable, at the least there must be a rational governmental 
basis for benefiting marriage.  All I can come up with for reasons to privilege 
marriage is the regulation of reproduction.  But that is a big one.  Be that as it 
may, this important question is much more complex than it may seem at first so it 
too will be set aside as a diversion because there are more marriage Enders to be 
sorted out.  
34
                                                 
33 A 1996 government study found that there are at least 1,049 protections, rights, 
and responsibilities that come with marriage under federal law alone. These 
protections include access to health care and medical decision making for a 
partner and children, parenting and immigration rights, inheritance, taxation, 
Social Security and other government benefits, rules for ending a relationship 
while protecting both parties and the ability to pool resources to buy or transfer 
property without adverse tax consequences. See 
 suggest that marriage 
must be ended because it holds in place a long-standing misogynistic system that 
http://www.drummajorinstitute.org/library/article.php?ID=5518.    
Section 3 of DOMA provides that marriage is defined as the union between a man 
and a woman for all federal-law purposes, of which there are 1,138. See 
http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.uscongress/legislation.104hr3396. 
 
34 Martha A. Fineman is law professor at Emory University.  She is founder and 
director of the Feminism and Legal Theory Project.  Her books include THE 
AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004) and THE NEUTERED 
MOTHER, AND THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 
(1995). 
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disadvantages women.  Ending marriage will create three clear social benefits: it 
will end the violence we have come to know as “domestic violence,”35 it will put 
the State out of the business of policing sexual behavior between consenting 
adults,36 and it will remove the wall of privatization around care-giving and the 
impoverishment that care-giving can cause.37
The mender-benders would have us imagine marriage as an egalitarian, or 
at least communitarian, enterprise between consenting adults, such that the labor 
of care-giving is equitably divided.  Indeed, this is compelling.  Under this 
perspective, marriage encourages the bonding of individuals, generally, whether 
for the purpose of future reproduction and care of the young, for the present care 
of the partners, or for the future shared care of their families.  In their view, 
although marriage is a good thing, it should be fixed so as to be more inclusive of 
  Recall here those sturdy little 
ducklings as compared to the ever-so-vulnerable human infants.  Upon inspection, 
those all actually seem to be laudable goals and again, not necessarily mutually 
exclusive ones either.  The important point here is that once again very different 
points of view about marriage seem to fit together quite nicely when we look 
through a large enough lens.  Staying with this big picture, the final collective 
camp in the marriage debate is the marriage mender-benders camp.   
                                                 
35 See Martha A. Fineman, “Why Marriage?,” Va. Soc. Pol. and Law 9, 262 
(2001). 
 
36 Id. at 263. 
 
37 Id. at 267. 
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additional, non-traditional, reproductive couples.  Marriage for the mutual care of 
family fortunes might even be acceptable.  The tangible benefits, including the 
financial entitlements that flow from marriage, are real and should be available to 
all of us just like any other benefit society has to offer and that is regulated by the 
promise of equal protection.  Marriage is a good thing that just needs to be 
allocated or distributed more justly.  It just needs to be modernized so it is sits a 
little further from its religious and patriarchal underpinnings in order to continue 
to serve our social needs of today.   
With all of the camps accounted for, let’s again recount what we have 
learned about the grand old question.  Marriage is not only necessary, and maybe 
sufficient, to order human reproductive behavior but also worthy of celebration 
and protection for several reasons.  It increases the overall well-being of its 
participants making them happier, healthier and wealthier than their non-married 
counterparts.  It creates a heightened sense of commitment and responsibility to an 
“other” human being which entails larger commitments to the family of the 
“other” and therefore to a larger sense of kinship and community.  But it may also 
be an archaic institution that holds in place and masks certain known evils like 
misogynistic violence.  It may be a mechanism that allows the State to be the 
morality police in contravention of some of our most dearly loved constitutional 
principles of individual liberty.  It may hinder, rather than aid, our survival and 
prosperity as a species because it devalues the care-giving that is left out of public 
view.  It may, by its very definition, mandate inequality of the sexes due to the 
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different physical roles the sexes play in reproduction.  So, the question remains 
whether these problems may be subject to some other, better remedy.   
We humans survived the Dark Ages and two world wars.  Surely, as a 
species, we could survive the reform of a single social institution such as 
marriage?  It seems that, for all their fervor, the voices of the current marriage 
debate have not given us a complete and sufficient answer to the grand old 
question, “What is Marriage?” so that we might pick a winner.  For that matter, 
the debate still rages so there must be more work to be done.  I simply will not 
accept that there is a social dilemma that is irresolvable by human ingenuity 
and/or invention.  Doing so might entail that civilization as we know it is doomed 
to fail and that humans might not remain the dominant species on this planet.  I 
simply will not admit that, not yet anyway.  Perhaps an historical and/or 
anthropological perspective will serve us better.  Let’s look further back for our 
answer.  Maybe history will shine a light for us?  From where did marriage come?    
 B: A Brief History of Marriage 
In ancient Greek and Roman history, wherein all of western civilization is 
alleged to have its roots, marriage is more fundamental than the State.38  It grows 
from, “a natural feeling, for nature has made man even more of a pairing than a 
political animal.”39
                                                 
38  See 1 THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, ch. 2 (Ernest Barker trans. Oxford Univ. 
Press 1962). 
  
  A Roman, Lucretius, believed that “male and female learnt to 
39 Id. 
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live together in a stable union and to watch over their joint progeny.”40  Later, 
John Locke tells us that the “first society” was between a man and a woman, as 
his wife, and defines marriage as, “a Communion and Right in one another’s 
bodies, as is necessary to its chief end, Procreation.”41  But, Locke further allows 
that “the ends” of marriage is, “procreation and mutual Support and 
Assistance.”42  And later yet, Frederick Engels thought that marriage is the, 
“world historic defeat of the female sex” in that the “mother-right” of 
reproduction was overcome by obsessions with private property and capitalism 
and, “the woman was degraded, enthralled, the slave of the man’s lust, a mere 
instrument for breeding children.”43
Is there necessarily an inextricable link between marriage and 
reproduction?  Marriage might be what anthropologists call, “pair-bonding,”
  As contrary or controversial as these 
definitions may be, they have in common that they equate marriage, in some way, 
with reproduction, or more specifically, the biology of reproduction.   
44
                                                 
40 See THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE (Lucretius trans. Latham 1994). 
 the 
establishment of a stable, long-term reproductive relationship, with a single 
 
41 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 318-19 (1680-1690). 
 
42 Id. at 321-22. 
 
43 See FREDERICK ENGLES, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND 
THE STATE, 68-69 (1884). 
 
44 Claude Levi-Strauss first observed this phenomenon. See BERNARD CHAPAIS, 
PRIMEVAL KINSHIP: HOW PAIR-BONDING GAVE BIRTH TO HUMAN SOCIETY 
(2008). 
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spouse.  Peter J. Wilson describes the process of human kinship as beginning 
with, “the copulation of two adults of opposite sex.”45
Before then, throughout prehistory, it appears as though humans 
understood that the female body is the point of production of babies.  We have art 
and other artifacts that confirm, from about 40,000 years ago, that there was no 
long-term bonding of male-female couples and little or no evidence of social 
fatherhood.
  It seems there is an 
undeniable link between marriage and reproduction.  Marriage, at least as a social 
institution, must in some way, have been constructed to address human 
reproduction.  Given that reproduction entails care-giving necessary to see an 
extremely fragile and vulnerable infant survive to adulthood it is indeed an awe-
inspiring task that may very well require more than one of us to accomplish well.  
At least that’s how it looks if we look to where marriage first appears in recorded 
history; in the Tigris-Euphrates and Nile River valleys.   
46  The mysterious ability of the female to create a new life was 
powerful.  Religion took on a female-centered focus.  This Mother-Goddess 
culture is evidenced in ancient burials.  The earliest human burials found did not 
include men.47
                                                 
45 See PETER J. WILSON, MAN THE PROMISING PRIMATE, 55 (1983). 
   
 
46  See MARIJA GIMBUTAS, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE GODDESS: THE WORLD OF 
OLD EUROPE, 342 (1992). 
 
47 Id. at 283-331. 
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But something changed.  None of us can be sure but, if we listen to Engels 
and Gimbutas we might be lead to the proposition that men discovered the part 
they play in reproduction and set out to control it.  It might be attributable to 
evolutionary changes in our bodies.  As our brains got larger, our heads got 
bigger, and infants had to born earlier so that they could be born at all given an 
understanding of the physical limitations of natural birth.  Maybe not, but either 
way, the important point here is that something changed.  Marriage came into 
existence. 
Indeed, one of the remarkable contributions of the ancient Mesopotamians 
and Egyptians was the institution of marriage.  Civilization means, if anything, 
the creation of social institutions.  Social institutions are social processes held in 
place by sets of rules that are believed to apply to all members of the society for 
the benefit of the society as a whole.  Marriage may have been one of the greatest 
of these institutions.  For the first time, in what has been called the world’s first 
city, Eridu, located on the west bank of the Euphrates River in lower 
Mesopotamia, archaeologists found burial plots that not only contained women 
and children of related bloodlines, but also men, presumably fathers/husbands.48
                                                 
48 See GWENDOLYN LEICK, MESOPOTAMIA: THE INVENTION OF THE CITY, 13-14 
(2001).  
  
Here is where we can look for the development of social rules that bind the 
mating couple, or reproductive pair, together.   Here is where we find the birth of 
marriage as a social institution.   
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Indeed, one of the earliest legal codes, The Laws of Lipit-Ishtar, who ruled 
that area of the world around 1900 BCE, includes a prologue wherein the king 
describes his many great feats.  Not the least of them is having, “established 
justice in the lands” because, “[he] made the father support his children.”49  In 
fact, about a third of the known laws of Lipit-Ishtar relate to what we would today 
call family law.  Indeed, they dealt with the same types of problems we still 
grapple with.  For instance, in terms of caring for his children, a man was bound 
to “provide grain, oil, and clothing” even for the “harlot” who had borne him 
children.  But, if he was married “the harlot shall not live in the house with his 
wife.”  Further, “the children which the harlot has borne him shall be his heirs” so 
long as his wife has borne him no children.50
Dadusha, who ruled Eshnunna, near what is now Bagdad, in about 1800 
BCE, adds to our understanding of early marriage by dictating that it be 
voluntary.  Importantly, those who had to voluntarily agree to the marriage did 
not include the bride.  Marriage required a contract between the man and the 
   A clear example of family.  
                                                 
49 See MARTHA T. ROTH, LAW COLLECTIONS FROM MESOPOTAMIA AND ASIA 
MINOR, 25 (1997). 
 
50 See Code of Lipit-Ishtar 27 (1870-1860 BCE). 
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parents of the girl before she could be considered the groom’s wife.51
Perhaps the most widely known source of ancient law today is the famous 
Code of Hammurabi.  It dates from Babylonia, about 1750 BCE.  Of the 275 laws 
of this code about 65 relate to family law.  Hammurabi’s Code includes 
provisions relating to cohabitation, adultery, divorce, and even a husband who has 
been taken captive in war.
  Here, the 
contract was a promise to provide gifts over time.  Some people have interpreted 
this as an early description of a dowry or a bride-price: money or goods paid to a 
man for the maintenance of a daughter who is to become his wife.  Incidentally, 
this is often where those who say marriage is about a contract to transfer property 
will point.  However, it is just as logical and reasonable to understand this gesture 
not in strictly economic terms, but as a conjoining of the two families in social 
and financial responsibility with each other.  The latter perspective is more 
reasonable when we understand the gifts were obligatory on both families and 
expected to be of essentially equal value.  This joining of families to extend the 
circle of social responsibility through marriage sounds like a laudable goal to me.   
52
                                                 
51 See LAW COLLECTIONS FROM MESOPOTAMIA AND ASIA MINOR, supra note 50, 
at 63 (Laws of Eshnunna). 
  It also contains provisions for contracts, bride-prices, 
dowry, and the support of children and their mothers.  It is important to note here 
that the rights of a wife were closely linked to whether or not she bore children 
 
52 See LAW COLLECTIONS FROM MESOPOTAMIA AND ASIA MINOR, supra note 50, 
at 205 (Laws of Eshnunna). 
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during the marriage; another clear link between marriage and reproduction.  
Hammurabi’s Code also changed the role of males with regard to reproduction, 
from one of inseminator to one of provider, by instituting and/or enforcing the 
rules of marriage and of parentage.  Unfortunately, this conflation, of marriage 
and parentage, may have solved a problem at the time but, maybe more than we 
need; like egg-salad at a picnic; if you make more than you need, the rest will sit 
around and poison someone later.  It is this conflation of marriage and parentage 
that is at the crux of the modern marriage debate; and the source of tension 
between children and their rights to parents and adults and their rights to their 
children.  Many who tout the extension of marriage to gays and lesbians do so 
because it will legitimate the children being raised by gay and lesbian parents.53
What have the arguments shown us in terms of an answer to the grand old 
question, “What is marriage?” The origins of marriage seem to be the same as any 
other social institution:  We made it up.  We created it and spoke it into existence.  
We did so to ensure that children and their mothers would be provided for and 
that society would flourish.  By marrying the male progenitor to the female 
progenitor we are better able to ensure that reproduction is successful such that 
the mother and child will survive and become a productive member of, but not be 
a burden on, the group.    
  
                                                 
53 See Professor Nancy Polikoff, The New “Illegitimacy”: Revisiting Why 
Parentage Should Not Depend on Marriage, Conference at American University 
Washington College of Law (March 25-26, 2011).  
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The emergence of marriage as a social institution and laws to regulate it 
signal the change from a female-centered model of reproduction to a male-
centered one.  As if it suddenly occurred to us, collectively, that either males play 
a part in reproduction and therefore they too have a responsibility to society or, 
that something was to be gained from controlling reproduction and ensuring that 
females, and the children they bear, are, in some way, the responsibility of a male 
progenitor.   Marriage was a means of widespread enforcement of that new idea.  
Marriage was a necessary social institution, needed to sort out which man is 
responsible for which women and which children.  So marriage very much is 
about reproduction and the rearing of children but, more importantly, it’s about 
assuring a provider, for children and their mothers, of the social benefits of 
civilization.  Marriage must have something to do with providing for the offspring 
who are the result of reproductive conduct that leaves the female less able to care 
for herself as she is then relegated to the incubating, gestating, birthing, and 
continued survival of the children.    
Some would say that the notion of legitimacy is integral to the notion of 
marriage.  Illegitimacy is the legal status of a child having no legal father.  This 
changes the focus from “father” to “legal father.”  A legal father is one who can 
be forced to acknowledge and provide for the child.  Logically, a “legal father” 
must be one that is “recognized” or “acknowledged” or even” “established” or 
“documented,” all of which seem to indicate a criteria of distinction wherein an 
authority, presumably the State in today’s society, may impose a duty.  Of course, 
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that rule is marriage and it is imposed by the government and enforced through 
law.  A male is a legal father only once our laws or courts recognize him as such.  
Any healthy adult male may be a biological progenitor of a child but only our 
laws or courts can pronounce him a father and bestow upon him the 
corresponding bundle of rights and obligations regarding a child.  Under our laws, 
the husband of a woman who gives birth to a child is presumed to be the legal 
father of the child.54
 Is that it?  Have we discovered the essence of marriage?  What we have 
discovered is that marriage is a rule, or set of rules, that ensure a man will provide 
for his children and the woman who bears them.   Is that enough?  Surely it will 
not silence all the voices in the marriage debate, if it would silence any.  So, there 
still must be more.  Leaving history behind, I’ll look next to the current legal 
treatment of marriage for further enlightenment.  Much of the current marriage 
debate swirls around the legal treatment of the distinction between married and 
not married.  Being married entails different treatment from the State and now, 
only some may marry while others may not.  Because marriage, as a social 
institution works, it survived and evolved.  In fact, it still may be evolving.  That 
would help explain the on-going disharmony.  Today’s marriage debate is not 
new, only a new emergence of long-standing issues. 
 
 Clearly marriage has come a long way from requiring a man to give oil 
and grain to the harlot who bears his child as the result of their sexual encounters.  
                                                 
54 See generally Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
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Still, a contemporary legal analysis of marriage undoubtedly still is deeply 
concerned with rights and responsibilities to each other and to shared progeny, 
just as it was at the beginnings of marriage.  Many legal determinations, not just 
parentage, turn on whether or not one is married.  One of the most obvious, of 
course, is who is entitled to file a “joint” tax return.  Most Americans are required 
by law to file a tax return with the Internal Revenue Service every year.  There is 
a financial benefit to filing a “joint” return but only “married couples” may file 
such a return and, therefore, are entitled to the financial benefit.  We encourage 
marriage by dolling out benefits.  Because of those benefits that marriage has 
become the battleground upon which we fight over what sorts of relationships it 
can accommodate; but again, I digress.   
 The first and simplest contemporary definition of marriage is that it is a 
contract.  A contract is a set of promises between two (or more!) people such that 
a failure to perform the promise entails a remedy of some kind to make the 
receiver of the broken promise again whole.55
                                                 
55 A contract is “an agreement between two or more parties creating obligations 
that are enforceable or otherwise recognizable at law.”  See BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 322 (6th ed. 1991). 
  At first blush, this seems simple 
enough, but marriage as a contract requires further analysis.  If marriage is a 
contract, we ought to be able to discern the promises made by each party, what 
constitutes a failure to perform them, and the remedy required should such a 
failure be proven.   
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 Proceeding as any reasonable legal analysis should, we must ask, “what 
are the terms of a marriage contract?”  A legal contract requires an offer of 
express terms, acceptance of the offer, and a bargained for exchange of something 
of value between the parties, called consideration.  We require consideration 
because a promise alone is not a contract; i.e., our courts do not enforce all 
promises, just the ones that are bargained for in an exchange of some kind of 
value.56
 If I promise you I will wash your car someday, you will not get a court to 
enforce my bare promise.  My promise is a unilateral promise and you did not 
give me anything in exchange for it.  However, if I promise you I will wash your 
car if you will clean my garage and you have cleaned my garage, then a court will 
force me to see that your car gets washed.  Our traded labor is the bargained-for 
exchange that makes our mutual promises an enforceable contract.  This is a 
bilateral contract because both parties have bargained for the promise of the other.   
   This is an important foundational concept so I will spend a few more 
words explaining it.   
 There is another important definition of contract; a unilateral contract.  
This is a contract where there is a promise on one side only and that promise 
becomes enforceable by its own conditions.  For instance, if I tell you that I will 
make you lunch if you mow my yard, I am not obligated to make you lunch 
unless or until you mow my yard.  In fact, until you start mowing, I can withdraw 
                                                 
56 The value can be as small as a single peppercorn, but it must have value to the 
parties.   
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my offer and no contract has been made.  Without a contract, promises are 
unenforceable by the courts.  Now, if you’re thinking what I am, application of 
this notion of a bilateral contract to the institution of marriage raises more 
questions than it answers.   
 All marriages begin with a set of promises.  Traditionally, the parties to a 
marriage, at the least, promise that the marriage will endure “until death do we 
part” meaning it is meant to be a promise that will last for an entire lifetime.  
Other promises are so well-known that most of us can recite them; “for better or 
worse, in sickness and in health,” we promise to “love, honor, and cherish” or in 
some cases, “love, honor and obey.”  Some more contemporary marriage 
promises include more specific behaviors or conduct chosen by the marriage 
partners but it seems that the historical roots of the traditional marriage promises 
can be found in the ancient codes of Mesopotamia.  Obligations to a particular 
woman that once were forced upon a man who begat a child with her are now 
promises made even before anyone is begotten.  Clearly some connection between 
the ancient code and the modern promises is indisputable.  In a marriage 
ceremony promises are exchanged and that takes marriage a step closer to being a 
contract between individuals.   
 It also seems that there are consequences for breaking such promises.  The 
ending of the marriage, its legal dissolution through the courts, brings with it the 
potential end of the benefits.  If the marriage was of long duration, or under 
certain other circumstances, not only the husband but the wife could find herself 
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or himself obligated to continue to provide support for a spouse after dissolution 
of the marriage and even whether or not the marriage produced offspring.57
 What then is the final requirement for a marriage contract—consideration.  
Consideration is the bargained for exchange that makes the promise(s) 
enforceable as a legal contract.  Recall that in the very earliest times of marriage 
the exchange was economic, mandated, and public.  The families of the bride and 
groom were required to exchange gifts; i.e. things that held value in their culture.  
In many cultures it was not the bride and groom who decided who would marry 
but rather it was a bargain struck by their parents.   
  
These rules have changed dramatically in recent history.  We now allow no-fault 
divorces where one party may simply change his or her mind about wanting to be 
married and the court will grant a divorce even if the other party has not breached 
any of the marital promises.  “No-fault” divorce is a relatively new development 
and divorces for cause still exist.  Marriage is a set of promises that, if breached, 
will afford the non-breaching party a remedy.   
                                                 
57 Alimony is the support of a former spouse after the dissolution of a marriage.  It 
was first provided in both the Code of Hammurabi and the Justinian Code of the 
later Roman Empire. Historically it was paid to “innocent” women, that is, those 
who were abandoned, because women were unable to earn a respectable living 
and legal disabilities prevented women from owning property.  Awarding alimony 
also mirrored the view that marriage was a lifetime commitment.  Increasingly, 
fault, such as an act of adultery, is no longer considered in allocating alimony.  
Neither is gender.  Since the holding in Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), states 
have had to consider an ex-husband's right to support equally with an ex-wife's.  
For an article on the growing trend of men receiving alimony see Anita Raghaven, 
Men Receiving Alimony Want a Little Respect; Modern Males Say Living Off the 
Ex-Wife is No Cause for Shame, WALL ST. J., April 1, 2008; see also 
http://online.wsj.com/article/sb120700651883978623.html. 
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In some cultures, this practice survives even today.  In fact, it is commonly 
dealt with in our courts.  Lawyers argue that certain gifts (family heirloom 
jewelry) given by the groom’s family to the bride during a traditional Hindi 
wedding ceremony are not actually given to her as gifts of her own to keep or 
dispose of at her discretion, but rather are intended for the offspring she is 
expected to bear with her husband and she only held them in trust for the 
husband’s family heirs.  If she has not produced such offspring and is divorcing 
the man such that no offspring will be possible, she must return the gifts, but not 
to the husband, to his parents.   
Others have argued or suggested that over time there are other places to 
look for the bargained for exchange needed to deem marriage a contract.  Some 
look to the nature of the relationship of the parties.  The American traditional 
marriage arrangement of the middle of the last century we could decide that the 
exchange was purely economic but between the parties, not their parents.  
Moreover, the bargain was sexual submission and caretaking (homemaking, 
child-rearing, elder-care, etc.) from the bride in exchange for housing, food, 
clothing, medicine from the groom.  These items were physical necessities of 
survival in civilized industrial society that she could not provide for herself.  An 
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argument has been proffered that marriage is little more than prostitution which is 
an economic bargained for exchange of sex for money.58
Therefore it appears after this cursory examination, that there is evidence 
to hold that contemporary marriage could rightly be seen as a contract.  But what 
of those naysayers who urge instead that contemporary marriage is a status?  They 
teach us that “married” is a noun; a label that conveys meaning and understanding 
that a certain set of entitlements, duties, liabilities, or more is connected to the 
label.  For instance, the legal status of “landlord” implies certain obligations and 
entitlements relating to a “tenant.”   
   
At first blush this notion of marriage as a legal status seems to help answer 
our grand old question in that we now have comparisons.  However, upon further 
examination, even though these comparisons answer some questions, like “can 
there be a wife without a husband?” it raises more questions than it answers.  For 
instance, what precisely are the parameters of the status?  Are the responsibilities 
and entitlements of the status universal?  Is the status exclusive of all others?  
Even more problematic for making a thorough comparison, some legal statuses 
are not necessarily voluntary, or mutable:  race and gender come to mind.59
                                                 
58 “Marriage is for woman the commonest mode of livelihood, and the total 
amount of undesired sex endured by women is probably greater in marriage than 
in prostitution.” BERTRAND RUSSELL, MARRIAGE AND MORALS (1970). 
   
 
59 Here, I include gender because I believe that gender and sex are fully 
distinguishable categories of human identity.  Sex exists on a continuum between 
male and female while gender’s continuum runs from masculine through 
feminine.  They are not dependent on each other.  The assumption that it is 
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Be that as it may, the bigger problem I have with this perspective is that 
the so-called social status of being married is not at all clear.  Although I can see 
where marriage may appear to be a transactional status; i.e., these two people 
have entered into a contract to marry and therefore acquire the status of 
“spouses.” that still seems to me like the status change is relational to the parties 
to the contract.  No contract means no status.  This suggests that it is really the 
marriage contract that  matters and marriage is just the state of being bound by the 
contract -- or not.  If this perspective is accurate then the entire body of rules we 
commonly refer to as family law might rightly be viewed simply as exemptions 
from the law regulating interactions between strangers such tort, contract, and 
property law.   
If family law is viewed as a set of exemptions to the ordinary rules of 
human interactions, such as tort, contract and property law, there must a status to 
be achieved that affords one the opportunity to claim the exemption.  And the 
exemption must be as a desired or desirable benefit.  If I agree to take on the 
status of being your “husband” and you take on status of my “wife” then we have 
obligated ourselves to each other under the law.  We now are beholden to the 
State to conduct ourselves within certain parameters or risk punishment.  Is this 
somehow different or even better than the set of rules to which we could have 
bound ourselves if instead we entered into what looks more like a business, rather 
                                                                                                                                     
“correct” or “natural” for sex and gender to coincide in a predictable set, such as 
male/masculine, stems from a misguided and unwitting dependence on the social 
constructions of gender.   
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than personal, status?  Why not, “landlord” and “tenant” or “employer” and 
“employee” status?  Because the status is not based on the transaction between us, 
it is based on the relationship between us.   
Marriage is a unique type of status in precisely this way.  It is not based on 
a transaction (read here: contract), rather it is based on the personal relationship 
between us and the State’s need and authority to regulate that relationship.  Why 
does the State regulate relationships?  We have a need to regulate reproduction; in 
an effort to prevent relegating the female to a position of either inability or 
decreased ability to provide for her own needs and those of her children by 
deriving support from the male progenitor.  We’ve come full circle.  Recall Lipit-
Ishtar’s pride in announcing his great feat of forcing a man to provide for his 
children and their mother(s)?  So, if marriage is a status, the status is that of 
potential breeder, not necessarily just as a contractor with a duty to perform 
certain duties and an entitlement to receive certain benefits.   In this way, and only 
this way, marriage, as a status, makes sense.60
We must not lose sight of the grand old question, “What is marriage?” 
What progress can we now announce in answering it?   Marriage is a social and 
legal institution with a ubiquitous long-standing history.  It is a contract-like bond 
between spouses, and possibly their families, that achieves for the individuals the 
  
                                                 
60 This sits squarely with the current marriage laws of most states; i.e., Arizona 
forbids a marriage between first cousins unless one of them is at least 65 years old 
or they prove to a judge that one of them cannot reproduce. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 25-101B (1996).  
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status of potential breeders thereby regulating reproduction and helping to ensure 
the successful rearing of offspring and survival of the species.  Surely we have not 
yet discovered an answer to the grand question that will help us determine a 
correct path to silence the current marriage debate.  It still seems as though maybe 
all the voices in the cacophony are right, in at least some way.  There must be 
more to this puzzle and religion has yet to offer up her bounty of knowledge on 
the topic.   
 C: Religion and Marriage 
In part because I am a product of my culture, I will focus primarily on the 
Christian religion.61  I also choose this focus because Catholicism is an essential 
Christian religion and Catholic leaders have been most vociferous about sharing 
publicly the Catholic view.62
                                                 
61  In using “Christian religion,” I mean to include the entire Judeo-Christian 
religious world.  In my opinion this encompasses Islam as well because, as I 
understand it, Muslims, like Jews and Christians, recognize themselves as 
receiving the promise of the single God of Abraham and consider themselves his 
descendents through his son Ishmael.  Jews and Christians are understood as his 
descendents through Abraham’s son Isaac.  
   Recall that Lipit-Ishtar, Hammarabi, and Dadusha 
ruled mankind about 1500 years before the Christian Era; i.e., before the birth of 
Jesus Christ and the Christian religion(s).  The birth of Jesus Christ and his 
followers propelled the spread of monotheism outside the Fertile Crescent and 
 
62 I understand that due diligence, if nothing else, requires an equal look at the 
world’s other leading religions but here I have neither the time nor the pages to 
spare to do it now.  Therefore, I rely on my cultural and personal upbringing and 
biases in producing this text. 
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Nile Valley.  It marks a significant shift in human belief systems and introduces 
an era of widespread belief in a single omniscient and omnipotent god who takes 
an active role in ordering each of our lives and to whom we owe, individually and 
collectively, duties of allegiance and obedience, as if to a parent.  Viola’ God the 
Father is born into our culture.   
The earliest Christian writings, including the Bible, tell us stories of 
people and things already ancient to them.  They tell us of Mesopotamian kings, 
Babylonia, ancient Egypt and the Persian Empire, though often with noticeable 
contempt for the people they thought of as godless neighbors.63
So, although there is evidence of our ordering of human reproductive 
activities far earlier than the Christian era, the early Christians clearly embraced 
the idea and even enforced it with religious conviction.  The notion thereby was 
  Despite the 
disdain, the discussion of marriage in the Old Testament clearly reflects ideas in 
common with their Near East neighbors, although the early Israelites put their 
own religious slant on it.  They believed that marriage was a god-given way of 
ensuring that their faith was passed on for later generations.  It’s a small and 
simple step in logic to go from assuring future generations to assuring future 
generations of Israelites.  
                                                 
63  These Old Testament stories were recorded originally by Jewish scribes as part 
of the people’s history, antedating the founding of Christianity.  Christians 
adopted the Old Testament, as the first Christians were Jews.  The prejudices of 
the Old Testament are those of the period in which the books were written, 
reflecting the audiences they intended to teach and tell us as much about the 
writers as about their subjects. 
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preserved and expanded in the political and social structures that developed along 
with the religion.  This is another station in our whistle-stop review of human 
history bent on answering the grand old question, “what is marriage?”  I see how 
we got from the origins of the written history of marriage to the origins of 
Christianity, but how does that add to our understanding?  Put bluntly, all that we 
have now added to our definition of marriage is that it is divinely inspired.  God 
wants us to be fruitful and multiply and wants us to do it through marriage, like 
Adam and Eve, Abraham and Sarah, and Mary and Joseph.  This is an overt 
connection between marriage and reproduction.  The religions emanating from the 
early Christian era either cleared up any ambiguity as to the question or overtly 
established for the first time that marriage is about regulating sexual behavior.  
That is how marriage, in the ancient Judeo Christian era, became a cornerstone of 
social life: sex matters.   
Then the world gets bigger again.  Plato was an ancient Greek living on 
the other side of the Mediterranean from 427-347 BCE.  He was the student of 
Socrates and the teacher of Aristotle who, in turn, was the teacher of Alexander 
the Great.  Plato did not care for the rambunctious and ill-behaved gods of 
Olympus but he was not clearly a Christian either; his writings seem to show 
some deference to monotheistic beliefs.  For instance, he sometimes capitalizes, 
“God.”64
                                                 
64 See PETER COLEMAN, CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TO MARRIAGE: FROM ANCIENT 
TIMES TO THE THIRD MILLENNIUM, 58 (Michael Langford ed. SCM Press London 
  Although Plato lived before the historical Jesus, “his philosophy has 
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proved more important in Christian history than it ever was in Greece.”65 “His 
argument for the existence of an ultimate reality beyond human knowing 
eventually opened the way through Stoicism and Neo-Platonism for Greeks and 
Christians to compare notes and seek some measure of harmonization; this was 
crucial to the progress of early Christianity.”66
Interestingly, Plato gives us another ancient perspective to consider in The 
Republic.  Plato’s Republic takes as its goal the definition of Justice and the 
creation of the perfectly just society.  However, in his perfectly conceived 
republic, marriage is not an enjoyment or entitlement of all members of his 
perfect society.  The Guardians and the Philosopher-Kings are not permitted to 
marry and not permitted to have “a family,” by which he clearly meant, 
“children” that they claimed as their own.  Children of the Guardians and 
Philosopher-Kings were produced via mating rituals such that no child could 
claim his or her progenitors and no adult could claim his or her progeny.
  Without Plato’s philosophy, the 
Greeks and Christians may not have found common ground and Christianity may 
not have survived the battle among religions and philosophies.   
67
                                                                                                                                     
2004).  
  
 
65 Id. 
 
66 Id. at 56 (citing Acts 17.23, Paul’s speech on the Areopagus, as an example).  
 
67 I say, “his or her” here because Plato did not exclude women from the ruling 
class.  There is significant debate regarding the correctness of categorizing Plato 
as a feminist but it is clear that he afforded women equal opportunities, at least in 
theory.   
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Children were educated communally and the position in society for which each 
was best suited is the position for which they would be trained and ultimately 
take.  The nuclear family certainly is not an essential element in Plato’s Republic.  
Be that as it may, many social features suggested by Plato in his Republic can be 
found today in our so-called modern social structure.68
Plato provided a platform for the survival and prosperity of Christianity 
and along with Christianity came the sacrament of marriage; now transformed 
from a requirement of mere kings to an institution with divine imagery.  From a 
feminist perspective, this shift might signal a move toward a new and improved 
version of marriage because it was now ordained by an omniscient, omnipotent, 
and beneficent god.   It was an arrangement of progenitors for the benefit of the 
offspring and therefore society as a whole.  Soon the Catholic Church emerged as 
one of the most powerful supporters and promoters of the Christian worldview.
   
69
                                                 
68 Education is an example.  Plato believed that each person in a just society was 
entitled to the appropriate amount and kind of education needed to allow him or 
her to take the place for which he or she was best suited based on the Myth of the 
Metals. See 7 PLATO, REPUBLIC (Francis M. Cornford trans. Oxford University 
Press 1941). 
  
Until relatively recently in human history the Catholic Church held sway over all 
matters relating to marriage and family.  It was the Church that determined who 
was married, who was not, and what that meant.  The church exercised exclusive 
 
69 The Great Schism dividing the Roman and Eastern rite churches occurred in 
1054, primarily on geographical, linguistic, political and some doctrinal and 
theological issues. The term Catholic Church refers to the Holy Roman Catholic 
Church. 
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jurisdiction over offenses against God and morality, marriage, and the property of 
the dead.  That did not change until the Reformation.   
The Reformation was a religious movement in Western Europe in the 
sixteenth century, which was originally aimed at enhancing the spiritual 
legitimacy, and thus the authority of the Church but actually led to a revolt against 
its power and an abandonment of many foundational Catholic Christian beliefs.  
This ultimately afforded an opportunity for the provinces of Canon law (Church 
law) to be subsumed by the growing and strengthening civil courts that ultimately 
replaced the Church of England.  Marriage became a matter of law rather than 
religion.  Be that as it may, marriage clearly has retained many of its religious 
underpinnings.  It remains a deeply religious act for many people with religious 
convictions.   
Although the State requires marriage-hopefuls to obtain a license for legal 
recognition of a marriage, the ceremony that creates the marriage still commonly 
is performed in a church by a religious leader.  At the very least, the most 
common vows of the marriage still retain divine references.70  As a society, we 
still hold to the notion that reproduction is divinely inspired and divinely 
ordained; that God71 wants us to reproduce and rear our young in married couples, 
like the first couple, Adam and Eve.72
                                                 
70 “Let that which God hath put together let no man tear asunder.” Matthew 19:6.; 
Mark 10:9. 
  
 
71 This is true not just of the Christian God but is common to all of the Gods of 
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Moving forward again in time, and painting history with very broad 
strokes, American law finds its origins in that of Old England and the English 
common law.  An intense part is marriage, steeped in Christian religious 
mythology.  Our government allows marriages to be performed by members of 
the clergy and judiciary despite the fact that clergy are not state officials and that 
our Constitution mandates a separation of religion and government.  When a 
person with the proper authority, including religious clergy, speaks the proper 
words before the proper audience, marriage happens.  Marriage remains a social 
institution based in Christian theology and morality and enforced by secular laws 
to benefit the offspring of reproductive pairs, and thereby society as a whole.  The 
problem is that our law too is now steeped in Christian theology; the common law 
subsumed the church law so the secular laws now embody ideals that emanate 
from pre-Christian Mesopotamia through Western civilization picking up 
momentum and substance as they travel.   
So now what do we know of marriage and our grand old question?  
Marriage is a social and legal institution with a ubiquitous and long-standing 
history steeped in Christian theology.  It is also a contract-like legal bond between 
participants, and possibly their families, that achieves for them the status (and 
                                                                                                                                     
the major monotheistic religions.   
 
72 Compare and contrast the earlier creation myth/story told in Plato’s dialogue on 
love, by Aristophanes, about how the male, female, and hermaphrodite were split 
into halves to seek “their other half” for eternity. See PLATO, THE SYMPOSIUM 
(Frisbee C. C. Sheffield ed., M. C. Howatson trans. Cambridge University Press 
2008). 
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therefore the benefits) of spouses whose proper reproductive conduct is either 
rewarded or punished by the State; this, in turn, determines who may engage in 
reproductive conduct so as to ensure, for society’s sake, the successful and 
responsible rearing of offspring.  This definition would appear to satisfy the 
contemporary feminist voices in the marriage debate that find themselves squarely 
in the Marriage Enders’ camp.   
Many would have us believe marriage is about men controlling women 
because only women can have babies. Thus, in order to control reproduction, men 
use marriage laws as a means to exert control over women.  Surely it is not that 
simple.  Marriage cannot really only be about men’s desires to control women’s 
reproductive conduct because we’re still left with the issue of “who’s going to 
raise the children?”  That problem could be solved more easily than with the 
invention and replication of the institution of marriage.  Plato solved it without 
marriage and/or the nuclear family.  Marriage and a nuclear family were 
appropriate only for the Craftsmen class, not the Guardians and Philosopher-
Kings.  Now we must consider that reproduction may not be all of what marriage 
is about but, at this point it is safe to say that reproduction certainly is an 
important, and likely essential, aspect of what is marriage.   
If marriage essentially is about reproduction we should find some 
evidence of that in our laws regarding marriage.  This is the body of law 
commonly known today as family law or sometimes as Domestic Relations law.  
Oddly, it does appear as though this is an area of law carved out as an exception 
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to the world of public law, those bodies of law that regulate interactions  between 
all members of the society.  Generally, family law or domestic relations law 
regulates the interactions of those of us engaged in reproductive conduct.  This 
fact, too, mitigates in favor of believing that marriage is a set of rules 
contemplated to regulate reproductive conduct.  Family law is about two things: 
how the property of the married couple is divided and, more importantly, who 
will take care of any children produced by the marriage.  In fact, the first issue 
addressed in any family law case is whether or not there are minor children 
involved.73
In fact, although I’ve been skirting around it a little thus far it is starting to 
seem like marriage, along with all of its social mores and legal and social 
recognition, still defines who is responsible for any children that may result from 
the relationship.  This speaks to the essence of marriage.  Marriage allows us to 
determine which man is obligated to support a woman and her children.  Marriage 
creates a status and the obligations that come with that status.  A contemporary 
male found to be the progenitor of a child is given the responsibilities and 
obligations of helping the mother care for herself and the offspring because 
  Thud, there is a clear correlation between marriage and parenting.   
                                                 
73 In the Arizona Superior Court, Maricopa County the case number assigned to a 
family law action identifies the nature of the action as including children or not.  
For example, FC indicates a case with children while a FN designation at the 
beginning of a case number refers to no children. See 
http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/search/index.asp?q=FC (Superior Court 
of Arizona Family Court Cover Sheet for use with minor children only). 
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without such care they are not as likely to survive.  Marriage saved us humans 
from extinction by defining parentage.   
If so, then a subsequent set of logical questions arises. Do we still need to 
be saved from extinction by the social institution of marriage?  Or, in other words, 
maybe the marriage enders are right that we no longer seem to be in danger of not 
surviving as a species.  Indeed we may have quite the opposite problem.  Have we 
overpopulated our environment so marriage as it currently exists is no longer 
necessary?  Has marriage, in fact outlived its usefulness entirely and become a 
danger?  Before we declare the Enders victorious, we will have to determine first 
if we really are saved or if we still need such protection from the possibility of 
extinction based on the biophysical vulnerabilities of our reproductive efforts. 
CHAPTER 3: Parentage 
Scientific technology has advanced so much in the recent past that we now 
take for granted many things that we once thought of only as science fiction and 
the early Mesopotamians likely never thought of at all.  We now have the luxury 
of such things as automobiles, computers, and assistive reproductive 
technology.74
                                                 
74 Among the advances in human reproduction are “test tube babies,” ova donors, 
sperm donors, and hormone treatments for both men and women to facilitate 
either the production of sperm or the release of ova.  
  Just as we are only now beginning to realize the full impact of 
computers and cars on our environment, ourselves, and our progeny, we once 
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again are forced to contemplate due to new reproductive technologies the 
question: who is a parent?   
Since the turn of the last century human reproduction has been achieved 
with increasing success through various means other than coitus.  Back in the, 
“good old days” parentage was a fairly easy determination to make.  We knew 
who was a mother because we knew who gave birth and we could know who was 
a father because we could determine who was, or should be, married to the 
woman who gave birth.  Now, because marriage has fallen into such disfavor, not 
only do we have trouble identifying legal fathers but because of the new 
reproductive technologies we have the new challenge of identifying mothers.  
Marriage is no longer solving the problems for us.  This could very well explain 
why we now are embroiled once again in a hotly contested debate over the proper 
construction of marriage.   
The first recorded instance of alternative insemination took place in the 
1880s.75
                                                 
75 See Judith L. B. Rice, The Need for Statutes Regulating Artificial Insemination 
by Donors, 46 Ohio St. L. J. 1055, 1056 (1985). 
  In 1985, Judith Lynn Bick Rice argued that the long-time use and recent 
growth of alternative methods of insemination and reproduction gave rise to the 
need to regulate such activities on behalf of the rights of donors, mothers, and 
their husbands.  New technologies and their exceedingly widespread usage give 
rise to the need to regulate such activities on behalf of the children that result 
from these transactions.   
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The number of families affected by assisted reproduction technologies 
(“ART”) has steadily and significantly increased since the 1980s prompting 
several states to adopt the Uniform Parentage Act.76
 In its simplest biological essence, during alternative insemination, sperm 
are injected into a woman’s reproductive tract during ovulation to combine with 
her eggs in order to induce pregnancy.  In more complicated procedures, eggs and 
sperm are collected, combined outside the woman's body, and then injected into a 
female's reproductive tract in hops of causing pregnancy.  In cases where 
surrogacy is involved, the collected genetic material is inserted into the 
reproductive tract of a woman who does not want or intend to parent the resulting 
child.  The eggs and sperm may both, or either, be collected from donors or from 
the intended parent(s).    
  The Parentage Act instructs 
us how to determine those who are to be acknowledged as the parents of a child 
created through ART.  This is a critical determination because, as we now know 
and understand why, it comes with legal obligations that can be enforced through 
the law.  Interestingly, such determinations of parentage are made with respect to 
the status of the parties as married to each other or not.  Incidentally, this is yet 
another clear piece of evidence demonstrating that marriage and parentage are 
legally linked and bundled together, as we determine one with regard to the other.   
A preferred neutral term to denote the procedure of introducing semen into 
a woman’s uterus or reproductive tract by a method other than coitus for the 
                                                 
76 See UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987 & Supp. 1999). 
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purpose of inducing pregnancy is “alternative insemination.”  “Artificial” means 
“imitation, [or] sham.”77  “Alternative” means “an opportunity for deciding 
between two or more courses or propositions”78
This technology commonly is employed to achieve pregnancy without coitus 
or sexual intimacy between the progenitors.  ART obviously is preferable between 
relative strangers, where the intimacy of coitus is not desired or deemed 
appropriate, perhaps because one or both of the participants to the reproduction 
may already be married to someone else or even deceased.  Now, given these 
definitions, it is easy to see how these new reproductive technologies have thrown 
our notions of marriage and parentage into a quagmire of uncertainty and debate.  
It is entirely possible under our current laws for a child to be born with no legal 
parents.  The sperm and eggs are donated and gestated in a surrogate for the 
benefit of another, or others, who contracted to create the child but are not 
otherwise legally related in any way to, nor have they given birth to, the child.  
  
 The Uniform Parentage Act79 and the Children of Assisted Conception 
Act80
                                                 
77 See MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 66 (10th ed. 1994). 
 are attempts at a resolution to the age-old problem of determining 
parentage.  Unfortunately, the legislation is so limited in scope that its offerings 
 
78 Id. at 34. 
 
79 Supra note 77.  
 
80 UNIFORM STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, 9B U.L.A. 135 
(1987  & Supp. 1999). 
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fall well short of the need it was intended to fill.  In most circumstances, the laws 
only apply to married women or couples and require the participation health care 
professionals and executed consent forms.   
 Section Five of the Parentage Act addresses alternative insemination. 
Because the driving concern behind the Act was legitimacy, recall the need here is 
to provide for the children and their mothers so it is no surprise that the law’s 
concern is one of legitimacy, the provisions of the Act pertain exclusively to 
married heterosexual couples wherein the wife is inseminated with semen other 
than her husband's.  In the Comment following Section Five, the drafters urge 
further consideration of other practices and uses of alternative or assisted 
reproduction.  Clearly, the authors were aware of the relatively widespread use of 
such techniques in circumstances beyond the scopes of marriage and legitimacy.81
The Act provides that if the insemination is done under the supervision of a 
licensed physician and with the consent of the inseminated woman’s legal 
husband, the inseminated woman and her legal husband are the "natural parents" 
of the resulting child.  Further, the husband's consent must be in writing and 
signed by both the husband and wife.  The semen donor who is the biological 
progenitor is afforded no parental rights or obligations whatsoever.  This clearly 
covers only a very limited application of the practice of alternative or assisted 
reproduction since logistically, a licensed physician, a legal husband, and his 
consent are not elements necessary to the ultimate success of the procedure, or 
 
                                                 
81 See UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, supra note 80. 
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reproductive conduct.  Insemination can be (and often is) accomplished at home 
or in private with nothing more technical than a syringe or even a turkey-baster.82
The other important piece of model legislation applicable to the practice of 
alternative insemination is the Children of Assisted Conception Act (Conception 
Act).
   
83
                                                 
82 See Anne R. Schiff, Frustrated Intentions and Binding Biology: Seeking AID in 
the Law, 44 Duke L. J. 524, 525 n.1 (1994). 
  In the Conception Act, “assisted conception” is defined as “a pregnancy 
resulting from (1) fertilizing an egg of a woman with sperm of a man by means 
other than sexual intercourse or (2) implanting an embryo.  But the term “assisted 
conception” does not include the pregnancy of a wife resulting from fertilizing her 
egg with the sperm of her husband.”  It is made clear in the Comment to this 
section, this exclusion is purposeful so as not to interfere with determinations that 
otherwise could be made under the Parentage Act.  The Conception Act contains 
sections on maternity, assisted conception by a married woman, and the parental 
status of donors, as well as two alternative sections concerning gestational 
carriers.   The options, of course, are acceptance of the validity of surrogacy 
agreements or a declaration that surrogacy agreements are void.  In the latter, a 
woman is the mother of a child to whom she gives birth and her husband, if a 
party to the agreement, is the father.  If the gestational carrier is not married, or if 
her husband is not a party to the agreement, parentage is governed by the Uniform 
Parentage Act.   
83 See UNIFORM STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, supra note 
81.  
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In all, 34 states have adopted legislation pertaining to alternative insemination, 
assisted conception, or both.84  The statutes in 16 of those states are applicable 
only where the donee is married.85
 A: The Marriage Debate Revisited 
  Although the statutes of the other 18 states 
contemplate, on their face, an unmarried donee, case law indicates that in many 
situations, the rights of an unmarried donee are neither settled nor guaranteed.  
Once again marriage and parentage have become essential parts of each other and 
are intertwined, but not inextricably.   
The foregoing statutes were supposed to be the resolution to the again 
complicated process of making parentage determinations but, because they are 
                                                 
84 See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1993); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (1993); CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 7613 (Deering 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45A-771F (1993); FLA. 
STAT. ch. 742.11 (1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (Michie 1991); IDAHO CODE 
§ 39-5405 (1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1-3 (Smith-Hurd 1993); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 23-129 (1995); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West 1993); MD. 
CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(b) (1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 
4B (West 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.111 (1995); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 
(1998); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.824 (Vernon 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 
(1999); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.061 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:3(II) 
(1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 
(Michie 1994); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
49A-1 (1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111-37 (Anderson 1989); OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 10, § 552 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.365 (1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.239, 
.243, .247 (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1996); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 
151.101 (West 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158A (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (West 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West 1997); 
WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1999). 
 
85  See Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New York, 
North Carolina, and Tennessee. 
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bound up with notions of marriage and legitimacy they fall short of achieving the 
goal.  Because of the new technology, we will either have to make parentage 
determinations outside of and without respect to marriage or we will have to 
amend our notions of marriage to accommodate the needs of parents and their 
children, or maybe both.  Scientific advances have once again brought us to a 
need to reconsider social ordering and obligations related to reproduction.  Here 
we are back to the bases of the contemporary marriage debate and the many 
voices attempting to define, redefine, or otherwise influence others’ views, and 
therefore treatments of, marriage.   
Recall the Marriage Defenders, Enders, and Mender-Benders.  What if 
they all are right?  What if there are aspects of the institution of marriage that 
should be defended, some that should be ended, and some that should be mended?  
That does not seem to be insurmountable task and with the brain trust involved in 
the debate surely a resolution should have emerged years ago.  But, it has not.  
And it does not seem forthcoming yet so now we must consider why that might 
be.  It is suggested this is because they cannot hear each other over their own 
cacophony of rhetorical dissonance.  We all intuitively understand what is at stake 
and that the stakes are perhaps the highest; maybe even the continued survival or 
superiority of our species on this planet.   
What if, from the dawn of organization of human beings into societies, a 
marriage: the joining of individuals (and possibly their families) sanctioned by the 
chief, priest, rabbi, judge, king was simply a license to breed and a set of 
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instructions for doing so responsibly such that the rest of us could be somewhat 
assured that the reproductive conduct would result in a healthy, productive, adult 
member of society?  Assuming, arguendo, the affirmative, do we still need this 
marital structure?  We license drivers of vehicles on public roadways ostensibly 
because we all recognize that we are interdependent upon and incredibly 
vulnerable to each other, especially when we engage in dangerous activities, like 
hurling ourselves along a freeway at seventy-five miles an hour in vehicles that 
we know are not likely to save our lives if we collide.  Are not we also engaging 
in a very dangerous activity that requires the utmost of responsible behavior to the 
community when we breed; just like when we drive?  Obviously it takes a lot 
longer to see the effects of bad parenting than it does the effects of bad driving but 
the result nevertheless can be the same: death and destruction to self and/or 
others.  When we learn of a serial killer, rapist, or other predator who among us 
does not ask, even if only to themselves, “what went wrong with his childhood?”   
We now know that marriage predates Christianity, as a legal institution. 
Marriage could then be just like some of the other religious restrictions and/or 
requirements that we now understand as quite practical and credit with having 
ensured the survival of our species in some way.  There were restrictions, 
enforced through religion, forbidding the eating of the flesh of cloven-hoofed 
animals (pigs); and fewer people suffered from food-borne afflictions such as 
trichinosis that sickened and often killed those who ate the forbidden.  Another 
early religious doctrine required circumcision of males.  We now understand this 
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practice as having saved many males from an early death due to a general lack of 
an adequate genital hygiene regimen available at the time.  It is not absurd to 
suggest that marriage was such an expedient and necessary set of rules/laws to 
maintain order over the ultimately dangerous act of breeding and rearing new 
members into the community.    
And now we have technology that has exceeded the necessity of those old 
rules.  We have refrigeration that allows us to preserve the meat of the cloven-
hoofed animal safely so that we do not contract trichinosis.  Still, some people 
will not eat pork for religious reasons.  We have warm running water, 
antibacterial soap and an understanding of hygiene that obviates circumcision, yet 
some people still insist circumcision is necessary; even if they cannot give you a 
tenable secular reason, personal or otherwise, for that belief.   These practices 
have become part of our worldview.  It makes sense that marriage falls into this 
category of early edifices that once served both a practical and noble purpose.  
But, even if it is correct that marriage is one of these archaic practical regulations, 
it does not necessarily follow that it is one that no longer serves a necessary or 
sufficient purpose and that it can, or should be, discarded, or even dramatically 
altered (no pun intended), without serious impact.   
Besides the fact that they cannot hear each other over all the rhetoric, 
maybe the marriage debate is so bound up with that rhetoric that the debaters have 
not yet correctly identified the purpose of the debate.  Mediating the marriage 
debate has shown such work to be a promising possibility for resolution.  We 
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have discovered that marriage once was a very good solution to a very serious 
problem – keeping the most vulnerable members of our society safe and ensuring 
the propagation and survival of our species.  However, our scientific progress has 
caused us, unwittingly or otherwise, to reinvent the problem and so now we are 
reconsidering reinventing marriage as the solution.  It’s not necessarily the 
definition of marriage that needs to change.  The parentage determinations that 
are so tightly conflated with, or determined by the definition of marriage have 
become problematic in light of our new reproductive capabilities.  This is why the 
marriage debate has failed so far and this discussion may be able to help simply 
by redirecting the conversation.  This allows us to move from “What is 
Marriage?” toward, “What is a mother? and What is a father?”  
As the practice of assisted reproduction has evolved socially, the problems 
left in the wake of that evolution have yet to be resolved fully and satisfactorily 
by our courts. It has been stated that the marriage debate, in significant part, either 
would subside or be tremendously changed if not largely obviated if parentage 
determinations were no longer problematic.  Recall that most of the voices in the 
marriage debate express at least some concern over the question, “who will care 
for the children?”  This warrants a closer, more detailed look at the practice.  
Reproductive conduct is any behavior or course of conduct that leads to 
the production of a human infant.”  This is a simple, easy to apply, and 
universally applicable definition.  It is simple because it includes all fathomable 
conduct or behavior that produces a similar result.  As such, it subsumes the 
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notion of intentional conduct and its alternative, unintentional conduct.  For this, 
any nature of conduct will do.  Its application is easy since the threshold is clear:  
an infant must be produced.  And it is universally applicable because it 
encompasses conduct and behavior without regard to the sex, gender, or marital 
status of the perpetrator.  
Reproductive conduct, in its simplest form is the injection of semen into a 
woman’s reproductive tract resulting in pregnancy, the birth of the child, and a 
determination of parentage for the biological progenitors.  Within this context, the 
arguments that warrant a distinction between women and men with respect to 
reproduction are required.  
When ART is utilized so that a female may produce a child, the extent of 
the male’s contribution is sperm.  The production and ejaculation is a simple and 
painless part to play in human reproduction. The female, however, must still carry 
the fetus through childbirth.  Thus, ART may produce a child that requires an 
extensive physical and emotional contribution from a female that far outweighs a 
sperm donation.  She not only maybe donated her own genetic material,86
                                                 
86 There are cases wherein the gestational female does not donate genetic material.  
Instead, she serves as an incubator for an already existing fetus implanted in her 
womb for gestation.  It is argued that even in such cases, the contribution of the 
gestational female to the reproductive effort greatly outweighs that of either of the 
genetic donors. 
 in 
effect, she leases or maybe licenses her body, her energy, her very existence as a 
human being to become an incubator for the fetus at substantial risk to her own 
66 
physical and emotional health and well-being.  To produce a child, her existence 
as a female is exploited as a means to end.   
If there were no other issues involved, the fact that the gestational 
female’s participation in the reproductive project is the greatest should-be reason 
enough to declare surrogacy contracts void and declare the female who gives birth 
the sole legal parent of the child, at least at a beginning.  And to the extent that a 
gestational female becomes a means to someone’s end, all of ART may run 
contrary to a long-lived and celebrated theory of moral philosophy.  Immanuel 
Kant teaches us that the use of a human being as a means to an end and not an end 
in himself87 is the ultimate immoral act.88
Another  reproductive conduct differs greatly between male and female is 
that the male who contributes only sperm, or the female who contributes only 
  Attention-grabbing as it may be, this 
conversation would require in depth discourse on the connections between law 
and morality; a subject that has dominated philosophers and other thinkers for at 
least the greater part of the last century forward.  Such an ambition cannot be 
satisfied within the boundaries of this dissertation.   
                                                 
87 Casting aside politically correct gender-neutral language, I purposely re-use the 
masculine pronoun as did Kant.  I see no good to come from re-writing history as 
I am less than convinced the practice will appropriately affect the present or cure 
the future.     
 
88  Immanuel Kant argued, in the "Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals" and 
in the "Metaphysical Principles of Virtue," that the ultimate law of morality is the 
"categorical imperative" which he interpreted to mandate that all human beings be 
treated as an end in themselves and never as a means to an end. See IMMANUEL 
KANT, ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY, 2 (James W. Ellington trans. 2d ed. 1994). 
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eggs and may do so anonymously if he or she so chooses.  A path of anonymity is 
much more difficult, if not impossible, for a gestational female since her 
contribution to the reproductive effort is that of incubating and giving birth to a 
living, albeit incredibly vulnerable and needy, human infant.  This is how her 
contribution is the greatest.  One who provides only genetic material may never 
know for certain if he or she has, in fact, been a party to the creation of a child 
through the use of his or her sperm or egg by others.  Additionally, a gestational 
female may have absolutely no means of identifying anonymous donors of 
genetic material after the fact.  Conversely, it is extraordinarily difficult for a 
woman to experience pregnancy and birth secretly.  Her path to anonymous 
participation is much more challenging.  Because it is not reasonable to presume 
that a female can endure pregnancy and childbirth without at least being aware 
that these events have occurred, she is certainly aware of whether or not she, in 
fact, contributed to the creation of a child.  The fact that the child may have been 
born sickly and did not survive birth or long after may be kept from her through 
the use of "modern medicine,"89
                                                 
89  I use this phrase in quotations to show deference to a secret organization of 
female midwives who hold, generally, that men's encroachment into the areas of 
medicine historically and traditionally controlled by women -obstetrics and 
gynecology - is not a modern advancement at all but rather a regressive, 
opportunistic political movement bent on gaining control over and dominating the 
one aspect of womanhood that not only separates women from men but keeps 
men from relegating women to an undisguised and unfettered slavery.  In other 
words, it is men's need for children that curtails the widespread misogyny that 
develops in a patriarchy.  These women assert it is no coincidence that the 
formation of the American Medical Association, the criminalization of midwifery, 
 but the knowledge that she has been pregnant 
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reasonably cannot be kept from her if she has even a rudimentary understanding 
of human reproduction.  
The most significant difference is that the sperm and egg contributions are 
not comparable in any way to the infant a gestational female contributes.  A living 
female’s body currently is the only means we have of gestating a human infant.  
Without her body there would be no infant.  Therefore, it is both correct and 
reasonable to view the infant as her contribution.90
These differences, between the contributions of male vs. female and 
donors vs. gestational carriers, spell concern for males who want to have children 
without the on-going involvement of a female.  For instance, if the traditional 
  The contribution of the 
genetic material is not even comparable to the donation of a living organ such as a 
kidney or liver for transplantation in order to preserve an already existing life.  
Human genetic material now is available for use by others than those who 
produce it.  Indeed, reliance on genetic connections to determine parentage is not 
required.  
                                                                                                                                     
and the widespread enactment of anti-abortion laws correspond in time to the 
public emergence of a theory of justice based on what is now more commonly 
referred to as radical feminist biological determinism.   
90  Of course, if mechanical incubators were available such that reproduction 
could be achieved artificially, I suggest that the woman's contribution to the effort 
would still outweigh the man's.  I base this assertion on the nature of the invasive 
procedure necessary to harvest human eggs from a woman compared to the 
production and ejaculation of sperm by a man.  The only situation in which a 
man's and woman's contribution to the reproductive effort could be equalized is 
where the entire process could be accomplished without the physical involvement 
of either. 
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constitutional protections afforded individuals in making decisions related to 
family and children91
A marriage between two men who want children will necessarily entail the 
use of a gestational female.  Considering the dominant social attitudes regarding 
children and their need for mothers,
 are extended to male couples, the current law pertaining to 
gestational carriers and gestational contracts will necessarily be called into 
question.  Although ART has eliminated female’s needs for a males in begetting a 
child, the converse is not yet true.  
92 the current state of the law respecting 
gestational motherhood,93
                                                 
91  See Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
 and the intense emotional and physical disturbance 
endured by a woman who carries and gives birth to a child, it seems reasonable to 
assume that women will not be waiting in line for the opportunity to provide 
children to these couples.  Where state laws prohibit "surrogacy" contracts 
outright or even where only "surrogacy" contracts for significant profit are 
prohibited, the interests of males wanting to parent without females will be 
 
92  Under the Tender Years Doctrine, in custody disputes courts generally award 
custody of young children to their mothers unless the mother is declared unfit.  
Also, where the parenting abilities of both parents are considered equal, courts 
will resolve the dispute in favor of the mother based on this doctrine.  See 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1024 (6th ed. 1991). 
 
93  Most states still prohibit "surrogate " contracts wherein a woman is paid a 
monetary fee for relinquishing her rights to the child she produced.  This is 
especially true when the contract does not include a provision by which the 
woman can change her mind and assert her rights and status as the child's natural 
mother.  See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); Doe v. Kelley, 307 
N.W.2d 438 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). 
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seriously curtailed if not effectively denied.  Clearly, any efforts to regulate 
reproduction should take account of, and be taken into account by, the current 
marriage debate.  Legal marriages between males afforded the same constitutional 
consideration as all others marriages and will necessarily relegate at least some 
women to the role of brood mares.  The children they produce will be treated as 
yet another commodity exchanged according to the whim and fancy of wealthy 
men.   
Of course, there are many differences of opinion regarding what the future 
may hold.  My position, put simply, is that men and women are not similarly 
situated with respect to reproduction and this is where the effort to regulate 
reproduction begins.  There is good reason, based on her contribution to the 
reproductive effort, that disputes regarding parentage begin with her who gives 
birth.  When this emphasis is rightly placed, it may entail unequal treatment for 
some males and some females in parentage decisions.  But the plain facts are that 
we are not all created equally.  Some of us are born with a penis and others with a 
uterus.  Some of them are in good working order and others are not.  That is a 
simple fact of life. We must recognize that the unequal treatment of males and 
females is a controversial and unpopular position to take but, I am not the first, 
nor will I be the last, to take it up.94
                                                 
94 See generally MARY DALY, GYN/ECOLOGY: THE METAETHICS OF RADICAL 
FEMINISM (1978); SUSAN GRIFFIN, WOMAN AND NATURE: THE ROARING INSIDE 
HER (1978); SUSAN OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY (1989).  For a 
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 B: The Cases  
The following cases demonstrate how our current laws fall well short of 
offering the guidance that is needed to address the myriad reproductive conduct 
known to us.  As I have used the term “reproductive conduct” several times now, 
a few words spent in explicating precisely what I mean by it are in order.  I will 
use actual cases to demonstrate the failures of our current legal 
marriage/parentage determination system.  I am compelled to begin the discussion 
of reproductive conduct with a look at the infamous Baby M. case.   
In the late 1980's, local and national headlines were flooded with reports 
of the case of "Baby M."95  Around the world, eager listeners were bombarded 
with the intimate details of two couples involved in a joint effort of reproduction.  
Both couples were heterosexual and married at the time.96
William and Elizabeth Stern were a childless couple who, based on a 
belief that pregnancy would be extremely detrimental to Elizabeth's health, 
decided to employ alternative insemination of another female under contract to 
deliver the resulting infant to the Sterns, thereby allowing the Sterns to become its 
parents.  The Sterns chose this method because it was important to them that the 
   
                                                                                                                                     
concise discourse on the topic of feminist biological determination see ALLISON 
JAGGER, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983). 
 
95 See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). 
 
96 Before the controversy was finally settled, Mr. and Mrs. Whitehead divorced 
and Mrs. Whitehead, the gestational mother, remarried and had another child with 
her new husband.  Id. at 1261 n.18.  
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child have a genetic link to Mr. Stern.  Most of his family had been destroyed in 
the Holocaust and as he was the only survivor it was deemed important to 
continue his bloodline.97
Both parties to this case responded to an advertisement of the Infertility 
Center of New York (ICNY).  The Sterns' response was the culmination of a long-
standing decision to become parents.
     
98  Mrs. Whitehead's response was the result 
of her family's financial difficulties, and her desire to give another couple the "gift 
of life."99  Irrespective of the sensitive and intimate nature of the contract into 
which they entered,100 both parties believed it was "right" and "constructive."101
Mrs. Whitehead even had previously been involved as a potential 
gestational female in the reproductive efforts of another couple.  That effort was 
abandoned after several unsuccessful insemination attempts.  These events 
occurred prior to any involvement by the Sterns in the ICNY.  After several 
   
                                                 
97  Id. at 1235. 
 
98  Id. at 1236. 
 
99  Id. The amount Mrs. Whitehead was to receive in addition to expenses was 
$10,000. Id. 
 
100  Id. The court stated, "Both parties, undoubtedly because of their own self-
interest, were less sensitive to the implications of the transaction than they might 
otherwise have been.  Mrs. Whitehead, for instance, appears not to have been 
concerned about whether the Sterns would make good parents for her child.  The 
Sterns,...while conscious of the obvious possibility that surrendering the child 
might cause grief to Mrs. Whitehead, overcame their qualms because of their 
desire for a child."  
 
101  Id.  
 
73 
insemination attempts with Mr. Stern's semen, Mrs. Whitehead became pregnant, 
experienced an uneventful pregnancy and on March 27, 1986 delivered a healthy 
baby girl.102
Because the Whitehead's did not want news of the "surrogacy" 
disseminated widely through the hospital, they acted as if the new-born was their 
own.  Her birth certificate showed her name to be Sara Elizabeth Whitehead and 
Richard Whitehead was named as her father.
   
103  Accommodating the Whitehead's 
wishes, the Stern's visited the nursery to see the baby unannounced and 
unnoticed.104  Mrs. Whitehead seemed to know from nearly the moment of birth 
that she would not be able to give up the child.  She indicated that she had bonded 
with the child during pregnancy and that the baby looked very much like her older 
daughter.105
Her first communication of these feelings to the Sterns came on the 
occasion of the Sterns telling the Whiteheads what they intended to name the 
baby.
   
106
                                                 
102  Id.  
  In spite of her strong reservations, and against all of her instincts, Mrs. 
 
103  Id.  
 
104  Id.  
 
105  Id. at 1237. 
106  Id.  
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Whitehead delivered the baby to the Sterns on March 30, three days after her 
birth.107
Later that night, Mrs. Whitehead became, "deeply disturbed, disconsolate, 
[and] stricken with unbearable sadness."
   
108  The next morning she went back to 
the Stern's home, told them how much she was suffering, that she, "could not live 
without her baby" and must have her company even if only for one week after 
which time she would return the infant to them.  Based on their fear and concern 
that Mrs. Whitehead would commit suicide, and believing that Mrs. Whitehead 
would keep her promise, they turned the infant back over to MaryBeth 
Whitehead.109
Mrs. Whitehead refused to return the child to the Sterns and Mr. Stern 
filed a complaint seeking enforcement of the contract between himself and Mrs. 
Whitehead.  A process server, accompanied by the police and the Sterns, went to 
the Whitehead's home to execute an order to return the infant to the Sterns.  Mrs. 
Whitehead delayed the group with a dispute over the child's correct name while 
Mr. Whitehead fled with the infant who was handed to him through an open 
window.
  Thus, this is when the parentage and custody battle began.  
110
                                                 
107  Id.  
  The Whiteheads fled to Florida with the baby and hid out with 
108  Id. This is the court's finding with regard to Mrs. Whitehead's emotional 
condition immediately following her delivery of the infant to the Sterns.   
109  Id.  
110  Id. at 1228. 
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relatives and in hotels for the next three months.  The Sterns commenced 
proceedings in Florida that ultimately were enforced by local police and the child 
was returned to them in New Jersey.111 The nation was glued to our news sources 
by both the sensational nature of it all and the deeply disconcerting underlying 
question:112
Based largely on the fact that the court believed the "surrogacy" contract 
to be enforceable and Mrs. Whitehead seemed at the time to be irrational, custody 
of the infant was awarded to the Sterns pending final resolution of the 
controversy.
  Who are this child’s rightful parents?   
113  Later, after thirty-two days of trial, the court enforced the 
"surrogacy" contract, awarded sole custody to Mr. Stern without visitation for 
Mrs. Whitehead, and entered an order immediately allowing Mrs. Stern to adopt 
the infant.114
While holding that the contract was valid, the trial court directed a 
sizeable portion of its opinion to the question of the baby's best interests.
   
115
                                                 
111  Id.  
  The 
court correctly adhered to the standard that the controlling interest in making 
these types of decisions – the best interest of the child.  Indeed, the contract stated 
on its face, well prior to the conception of the child, that the best interests of the 
112  Id.  
113  Id.  
114  Id. 
115  Id.  
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resulting child would be served by awarding sole custody to Mr. Stern.  The 
court's reasoning was that although the contract was valid, it could not be 
enforced if contrary to the child's interests.116  The trial court boldly stated, 
"beyond the question of the child's best interests, '[all] other concerns raised by 
counsel constitute commentary.'"117
Instead, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the contract was not 
valid and the best interests of the child warranted leaving the child with the 
Sterns.  Mrs. Whitehead was awarded visitation.
  Applying the simple principle properly 
proffered, the baby have been placed with to Mrs. Whitehead pending a 
determination of Mr. Stern’s, Mrs. Stern’s, and Mr. Whitehead’s rights 
individually as potential parents.   
118  This holding was likely 
because by the time the controversy was finally resolved, baby M was walking, 
had cut her first teeth, recognized and responded affectionately to the Sterns 
whom she perceived as her parents, and was looking forward to her second 
birthday.  For all practical purposes, she seemed to be a happy and well-adjusted 
child.119
                                                 
116  Id.  
  The court did not see it in the child’s best interest to have her 
117  Id.  
118  Id. at 1227. 
119  Id. at 1245. 
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environment so violently altered as to move her from the people she had grown to 
love regardless of a genetic connection.   
In this limited way, I think the New Jersey courts got it right.  Once the 
wrong was done, doing another one by removing the child again would not make 
things better.  In this way, the child’s interest held sway over the rights of the 
adults in her life. The important thing to take from this is that the court was forced 
to balance the child's interests against the rights and interests of her purported 
parents.   
The New Jersey court invalidated the contract between the Sterns and 
MaryBeth Whitehead because under New Jersey law, "There is no doubt that a 
contractual provision purporting to constitute an irrevocable agreement to 
surrender custody of a child for adoption is invalid."120  A contract that does not 
allow the gestational female to retain parental rights runs contrary to public 
policy.  The court stated, "[t]his is the sale of a child, or, at the very least, the sale 
of a mother's right to her child, the only mitigating factor being that one of the 
purchasers is the father.  Almost every evil that prompted the prohibition on the 
payment of money in connection with adoptions exists here."121
The Baby M case demonstrates the court's commitment to taking a correct 
first step in honoring a gestational female’s right as a parent of the child to which 
   
                                                 
120  Id. at 1245-46. 
121  Id. at 1248. 
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she gives birth, if that’s what she wants.  The court declared that any such 
relinquishment of those rights must be revocable for a reasonable time after birth.  
In fact, the court's decision on custody/parentage did not turn on Mrs. Whitehead's 
unstable and unpredictable behavior.  The court recognized this lamentable course 
of events but correctly reasoned that such decisions cannot rightly be based on 
what the child's best interests would be or would have been if different facts had 
existed.  It seems clear that if Melissa had been in the Whitehead's custody during 
this time they would have been awarded custody and the Stern's would have only 
visitation.      
In this clear-cut case of parentage by choice, privileging the gestational 
female’s intentions just makes sense.  The next step in taking our parentage 
determination formula for a test drive is to determine in what circumstances those 
rights are to be shared with or transferred to others.  Should not Mr. Stern be able 
to assert his parentage at some point?  After all, he is the paternal progenitor.  He 
also should be allowed to parent the child since he also engaged in reproductive 
conduct that resulted in the production of a child.  Further, Mrs. Stern and Mr. 
Whitehead also had a part to play in this little reproductive drama.  Mrs. Stern 
expected to become a mother.  And, Mr. Whitehead ostensibly cared for and 
nurtured his wife through the pregnancy and delivery.  This fact is where the 
rubber hits the road so to speak.  We, therefore, must look to more cases for more 
rules and their application.  An early case involving a lesbian couple using the 
donated sperm of a friend to become pregnant and later parents is instructive.   
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Thomas S. v. Robin Y. 122 involves a struggle for parentage within the 
context of conception through non-physician-assisted alternative insemination of 
genetic material from a known donor sperm.  In Thomas S. v. Robin Y., Thomas 
was a gay man who, twelve years earlier, donated sperm to Robin who wanted to 
bear a child and become a mother.  Robin, after several attempts, successfully 
inseminated herself with Thomas's genetic material and became the mother of the 
resulting child, Ry.123  At birth, Ry was given Robin's last name hyphenated with 
that of Robin's partner and consequently Ry's second mother, Sandra.  Thomas 
was not listed on the birth certificate and all expenses, including the trials and 
tribulations of pregnancy and birth were met by Robin and Sandra without 
contribution or concern from Thomas.124  Thomas was not present at the birth but 
after being notified of the birth subsequently sent flowers to the women.   Ry 
lived with Robin and Sandra and an older sister, Cade,125  as she had since birth.  
Ry considered this her family unit, as did all the other members of the family.126
                                                 
122 Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1994). 
  
Thomas even shared this view until July of 1990 when he asked for and was 
123  Id. at 358. 
124 Id. 
125   Cade is the birth child of Sandra and also the culmination of artificial 
insemination with donated genetic material.  Her donor is unknown to us and 
irrelevant to this controversy.  At birth, Cade also was given a last name 
comprised of the hyphenated names of the two women she considers her mothers, 
Sandra and Robin. See 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, supra note 123. 
126  Id. at 358.   
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denied permission to take both girls to meet his parents and siblings and their 
children.127
When Robin and Sandra denied Thomas's request to take the children on 
the trip without them, Thomas initiated a paternity proceeding.  The trial court 
ordered a blood test that confirmed Thomas was Ry's paternal progenitor, a point 
to which both parties had already agreed.
  For the first time in nearly ten years, Thomas had manifested an 
intent to become a parent.    
128
Also, pursuant to the Court's instructions, Ry was evaluated by a 
psychiatrist.  This evaluation revealed Ry's belief that, under the circumstances 
created by the paternity proceeding, any further contact with Thomas would 
threaten or disrupt her concept of and relationship with her family.
  The fact that the court felt it was 
necessary to prove conclusively the genetic relationship even after the parties had 
both admitted it is a clear indication that this court was taking such a connection 
very seriously.   
129
                                                 
127  Id.  The opinion states that the mothers were not invited because Thomas 
would be uncomfortable introducing the women to his parents. Id.  It seems to this 
author that a single gay man also should be uncomfortable introducing to his 
parents for the first time a nine year old child that he claims is his!  Clearly, the 
existence of the children’s mother(s) would be an axiomatic presumption and her 
absence then would be cause for questioning that might also be uncomfortable.  
  Ry's 
concept of her family unit included herself, her sister, Cade, and mothers, Robin 
128 The court ordered a blood test pursuant to § 418 and § 532 of Article 5 of the 
New York Family Court Act to confirm what the parties stipulated to as fact. Id.  
129  Id. at 359. 
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and Sandra.  Because she did not consider Thomas her parent after 10 years "a 
declaration of paternity would be a statement that her family is other than what 
she knows it to be" and therefore "would not be in her best interests."130   Based 
on this finding, the Family Court refused to grant Thomas's request for a paternity 
order.131
Nevertheless, based on the same facts, the appellate division reversed the 
decision of the Family Court holding that paternity, defined as biological 
paternity, is the only criteria to be met in granting the requested order and that a 
finding of paternity is separate from and not dispositive of an action for support, 
visitation, or custody of the child.  However, a declaration of paternity alone 
without a determination of the extent of the rights and responsibilities that flow 
from that declaration seems to frustrate the desires of the parties.  Neither party 
disputed the fact that Thomas was Ry's paternal progenitor.  Their controversy 
stems from Thomas's change of heart regarding his parental status.  These parties 
needed to know precisely what rights and responsibilities flow from the fact that 
Thomas donated genetic material that was used by Robin to create a child.       
   
The appellate court stated, "[i]t is appropriate to begin with the 
observation that the effect of the Family Court's order is to cut off the rights of a 
man who is conceded by all concerned - the child, the mother and the court - to be 
                                                 
130  Id. at 358. 
131  Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1993). 
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the biological father."132  The court demonstrated a fundamental misconception of 
the contested issues.  Thomas brought the proceeding as the first step in his 
pursuit of visitation rights.133  The appellate court's characterization of the dispute 
as one simply of paternity is puzzling.  This decision becomes an even greater 
enigma when we are left to contemplate the court's impetus for allowing the 
parties to withdraw before the matter was appealed to a higher court and thus 
finally settled.134
The appellate court represented the legal question as "whether the legal 
rights of a biological parent are to be terminated."
   
135  By framing the question in 
such a way, the court became pre-occupied with preserving rights that have not 
yet been created.136
                                                 
132  Id.  
  The court analyzed the controversy in terms of preserving 
133  Id. at 357. 
134 See Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 86 N.Y.2d 779 (1995) (Appeal dismissed on 
consent of the parties). 
135  Id. at 359. 
136  The court cites to Matter of Ricky Ralph M., 56 N.Y.2d 77, 81 (citing 
Santosky v. Kramer; 455 U.S. 745 (1981)) for the proposition that termination of 
parental rights outside of strict adherence to statutory provisions violates well 
established standards of due process.  However, Ricky M. was about an unwed 
father's right to veto the adoption decision of the mother and take custody of the 
child without her consent, while Santosky was about the termination of the rights 
of both parents pursuant to a finding of permanent neglect. The decisions, based 
on their facts, are of little relevance or assistance in formulating a decision on the 
facts in Thomas S. v. Robin Y. The court's decision to frame the issue as one of 
termination of parental rights allowing it to draw analogies to the cited cases and, 
thus, assert their relevance is untenable at best.  Filiation proceedings have as 
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Thomas's rights when the purpose of the proceeding was to establish those rights 
in the first place.  Perhaps the dissenters in the case stated it best, "Until it can be 
established that petitioner has some parental rights, the very relief sought in this 
proceeding, the question of a 'termination' of petitioner’s rights never arises...."137
Even if this case were not a filiation proceeding seeking an order of 
paternity, such that it would have been appropriate to consider Thomas's pre-
existing parental rights, he does not fit the profile of those parents whose interests 
have warranted the courts' protection.
  
138
                                                                                                                                     
their purpose the creation of parental rights, not termination.  When an order of 
filiation is denied no new parental rights and responsibilities are created and 
something which does not exist logically cannot be terminated.  
  He was never involved in the on-going 
care, support and nurturing, and decision-making processes which characterize 
137 Supra note 123, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 364. 
138  See In re T.J., M.D. & C.J., 1995 WL 555106 (D.C. App. 1995) (holding that 
the parent whose rights have not yet been terminated has a right to decide which, 
of multiple acceptable adoptive homes, is to be the one allowed to adopt her 
child); In re D. Children, 576 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1991) (holding that the adoptive 
decision of the parent is to be given priority even over the objection of a "blood 
relative" who stands ready to adopt); Freeman v. Chaplic, 446 N.E.2d 1369 
(Mass. 1983) (holding that a parent has the right to decide which of the available 
and ready grandparents should be awarded custody); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 
N.Y.2d 651 (1991) (holding that allowing a third person visitation, a limited form 
of custody, would necessarily impair the parents' right to custody and control of 
their child); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (holding that a New York 
statute which allows an unwed mother to block the adoption of her children but 
does not afford the same right to the unwed father is a violation of the equal 
protection clause); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that a denial 
of unwed fathers of a hearing on fitness to parent accorded to other parents whose 
custody of their children is challenged by the State is a denial of equal protection 
and due process of the law).  
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parenthood.139  His absence from those duties and joys was the result of his own 
preference, not circumstances beyond his control.  Just as it is inappropriate for a 
court to assign parental rights to an outsider without the consent of the legal 
parent or the prior termination of his or her rights,140
The more appropriate analysis would have been the best interests of the 
child.  The court unfortunately placed a determination of the best interests of the 
child beyond its reach when it incorrectly characterized the question as one of the 
appropriateness of terminating parental rights outside of statutory authority.   
 it was inappropriate for the 
court to have assigned parental rights to Thomas, regardless of his status as a 
biological progenitor.     
Neither party argued that it was in Ry's best interests to create parental 
rights for Thomas.  Indeed, Ry's psychiatric evaluation indicated the contrary.  
The lower court findings assure us that Ry was living in a loving, supportive, and 
healthy family environment.  Thomas did not even raise the pretense that his 
petition was prompted by concerns for Ry's continued well-being.  Rather, he 
asserted his own interests to the exclusion of hers because it had become 
inconvenient for him to abide by his choice to donate genetic material as a non-
                                                 
139  See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (setting out a clear statement 
regarding the criteria and procedures necessary for establishing parental fitness). 
 
140  See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651 (1991).  In In re Baby M, supra 
note 96, a now famous gestational surrogacy case where custody of the child was 
ultimately awarded to the biological father, the court unambiguously held that 
termination of parental rights must proceed along statutory guidelines irrespective 
of an agreement between biological parents.  
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parent.  The appellate court should have been more sensitive to Ry's best interests 
and to Robin's status as Ry's mother, as was the lower court, and in doing so 
would likely have reached a more satisfactory decision.   
This case demonstrates that Thomas agreed to donate his genetic material 
without becoming a parent and also to make himself available to the resulting 
child in some other capacity should the child’s parent(s), at some future time, 
determine it to be appropriate or beneficial.  As an already existing fit parent, 
Robin is in the position of determining what that is.  Even if the best interests test 
had suggested that a continuing relationship with Thomas was in some way 
beneficial to Ry, her fit parent(s) should be free to disregard such a determination.  
So long as a parent is found to be a fit parent,141
Thomas and Robin engaged in reproductive conduct.  They agreed, in 
doing so, that Robin would parent the child and that Thomas would not.  The fact 
that Thomas provided the genetic material did not, and should not, make him a 
parent.  There is a world of difference between a biological progenitor and a 
parent.  The existence of adults who are parenting children created through the 
use of someone else’s genetic material is undeniable.   
 his or her parenting decisions 
should control.   
                                                 
141 Needless to say, this author's opinion concerning what the legal definition of a 
"fit" parent ought to be differs greatly from the definition currently in use.  But, 
that is another essay in its own right.  The reforms suggested herein may be 
contingent upon the adoption of a new definition of "fit parent."   
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This clarifies further that a “parent” need not be a “biological progenitor” 
and vice versa.  Would any of us argue that an adoptive parent is any less a parent 
than is a biological progenitor?  Of course not. The difference is legal recognition 
of the parental relationship between the parent and the child.  One way to become 
a parent is to knowingly use, or allow the use of your genetic material, to create a 
child, by choice.  Another is to have a court tell you that you are, by chance.  The 
challenge arises when one is functioning as a parent but is not recognized as one 
by our courts.      
A parent is an adult who undertakes and performs a fiduciary duty 
regarding a child, decisional authority over a child, and daily care-
giving/nurturing duties with respect to the child.  This simple yet ubiquitous 
definition is important because, as we will see later, commonly, not all of these 
undertakings are assumed by a single person.  Often, in real life, they are sorted 
out into smaller, if not individual, obligations, duties, and authorities.  Like any 
other important job, delegation makes it easier.  Now we can have a better look at 
how our courts define parentage.    
Nancy S. v. Michele G.142
                                                 
142 Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991), overruled by Elisa 
B. v. Superior Ct., 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005). 
 is a nice example of the way our courts are 
limited in dealing with a parent who is not a biological progenitor.  Michele and 
Nancy had been a couple for eleven years when they decided to become parents 
together.  Being a lesbian couple, they needed sperm.  They chose a donor and via 
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insemination Nancy gave birth to two children.  The children were given 
Michele’s surname and Michele was listed on their birth certificates as “father.”  
After parenting the children together, Nancy and Michele split up but they were 
able to share the parenting of the children for about another three years.  Then, 
Nancy wanted to change the arrangements and Michele objected.  Nancy brought 
a suit under the Parentage Act asking the court to declare that Michele was not a 
parent and that only Nancy was entitled to any sort of parental recognition.  She 
won.   
Applying the Parentage Act, the trial court determined that Nancy was the 
mother of the children because she had given birth to them and that Michele was 
not their mother because she had not.  Based on such a judgment, only Nancy was 
entitled to sole legal and physical custody and any further contact between 
Michele and the children would be only with Nancy’s consent.  However, it 
seems that Michele had in fact undertaken the fiduciary obligations of a parent, 
the decisional authority of a parent, and the daily nurturing duties of a parent with 
regard to these children.  Moreover, she participated in the reproductive conduct 
that created the children: the insemination.  She appealed the judgment to a higher 
court.   
Michele appealed and tried valiantly to convince the court that she was a 
parent worthy of their recognition.  She argued that she stood in loco parentis to 
the children; that the doctrine of estoppels prevented Nancy from denying 
Michele’s parentage, that she was a de facto parent to the children, and that she 
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was a functional parent to the children.  Although the appellate court agreed with 
the trial court and denied parental recognition for her, Michele’s arguments were 
the only logical arguments made.  They are worthy of some explanation.   
 The notion of estoppel is an interesting one.  Although the word sounds 
like it could have a foundation in Latin, this term comes from the Old French 
estoupail (or variation), which meant "stopper plug", referring to placing a halt on 
the imbalance of the situation. The term is related to the verb "estop" which 
comes from the Old French term estopper, meaning "stop up, impede" 143
In loco parentis is a borrowed Latin phrase used to describe a person who 
is not a parent but stands in the shoes of a parent.  This concept becomes 
especially problematic now that we have unhinged the concept of parent from 
biological progenitor.  In other words, it means that even though someone actually 
  But 
that’s not the interesting part.  Abiding the notion that we learned the really 
important things we need to know in childhood, estoppel the rule of “no take-
backs.”  Once something has been said, or done, and someone else has relied on 
it, it simply cannot be undone.  The doctrine of estoppel stops the undoing.   Here, 
Michele wants it to stop Nancy from taking the position she Michele is not a 
parent because she has already encouraged and supported Michele as being a 
parent.  The court did not apply estoppel to a claim of parentage.   
                                                 
143 There are those who believe that the law is riddled with obscure Latin phrases 
and other linguistic oddities purposely by lawyers bent on maintaining the 
inaccessibility of the law to laymen.   
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may be parenting, i.e., stands in the shoes of a parent; he or she is not a parent 
unless they also are a biological progenitor.  Of course, we can leave aside 
adoptive parents because their parentage has been established by the court.  So, 
under this doctrine, a person who has standing under the doctrine of in loco 
parentis is a person who is parenting but will not recognized as a parent.  Does 
not it make you ask, “but why not?”  If someone is parenting a child successfully, 
why should not they be recognized as a parent if doing so will benefit the child?  
That was crux of Michele’s other arguments.  
De facto is another borrowed Latin phrases. It means, “in fact.”  Michele 
argued to the court that she was, in fact, a parent to the children.  They called her 
“Mom,” they shared her last name, she was listed on their birth certificates, and 
she raised them and held them out to all the world as her own children since their 
birth.  Most importantly, they thrived in her care.  Even this, however, was not 
enough to sway the court.  The court held that, even as a de facto parent, Michele 
would only be entitled to some deference if Nancy, the biological mother, 
consents.  Therefore the objection to Michele’s claim based on functional 
parenthood failed as well.  The court reasoned that such a “novel” idea should 
come from the legislature.   
It is axiomatic that when males want to procreate, they need a female for 
gestation, not just an egg for fertilization.  Males necessarily need much more 
involvement from females than is necessary for them and this may account for the 
lower number of parenting couples among men.   Nevertheless, a male couple that 
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wants to parent faces the same challenges as does the lesbian couple with respect 
to our courts’ penchant for biological connections.  At best, only one of them, the 
biological progenitor, may be a parent.  The other may suffer the same fate as 
Michele, if they are no longer parenting together, yet both want to continue 
parenting and cannot agree on how it should be done.  In fact, there even are 
challenges for same-sex couples that do not separate.   
In Adar v. Smith,144
The District Court informed the clerk she had to issue the birth certificate. 
An appeal followed.  The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
there was no private cause of action that can be brought directly in the federal 
courts to remedy the failure to accord the full faith and credit clause of the U. S. 
 adoptive parents (both equally recognized by the 
court as parents) asked the State of Louisiana to issue a new birth certificate for 
their son, born in Louisiana, naming them as his parents.  The attorneys for the 
clerk who was asked to issue the birth certificate refused.  Oren Adar and Ricky 
Smith sued Darlene Smith, as the state Registrar for Louisiana, for not issuing the 
birth certificate they sought.  The clerk refused, stating that Louisiana did not 
recognize adoption by unmarried parents.   She relied on a determination by the 
Louisiana attorney general that she did not have to respect an adoption from 
another state that Louisiana would not have granted under Louisiana law if the 
couple had lived and adopted there.   
                                                 
144 Adar v. Smith, 622 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2010). 
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Constitution.145
The U.S. Supreme Court only hears those cases it wants to hear. They are 
allowed to reject cases, called denying certiorari.  And, that is what happened in 
Adar v. Smith.  Accordingly, the ruling handed down by the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals remained in place.  Although Louisiana had to recognize the men as the 
child’s parents, it did not have to alter its vital records to reflect this fact.   
  The court stated that the men were required to bring an action in 
Louisiana state court and when, upon exhaustion of their state remedies, the 
proper recourse would be to the U.S. Supreme court under its authority to hear 
state court appeals.  The matter could not be brought in the federal courts directly.   
Whenever the family travels there are likely to be questions regarding 
parentage that would be easily answered with a birth certificate.  Now, the child’s 
birth certificate will muddy the waters.  A birth certificate is needed to enroll the 
child in school.  These parents will be required to show more.  They both will 
have to authenticate the adoption to prove parentage.  This is tantamount to 
proving, over and over, that they are parents because that they are not biological 
progenitors.  We can take from this a rule that only biological progenitors, when 
known, are to be listed on birth certificates.   
That would be an acceptable rule if only biological progenitors were 
parents.  But that’s not the reality we live in.  Many different connections can be 
found between today’s parents and the children they are parenting: step-parents, 
adoptive parents, same-sex parents, grand-parents, and even other relatives.  
                                                 
145 See U.S. CONSt. art IV, § 1. 
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There is a family when a brother and sister live together and raise their nieces and 
nephews together because their sister and her husband were both killed suddenly 
leaving the four children without parents.  There is no doubt in my mind that the 
children’s aunt and uncle became their parents, though they do not hold the title 
of mother and father. Oren and Mickey wanted to replace their child’s biological 
progenitors.  What is important here the legal recognition of the parental 
relationship; the ability of the adults acting as parents to validate and assert their 
authority to do so.   
But should the children’s birth certificates be re-issued to indicate the 
reality of the child's environment?  Or, like Oren and Mickey, should they be 
satisfied to prove parentage via the adoption records?  What is the significant 
difference?  It can only be the relationship between the two sets of parents.  One 
set is comprised of siblings; the other set is an otherwise unrelated, romantically 
bound couple.  That difference need not be reflected in the issuance of the 
children’s birth certificates.  Neither would need a new birth certificate so long as 
the rest of us agreed that parents are parents regardless of their status as biological 
progenitors.  That is the important point here.   
Not all of the current case law is wrong.  Elisa B. v. Superior Court146
                                                 
146 Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005). 
 was 
a step in the right direction.  Elisa and Emily became a couple in 1993 and soon 
began living together as a family.  They both wanted children and both wanted to 
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give birth.  They both became pregnant by insemination with donated genetic 
material.  They used the same donor from the same bank because they wanted the 
children to be “biological brothers and sisters."147
  Elisa claimed all three children as her dependents on her tax returns and 
obtained a life insurance policy on herself naming Emily as the beneficiary so that 
if "anything happened" to her, all three children would be "cared for."  Elisa 
believed the children would be considered both of their children.  Elisa was the 
bread-winner of the family earning a comfortable salary from full-time 
employment.  Emily became a stay-at-home mom.  They considered themselves 
to be in a committed familial relationship.
  They attended each other’s 
doctor appointments and pre-birth classes.  They acted as each other’s birth coach 
and they shared the responsibility and joy of cutting of the children’s umbilical 
cords at their births.  They chose the children's names together and gave all three 
a surname that was both of their hyphenated together.  Elisa gave birth to Chance 
and Emily gave birth to twins, Ry and Kaia.  Ry was diagnosed with Down’s 
Syndrome and required a heart surgery.   
148
            Like all of the sad stories that reach our family courts for resolution, Elisa 
and Emily subsequently separated.  When finances became difficult due to the 
loss of Elisa’s job, there was strife and the two of them disagreed about who 
   
                                                 
147 Id. at 663. 
148 Id.  
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should support the children.  The court decided that they had clearly chosen to 
raise the children together as a couple and “acted in all respects as a family.”149  
Thus, the court found that, “a person who uses reproductive technology is 
accountable as a de facto legal parent for the support of that child. Legal 
parentage is not determined exclusively by biology."150
The need for the application of this doctrine is underscored by the 
fact that the decision of Respondent to create a family and desert 
them has caused the remaining family members to seek County 
assistance. One child that was created has special needs that will 
require the remaining parent or the County to be financially 
responsible of those needs. The child was deprived of the right to 
have a traditional father to take care of the financial needs of this 
child. Respondent chose to step in those shoes and assume the role 
and responsibility of the “other” parent. This should be her 
responsibility and not the responsibility of the taxpayer.
  Based on those findings, 
the court ordered Elisa to continue financially supporting the twins by applying 
the equitable doctrine of estoppel:  
151
 The court recognized the need to acknowledge that parenthood is not 
necessarily derived exclusively from genetics.  The Court realized that a parent is 
an adult who has acted by choice to become a parent regardless of sex.  The court 
then to recognize the rights of the children to keep all of the parents they may 
have and the on-going obligation of those parents to remain in a beneficial 
relationship to the children.  The court's analysis was done without reference to a 
 
                                                 
149 Id. at 664.  
150 Id.  
151 Id.  
95 
marriage between the parents because their intentions were easily discerned from 
their conduct.  When Elisa and Emily decided to act together to engage in 
reproductive conduct that resulted in three children, they became accountable for 
their conduct.  In effect, parents' actions speak louder than any words or marriage 
vow. 
Keep in mind here that the intentions of these parties were clear.  That is 
not always the case.  Sometimes such agreements can be demonstrated with a 
written document such as a co-parenting agreement that alleges joint reproductive 
conduct.  Or even one that alleges parentage should attach based on an agreement 
to do so regarding an already existing child by a person who had no part in his or 
her creation?  Recall that many view marriage as a contract.  It is memorialized in 
writing by the issuance and signing of a license issued by the State but it is indeed 
a set of promises that will be upheld and for which a remedy can be had for its 
breach.  A bargain is a bargain and it should not matter what evidence there is to 
support the claim of it.  A traditional marriage is not the only mechanism with 
which we bind together those who reproduce for the benefit of their progeny.   
Another interesting development in this area of the law is a case named In 
re E. L. M. C.152
                                                 
152 In re E. L. M. C., 100 P.3d 546 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). The term in re is a Latin 
phrase meaning "in the matter of." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 793 (6th ed. 
1991). 
  In fact, that court stated that, “This case illustrates the evolving 
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nature of parenthood.”153  It does so by recognizing that it is harmful to children 
to lose a parent, even if that parent is not biologically related or ordained by the 
marriage of his parents or a court order of adoption.  This case acknowledges the 
doctrine of psychological parenthood154
CHAPTER 4: The Family Law Paradigm 
 and finds it is harmful to children who 
are separated from such a parent.  Here, parentage is not supported by the intent 
of the parties to engage together in reproductive conduct.  It is almost as if the 
court recognized an agreement for adoption between the parties that was not 
ordered by a court.  Better, this court, like the court in Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 
agreed that parentage need not rest on a relationship between the parties, or even a 
joint reproductive act so long as the intent to do so was established.  This child 
was born in China, adopted, and not biologically related to either parent.   
 Of the foregoing cases, some have been decided correctly for the wrong 
reasons and some were decided wrongly or the wrong reasons.  The point here is 
that advanced reproductive technology has out paced the law.  Marriage is no 
longer a good solution to the problem because it is no longer able to help us sort 
                                                 
153 See In re E. L. M. C., supra note 154, at 548. 
154 A psychological parent is found by application of a four-pronged test.  First the 
legal parent must have consented to and fostered the relationship.  Second, the 
non-parent and the child must have lived together in the same household (i.e. 
familial unit). Third, the non-parent must have actually assumed the obligations of 
parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the support of the child without 
expectation of reward.  Finally, the non-parent must have established a bonded 
parental relationship with the child.  See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 
2000). 
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out parents and parenting responsibilities.  The marriage debate is critically 
important because we need to determine who is responsible for which children so 
we need to take a new critical look at family law.  We do not necessarily a new 
set of rules but rather, a new way of interpreting our existing rules.  We need 
expanded definitions that stem from today’s technological challenges.  We still 
need to manage the familial relationships that have persisted since the dawn of 
our history and that continue to evolve alongside our technology.  We need to 
admit that reproduction is no longer based simply in biology and therefore 
parentage and marriage can no longer be codependent on each other.    
All of these cases show that the evolution of family has fallen short of 
alleviating our dilemma.  Even those that come to the right conclusions have not 
bestowed on non-married, non-biological parents the full plethora of parental 
rights.  This fact may appear to be a challenge but, like all of the voices of the 
marriage debate, actually is quite helpful.  As any good philosopher believes, the 
answer often is found in the question.   
The courts have not bestowed a full assortment of parental rights on those 
who seek them outside of genetics and marriage, at least in part, because they did 
not have to.  They did not have to because the assortment of parental rights and 
responsibilities is easily broken up into its concomitant parts and the parts can be 
disbursed to separate individuals as needed to achieve the child’s best interests.  If 
the role an adult plays in a child’s life is that of provider then the courts should 
protect the relationship.  But even though that person is a provider, he or she may 
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not be the nurturer or the one responsible for daily care-giving duties.  Often such 
parental responsibilities are separated and either shared or delegated between 
parents.  This is the next step the courts need to take.  The courts need to 
recognize that the full assortment of parental rights and responsibilities (easily) 
can be broken down easily into separate tasks that can be delegated among as 
many individual adults as any child may have available to him or her.   
This entails an argument in favor of recognizing multiple parents.  After 
all, if marriage and genetics are not the exclusive and controlling parameters with 
which to make parentage determinations, then neither is the number of parents.  
The number is constricted by the notion of marriage which in turn in constricted 
by the notion of reproductive pairs and tops out at two.  Based on today’s 
technology and the reality of today’s parentage determinations, such a limit is 
neither necessary nor sufficient.  Put simply, lots of kids have multiple parents 
now and for lots of reasons.  The best interests of children will be best served 
when the law recognizes and supports all of the beneficial relationships a child 
develops.    
This position is not original.  Professor Bartlett155
                                                 
155  See Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The 
Need for Legal Alternative When the Premise of the Nuclear Family has Failed, 
70 Va. L. Rev. 879 (1984). 
 argued that an intact 
nuclear family unit should be protected but where it has failed a multiple parent 
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model should be supported if it is found.   Professor Young156 rejects unique 
considerations or protections for the nuclear family model and suggests that 
parenting is organized around a “core family unit” or “core” parent(s).  Professor 
Kavanagh157 rejects the notion of a “core” and instead claims the family should be 
recognized as organized around a “care-based” and “child-centered” model.158  
The important point in all of their positions is that in reality lots of people are 
parenting children in lots of different ways and all of them should be 
recognized,159
Collaborative parenting means cooperative parenting by multiple adults.  
This is neither a theoretical invention nor a novel concept at all.  The existing 
models for it are joint custody, open adoption, foster parenting, and the 
 and protected by our courts so long as they are beneficial to the 
children.   
                                                 
156 Id. at 944.  
157  See Alison H. Young, Preconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm of 
the Exclusive Family, 6 Am. U. J. Gender & L. 505, 518 (1998).  
158  See Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to 
a Care-Based Standard, 16 Yale J. L. & Feminism 83, 85 (2004). 
159 This is not a novel notion to children either.  My own daughter, now in high 
school, began referring to my partner and I as her “parental unit.”  I immediately 
liked both the notion and the moniker and now consider myself a founding partner 
of her parental unit.  This title could shortened in daily usage to “parent.”  In fact, 
any title appropriate to any member of any child’s “parental unit” could be 
shortened in daily usage to “parent.”  Do not you love the simplicity? So long as 
the members of the parental unit understand and fulfill their individual 
responsibilities and share in the joys of the job there is no need to distinguish 
legally, or publicly, between them. The challenge here is overcoming a societal 
presumption of the exclusivity of parentage.    
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recognition of visitation, custody, and adoption rights for third parties.160
 A: The Call for Reform 
  When 
such collaboration is involved I think it is right to state that it comprises a parental 
unit.  Notice how easily “parent” has been replaced with “parental unit.”  A 
parental unit is any number of adults of either sex acting alone or together to 
fulfill the parental needs of a child or children.  The definition does not require, 
nor does it forbid, the adults from being the biological progenitor(s) of the child 
or children.  Even a single parent is a parental unit worthy of recognition and 
protection so long as it benefits the child.   
The worst of these decisions was predicated on passé notions of the family 
unit; notions that for the most part began with genetic links and ended with 
marriage.  These notions catered to concerns that generally no longer apply to the 
institution of family as it exists today and demonstrate the need for mechanisms 
that better protect a child's best interests, that in having a functioning parental 
                                                 
160 Some jurisdictions allow what is commonly referred to as second-parent 
adoption.  This process recognizes the addition of a new parent without 
terminating or essentially limiting the rights of an already existing parent.  The 
following cases represent about a dozen jurisdictions where third-party parental 
rights have been recognized:  In re E. L. M. C., 100 P. 3d 546 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2004); King v. S.B., 837 N.E.3d 965 (Ind. 2005); S.F. v. M. D., 751 A.2d 9 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 2000); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999); T.B. v. 
L.R.M., 76 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001); In re H.S.H.K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wisc. 1995); 
Thomas v. Thomas, 49 P.3d 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); LaChappelle v. Mitten, 
607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); A.C. v. C. B., 829 P 2d 660 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1992); Laspina-Williams v. Laspina-Williams, 742 A.2d 840 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 1999); Coons-Andersen v. Andersen, 104 S.W.3d 630 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); 
Clifford K v. Paul S, 619 S.E.2d 138 (W. Va. 2005). 
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unit.  The courts need not put themselves to the task of playing Solomon.161
Working within the current paradigm, courts have prevented a biological 
progenitor from obtaining an order of parentage because the child's mother was 
married to another man and the child already had a stable and secure parental 
unit.
  
Family courts should not be in the business of settling custody disputes by 
weighing the rights of the so-called parents as independent from and/or equal to 
the interest of the child in having parents.  Rather, they should make parentage 
determinations on the basis of those relationships that are beneficial to the child.  
The interests of children are frustrated by Solomon-like decisions that award only 
a genetic parent or a married parent a stake in the child with less regard for the 
consequences to the child.   
162  In some jurisdictions,163 a biological progenitor’s capacity to be a parent 
is terminated without regard for whether or not the child has a functional parental 
unit.164
                                                 
161 KINGS  3:16-28 (King Solomon is said to have settled a dispute between "two 
harlots" concerning which of them was the mother of a certain baby.  His decision 
was to cut the baby in half and give half to each woman, assuming that the real 
mother would relinquish her half rather than allow the baby to be harmed.  
Indeed, he gave the baby to the woman who relinquished her half of the baby.) 
  Our court's adherence to antiquated rules of dependence on genetics 
and/or marriage ignores the possibility of successful parental units that exist 
162  See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
163  Here I am considering only those jurisdictions that do not require the mother 
to be married as a precondition to the extinguishment of any rights of the donor. 
164  See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 677.365 (1993). 
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outside the current definitions.   Now that we have restated the definition of a 
parent and defined a parentage principle that is not conflated with marriage much 
of the work has been done toward reaching a better paradigm of family law.  
 B: Defining the Parent/Child Relationship 
In order to protect children's best interests we have to protect their parental 
relationships to the same degree that those relationships are established.  The 
models for multiple member parental units hold out lessons for how to do this.  
Joint custody as well as adoption, custody, and visitation rights for third parties 
are particularly good examples of where the three major functions of parenting are 
distilled into separable tasks and the duties can be delegated and shared.   
Joint custody generally is the result of a divorce between married parents.  
It is two adults living in separate households sharing the responsibility of meeting 
the needs of their shared children.  Sharing means just that; some is for me and 
some is for you.  Recall that we learned everything that was really important, like 
sharing, in childhood along with the rhyme that brought us here.  Custody is 
further distilled into legal custody (decisional authority) and physical custody 
(daily care-giving duties). Decisional authority can be and often is distilled into 
individual decision-making categories; such education or as we saw earlier, 
religion.  There have been court orders determining which days of the week a 
child will take golf lessons and which parent will pay for the lessons.  The 
division of parental responsibilities maintains the cohesiveness of a parental unit 
for the benefit it provides the child by maintains the child’s beneficial 
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relationships to adults that provide for him or her. Extending such recognition to 
other beneficial adults can only extend the benefits to children.   
Third party parental rights include visitation, custody, and in the case of 
adoption, legal recognition on par with, and entitled to the same protection as, a 
natural parent.  These third-parties are adults that are functioning as parents but 
are not progenitors.  Essentially, this is court ordered protection of the 
relationships of a parental unit that exceeds the reproductive progenitors.  These 
third parties are step parents, same-sex parents, or any other adults who in fact can 
show that their relationship with a child or children is worthy of protection 
because it benefits the child.  So you see, protection of the parental unit has 
already begun.   
 C: Statutory Determinations  
What is left to do is present a statutory regime that recognizes today’s 
realities and is not bound by the antiquated assumptions that parentage is rightly 
based in genetics or marriage.  Several attempts have been made.165
                                                 
165 The A.L.I. model parentage statute, the new Uniform Parentage Act, and the 
recent Washington, D.C. parentage statute stand out as examples.   
  I now 
undertake the ambitious task of presenting a parentage statute for the State of 
Arizona.  The choice is important because Arizona possibly has the worst record 
for recognizing beneficial parental units.  Arizona does not recognize same-sex 
marriage, does not allow multi-parent adoption, and has an in loco parentis statute 
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that leaves a child with no support from the non-parent who nevertheless gets 
visitation thereby playing a part in the child’s parental unit.  
 Arizona’s parentage statutes are found in the Arizona Revised Statutes at 
Title 25: Marital and Domestic Relations (Chapters1 - 9).  Some of them required 
only minor adjustments, such as moving an apostrophe to indicate plurality and 
possession but others needed a total makeover.  The re-draft of this statute should 
convince the reader that the task is simpler that it sounds.  We have come too far 
protecting children’s interests by recognizing their parental units to ever go back 
to the dark ages of family law where children are treated differently based on the 
configuration of their parental unit.  A realization that we must protect all of the 
beneficial relationships of children in order to serve their best interests may be 
one of the most important steps our courts can take in safeguarding the essential 
resource for our survival, our children. 
 To achieve these lofty goals, below are my proposed newly revised 
Arizona revised statutes.  Excluded from my proposed redraft are those sections 
of existing Arizona statutory law that are mostly satisfactory as currently written.  
In these unchanged sections, only the masculine and feminine discriminations 
between parents should be changed, as well as the singular to plural to 
accommodate the more dramatic adjustments proposed in other sections.  
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CHAPTER 5: The Newly Revised Arizona Revised Statutes  
 A: Marriage    
 Marriage had not been done away with simply because, as we saw earlier, 
there are several good things about it as all of the voices in the marriage debate 
tell us so.  But for the same reasons that marriage has always been worthy of 
protection, it remains so today.  We may each bear allegiance to one or another 
reason without recognizing the validity of others, however, all but the minority 
comprised of the marriage-enders still like it.  And I hope this argument will 
convince them to join the marriage-menders by showing what has gone changed 
and how we can, and should, adapt.   
 As marriage does work, a new statute should allow any adult who wants to 
promise his or her allegiance in marriage to another, or multiple others, is 
afforded an opportunity to do so.   After all, if familial associations are good and 
marriage helps create those associations then marriage is good.  And those who 
make such promises will be held to them.   Remedies will continue to be applied 
through divorce rules.   
 Because those who chose to marry and those who chose to procreate are 
not always the same people, parentage determinations will have little to do with 
marriage.  The diminutive dispositive influence that remains is a presumption 
based on marital status that may be easily rebutted by evidence of a different 
intent on the part of the adults who engaged in the reproductive conduct that 
resulted in a child or children.  
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 As before, parenting time and support obligations are dispensed  based on 
the actual indicia of parentage each parent evidences.  Parentage, seen this way, is 
easily broken into its composite components relating to fiduciary responsibility, 
decisional authority, and daily care-giving duties.   Fiduciary responsibility 
includes an obligation of financial support.   Decisional-authority requires an 
adult to make the best possible decisions regarding the best interests of the child 
or children.  Daily care-giving duties entail a little of all three categories but most 
importantly it includes the physical custody of the child or children.  The others 
may not include daily physical custody or even periodic face-to-face interactions.  
Some parents can be held to an obligation of support only; and that obligation can 
be shared among multiple adults.  After all by contract, by production and 
donation of genetic material, and simply by biological chance one can engage in 
reproductive conduct.  The law will allow us to determine not only who among us 
are parents but among them who should have what responsibilities to the child.    
 Because the purpose of marriage is create families and families are a good 
thing as we are communal animals, any adult can marry any other or others.  
Reproduction is not the basis of marriage under the new statute. In fact, it no 
longer has anything to do with marriage.  Marriage provides a benefit from the 
State.  It should be shared equally by those who want to share in it.  The only 
reason to disallow a marriage to any person is if the marriage is entered into in 
order to commit fraud in some way related to the benefits of marriage.   
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 Marriage by minors also is not forbidden but remains restricted by the 
consent of the parents (or a guardian) of a minor.  Recall that we all are not equal.  
We mature, both physically and emotionally, at varying rates.  Some of us may 
feel compelled to take on the responsibility of marriage, unwavering familial 
obligations to others, while our parents still are responsible for us.  In that case, it 
seems reasonable that the parents should consent.    
 The new statute also retains the requirements of a State-issued license and 
several indicia of formality such as who may perform the ceremonies that create a 
marriage.  This is necessary because marriage is a status that entitles the parties to 
State benefits, like joint tax returns.  In order to maintain the integrity of the 
system of distribution of the benefits, the State must have a way of certifying such 
status.  The requirement of a license seems an easy and practical way to do it.  
The statute also continues to allow, but does not require, various religious leaders 
to perform such ceremonies simply because it matters to some people.  So long as 
the regulations are applied equally to secular and non-secular figures it makes no 
difference to the system. 
Article 1: Marriage (§§101-103) 
§101- Void Marriages – A marriage entered into for the purpose of, or 
with the intent to, perpetrate a fraud in any way is void.   
 
§102 – Marriage of Minors 
 
A. Persons under eighteen years of age shall not marry without the consent 
of their parental unit.  Persons under sixteen years of age shall not marry 
without the consent of their parental unit and the approval of a superior 
court judge in the state. 
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B. Before authorizing the marriage of a person who is under sixteen years 
of age, the court: 
1. Shall require both parties to the marriage to complete premarital 
counseling.  
2. Must find that the minor is entering into the marriage 
voluntarily. 
3. Must find that the marriage is in the best interests of the minor. 
C. A marriage shall not take place under this section if it is prohibited by 
the law relating to void marriages.  
Article 2: Validity of Marriages (§§111-112) 
§111 - Requirements 
A. A marriage shall be contracted by agreement with or without a 
marriage ceremony. 
B. A marriage contracted within this state is not valid unless all of the 
following occur: 
1. A license is issued as provided in this title. 
2. The marriage is solemnized by a person authorized by law to 
solemnize marriages or by a person purporting to act in such capacity and 
believed in good faith by at least one of the parties to be so authorized. 
3. The marriage is solemnized before the expiration of the 
marriage license. 
§112 – Marriages from other jurisdictions  
A. Marriages valid by the laws of the place where contracted are valid in 
this state.  
B. Marriages solemnized in another state or country by parties intending at 
the time to reside in this state shall have the same legal consequences and effect 
as if solemnized in this state.  
C. Parties residing in this state may not evade the laws of this state relating 
to marriage by going to another state or country for solemnization of the marriage.  
109 
Article 3: License, Ceremony and Record (§§121-130) 
§121 – Application and affidavit 
A. Persons shall not be joined in marriage in this state until a license has 
been obtained for that purpose from the clerk of the superior court in any county 
of this state.  
B. Persons who wish to marry shall apply to the clerk of the superior court 
for a license and shall complete and sign under oath an affidavit provided by the 
clerk that states each applicant's name, age and residential address. The applicants 
shall provide their social security numbers to the clerk separately from the 
affidavit. The affidavit shall be filed by the clerk who shall then issue to the 
applicants a license directed to the persons authorized by law to solemnize 
marriage and shall collect the fee prescribed by section 12-284. The license is 
sufficient authority for any authorized person to solemnize the marriage. The 
marriage license shall state that the marriage license expires one year from the 
date of issuance of the license. 
C. Except for release to the department of economic security for the 
purpose of child support enforcement, the social security number provided to the 
clerk of the superior court pursuant to subsection B of this section for an 
applicant's marriage license shall not be released to any person or entity unless the 
applicant requests in writing that the information be released. The provisions of 
this subsection shall appear in each application for a marriage license. 
§122 - Consent for minor  
The clerk of the superior court shall not issue a license to a person who is 
under eighteen years of age without the consent required pursuant to section 25-
102.  
§123 - Recording; return; lost licenses 
 A. The clerk of the superior court shall maintain a record of all marriage 
licenses issued. 
B. The person solemnizing the rites of matrimony shall endorse the act of 
solemnization on the license and shall return the license to the clerk within thirty 
days after the solemnization. The returned marriage license shall be recorded by 
the clerk. 
110 
C. If a marriage license is lost before the endorsement of solemnization, 
the persons who wish to marry shall reapply to the clerk for a marriage license 
pursuant to section 25-121 and pay a fee pursuant to section 12-284. 
 D. If the license that bears the endorsement of solemnization is lost, the 
clerk shall issue a replacement license that must be signed by the person who 
solemnized the marriage, the persons who married and two of the witnesses to 
their marriage ceremony. The signed replacement license shall be returned to the 
clerk who shall record the license. If the persons married are unable to obtain all 
of the required signatures, either of them or their representative may apply to the 
superior court for an order to authorize the issuance of a duplicate endorsed 
marriage license. The application shall be by a sworn statement that describes the 
circumstances of the marriage ceremony and that contains the notarized signatures 
of the applicant and, if possible, both persons married, the person who solemnized 
the marriage and at least two witnesses to the marriage ceremony. If the 
application is submitted by a representative, the court shall determine if the 
representative is an appropriate requesting party. Pursuant to a court order, the 
clerk shall issue and record a duplicate endorsed marriage license. The court shall 
not charge a fee for the application or for issuing or recording the duplicate 
endorsed marriage license. 
§124 - Persons authorized to perform marriage ceremony; definition 
A. The following are authorized to solemnize marriages between persons 
who are authorized to marry: 
1. Duly licensed or ordained clergymen. 
2. Judges of courts of record. 
3. Municipal court judges. 
4. Justices of the peace. 
5. Justices of the United States supreme court. 
6. Judges of courts of appeals, district courts and courts that are 
created by an act of Congress if the judges are entitled to hold office 
during good behavior. 
7. Bankruptcy court and tax court judges. 
8. United States magistrate judges. 
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9. Judges of the Arizona court of military appeals. 
B. For the purposes of this section, "licensed or ordained clergymen" 
includes ministers, elders or other persons who by the customs, rules and 
regulations of a religious society or sect are authorized or permitted to solemnize 
marriages or to officiate at marriage ceremonies. 
§125 - Ceremony; official; witnesses; marriage license; 
A. A valid marriage is contracted by persons with a proper marriage 
license who participate in a ceremony conducted by and in the presence of a 
person who is authorized to solemnize marriages and at which at least two 
witnesses who are at least eighteen years of age participate.  
B. A marriage license shall be signed by all parties to the marriage, two of 
the witnesses to the marriage ceremony and the person who solemnized the 
marriage, who shall return the signed marriage license to the clerk of the superior 
court for recording.  
§126 - Application to justice of the peace  
A. A justice of the peace whose office is located five miles or more from 
the county seat of the county in which the office is located may be designated by 
the clerk of the superior court to receive applications for and issue marriage 
licenses in that county.  The applications for a marriage license shall be made on 
forms conforming to section 25-121, which shall be provided by the clerk of the 
superior court. 
B. If requested by the justice of the peace designated pursuant to 
subsection A of this section, the clerk of the superior court shall issue in blank 
licenses as requested and charge them against the justice of the peace. A justice of 
the peace who has possession of marriage license forms as provided in this 
section shall account for these forms as required by the clerk of the superior court. 
C. The justice of the peace designated pursuant to subsection A of this 
section shall report to the clerk the issuance of each license and shall transmit the 
fee prescribed by section 12-284 at the same time. Intentional failure to transmit 
the report and fee or the use of the authority granted by this section by the justice 
of the peace for personal gain is a class 2 misdemeanor. 
§127 – Application to Town or City clerk  
A. If a city or town is more than four miles from the county seat, the clerk 
of the superior court may allow the clerk of the city or town or the city or town 
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court clerk to issue marriage licenses.  The clerk of the superior court may take 
this action only at the request of the local clerk. 
B. The local clerk shall only use marriage license application forms and 
licenses provided by the clerk of the superior court. The clerk of the superior 
court shall provide the local clerk with these documents on request. 
C. The local clerk shall account for all forms and blank licenses in the 
local clerk's possession as required by the clerk of the superior court. 
D. The local clerk shall collect the fee prescribed under section 12-284 
and transmit it to the clerk of the superior court. The local clerk may retain one 
dollar fifty cents from the fee prescribed under section 12-284.  
§128 - Unlawful acts of person authorized to solemnize marriages 
A. It is unlawful for any person who is authorized to solemnize marriages 
to: 
1. Knowingly participate in or by his presence sanction the marriage 
of a person under the age of eighteen years who obtained a marriage 
license without consent in writing of their parental unit or other guardian 
lawfully entitled to give consent. 
2. Solemnize a marriage without first being presented with a 
marriage license as required by the laws of this state. 
3. Fail to file the marriage license with the act of solemnization 
endorsed on the marriage license within thirty days of the ceremony. 
4. Knowingly make a false return of a marriage or pretended 
marriage to the clerk of the superior court. 
B. A violation of this section is a class 2 misdemeanor.  
§129 - Unlawful acts of person authorized to issue marriage license or 
make marriage records; classification 
A. It is unlawful for a clerk of the superior court to knowingly issue a 
marriage license to a person under the age of eighteen years without the consent 
in writing of the parental unit or guardian lawfully entitled to give consent. 
 B. It is unlawful for any person to knowingly make a false record of a 
marriage return. 
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 C. A violation of this section is a class 2 misdemeanor. 
§130 - Abstract of marriage in lieu of reproducing marriage license 
The clerk of the superior court may produce an abstract of marriage in lieu 
of a reproduction of the recorded marriage license. An abstract of marriage shall 
include the legal names of parties prior to the marriage, their names after the 
marriage, the date of the marriage and the date on which the marriage license was 
recorded.  
 B: Marital Property Rights  
 Marriage is a contract between private parties regarding the 
responsibilities and obligations of family.  Those responsibilities and obligations 
have to do with finances.  As such, the property and contract rights of married 
partners still need to be spelled out.  This Chapter of the “revised” statute 
addresses this rights.  The proposed revised statute addresses premarital 
agreements, contracts that alter the ordinary application and presumptions of 
marriage property law.  Because marriage is a contract between private parties, 
they should have the option of modifying the contract to fit their individual goals.  
This is what premarital contracts accomplish.  This section of the statute defines 
the scope, application, and treatment of those individual contracts that modify the 
general marriage contract.  In defining the capacity to modify the general 
marriage contract it also defines the parameters of any separate, non-marital 
property and its management and control.  
 This chapter used to contain a section regarding contracts for reproductive 
conduct or reproductive contracts, called surrogacy contracts.  This section has 
been modified and moved to the chapter addressing parentage determinations.  
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After all, those sorts of contracts help determine who is a parent much more so 
that who is married.  Logically and logistically it just does not belong in this 
section.   
Article 1: Arizona Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (§§201 - 205)  
§201 - Definitions 
In this article, unless the context otherwise requires: 
1. "Premarital agreement" means an agreement between 
prospective spouses that is made in contemplation of marriage and that is 
effective on marriage. 
2. "Property" means an interest, present or future, legal or 
equitable, vested or contingent, in real or personal property, including 
income and earnings.  
§202 Enforcement of premarital agreements; exception 
A. A premarital agreement must be in writing and signed by all parties. 
The agreement is enforceable without consideration. 
B. The agreement becomes effective on marriage of the parties. 
C. The agreement is not enforceable if anyone against whom enforcement 
is sought proves either of the following: 
1. The person did not execute the agreement voluntarily. 
2. The agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and 
before execution of the agreement that person or persons: 
(a) Was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the 
property or financial obligations of the other party or parties. 
(b) Did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any 
right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the 
other party or parties beyond the disclosure provided. 
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(c) Did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an 
adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the 
other party or parties. 
D. If a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal 
support and that modification or elimination causes a party to the agreement to be 
eligible for support under a program of public assistance at the time of separation 
or marital dissolution, a court, notwithstanding the terms of the agreement, may 
require the others to provide support to the extent necessary to avoid that 
eligibility. 
E. An issue of unconscionability of a premarital agreement shall be 
decided by the court as a matter of law. 
F. If a marriage is determined to be void, an agreement that would 
otherwise have been a premarital agreement is enforceable only to the extent 
necessary to avoid an inequitable result.  
§203 - Scope of agreement 
A. Parties to a premarital agreement may contract with respect to: 
1. The rights and obligations of each of the parties in any of the 
property of any of them whenever and wherever acquired or located. 
2. The right to buy, sell, use, transfer, exchange, abandon, lease, 
consume, expend, assign or create a security interest in, mortgage, 
encumber, dispose of or otherwise manage and control property. 
3. The disposition of property on separation, marital dissolution, 
death or the occurrence or nonoccurrence of any other event. 
4. The modification or elimination of spousal support. 
5. The making of a will, trust or other arrangement to carry out the 
provisions of the agreement. 
6. The ownership rights in and disposition of the death benefit 
from a life insurance policy. 
7. The choice of law governing the construction of the agreement. 
8. Any other matter, including their personal rights and obligations, 
not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty. 
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B. The right of a child to support may not be adversely affected by a 
premarital agreement.  
§204 - Amendment or revocation of agreement 
After marriage, a premarital agreement may be amended or revoked only 
by a written agreement signed by the parties. The amended agreement or the 
revocation is enforceable without consideration. 
§205 - Limitation of actions 
A statute of limitations applicable to an action asserting a claim for relief 
under a premarital agreement is tolled during the marriage of the parties to the 
agreement. However, equitable defenses limiting the time for enforcement, 
including laches and estoppel, are available to any party.  
Article 2: Property Rights and Contract Powers (§§211 - 218) 
§211 - Property acquired during marriage as community property; 
exceptions; effect of service of a petition 
A. All property acquired by any party during the marriage is the 
community property of the married partners except for property that is: 
1. Acquired by gift, devise or descent. 
2. Acquired after service of a petition for dissolution of marriage, 
legal separation or annulment if the petition results in a decree of 
dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment. 
B. Notwithstanding subsection A, paragraph 2, service of a petition for 
dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment does not: 
1. Alter the status of preexisting community property. 
2. Change the status of community property used to acquire new 
property or the status of that new property as community property. 
3. Alter the duties and rights of either spouse with respect to the 
management of community property except as prescribed pursuant to 
section 25-315,  subsection A, paragraph 1, subdivision (a).  
§213 - Separate property 
117 
A. A spouse's real and personal property that is owned by that spouse 
before marriage and that is acquired by that spouse during the marriage by gift, 
devise or descent, and the increase, rents, issues and profits of that property, is the 
separate property of that spouse. 
B. Property that is acquired by a spouse after service of a petition for 
dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment is also the separate 
property of that spouse if the petition results in a decree of dissolution of 
marriage, legal separation or annulment. 
C. Notwithstanding subsection B of this section and section 25-214, 
subsection C, a mortgage or deed of trust executed by a spouse who acquires the 
real property encumbered by that mortgage or deed of trust after service of a 
petition for dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment shall be 
enforceable against the real property if the petition does not result in a decree of 
dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment. 
D. A contribution to an irrevocable trust that has or will have as its 
principal asset life insurance on the person making the contribution is a 
contribution of the insured's separate property if a spouse of the insured is the 
primary beneficiary of the trust.  
§214 - Management and control 
A. Each spouse has the sole management, control and disposition rights of 
his or her  separate property. 
B. The spouses have equal management, control and disposition rights 
over their community property and have equal power to bind the community. 
C. Any spouse separately may acquire, manage, control or dispose of 
community property or bind the community, except that joinder of all spouses is 
required in any of the following cases: 
1. Any transaction for the acquisition, disposition or encumbrance 
of an interest in real property other than an unpatented mining claim or a 
lease of less than one year. 
2. Any transaction of guaranty, indemnity or suretyship. 
3. To bind the community, irrespective of any person's intent with 
respect to that binder, after service of a petition for dissolution of 
marriage, legal separation or annulment if the petition results in a decree 
of dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment. 
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§215 - Liability of community property and separate property for 
community and separate debts 
A. The separate property of a spouse shall not be liable for the separate 
debts or obligations of any other spouse, absent agreement of the property owner 
to the contrary. 
B. The community property is liable for the premarital separate debts or 
other liabilities of a spouse, incurred after September 1, 1973 but only to the 
extent of the value of that spouse's contribution to the community property which 
would have been such spouse's separate property if not married. 
C. The community property is liable for a spouse's debts incurred outside 
of this state during the marriage which would have been community debts if 
incurred in this state. 
D. Except as prohibited in section 25-214, any spouse may contract debts 
and otherwise act for the benefit of the community. In an action on such a debt or 
obligation the spouses shall be sued jointly and the debt or obligation shall be 
satisfied: first, from the community property, and second, from the separate 
property of the spouse contracting the debt or obligation.  
§217 - Ownership of property acquired after moving into state 
Marital rights in property which is acquired in this state during marriage 
by persons married without the state who move into the state shall be controlled 
by the laws of this state. 
 C: Dissolution of Marriage  
 If we are to retain marriage we must also retain divorce.   Logically, it 
must be this way; it is also required by the feminist voices in the marriage debate.  
If these voices are taken seriously, the best way to assuage their concerns is to 
make divorce as easy as marriage.  In other words, it must be just as easy to get 
out of a marriage as it is to get into one if the harms of marriage, as they see them, 
are to be cured.  Marriage must be a matter of informed and continued consent by 
the parties.   
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 However, because religious concerns are no longer controlling in family 
law, annulments are not necessary and reference to such and procedures for such 
have been eliminated.  Currently, there is no significant difference to the State 
between annulment and divorce.  Since the proposed new statute denies the ability 
of church and state to hold sway over one another in familial legal determinations 
and annulment is more significant to religious concerns it has been eliminated as 
superfluous.   
 Sections 351-355 of Chapter 3, Article 5 relating to education remains.  
This section requires anyone coming into contact with the family courts to engage 
is a specific certified program of education.  The program is intended to impress 
upon its participants the importance, to all of us, of good parenting and how to 
achieve it.  The program will continue to be developed and certified by the State 
and will ensure that all participants in any family law proceeding involving 
children will be reminded of the impact of their decisions on the young lives they 
influence so greatly and how that in turn will affect society.  After all, those who 
accept parentage by chance may not have had the time or taken the opportunity to 
educate themselves.   Those who engage in parentage by choice may not think 
they have anything left to learn.  Both may be mistaken and because parenting is 
so critical to our shared future, it matters. 
 The section on reconciliation has also been retained.  It seems to me that if 
familial obligations are important enough for us to maintain through civil law then 
some effort ought to be made in actually maintaining them rather than simply 
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providing a means for a peaceful dissolution of them when it does work out.  
Conciliation courts give the parties another opportunity, and some important 
resources, with which to maintain these ever-so-important interpersonal 
connections.  Recall that they are important because they order society and 
provide support and care-giving duties that otherwise might fall to the society at-
large.   
Article 2: Dissolution of Marriage (§§311 – 331) 
§ 311 - Jurisdiction; form of petition; award of decree 
A. The superior court is vested with original jurisdiction to hear and 
decide all matters arising pursuant to this chapter and pursuant to chapter 4, article 
1 of this title. 
B. A proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation shall be 
entitled, "in re the marriage of (the parties to the marriage)" A custody or child 
support proceeding shall be entitled, "in re the (custody) (support) of (the child or 
children)." 
C. The initial pleading in all proceedings under this chapter and under 
chapter 4, article 1 of this title shall be denominated a petition. A responsive 
pleading shall be denominated a response. 
 D. A decree of dissolution or of legal separation, if made, shall not be 
awarded to one of the parties but shall provide that it affects the status previously 
existing between all parties in the manner decreed. 
§312 - Dissolution of marriage; findings necessary 
The court shall enter a decree of dissolution of marriage if it finds each of 
the following: 
1. That one of the parties, at the time the action was commenced, 
was domiciled in this state, or was stationed in this state while a member 
of the armed services, and that in either case the domicile or military 
presence has been maintained for ninety days prior to filing the petition for 
dissolution of marriage. 
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 2. The marriage is irretrievably broken.  
 3. To the extent it has jurisdiction to do so, the court has 
considered, approved and made provision for child custody, the support of 
any child common to the parties of the marriage entitled to support, the 
maintenance of any spouse and the disposition of property.  
§313 - Decree of legal separation; findings necessary 
The court shall enter a decree of legal separation if it finds each of the 
following: 
1. That one of the parties at the time the action was commenced 
was domiciled in this state or was stationed in this state while a member of 
the armed services. 
2. The conciliation provisions of section 25-381.09 and the 
provisions of article 5 of this chapter either do not apply or have been met. 
3. The marriage is irretrievably broken or any of the parties desire 
to live separate and apart and severe the community between them.   
4. The other party or parties do not object to a decree of legal 
separation. If another party objects to a decree of legal separation, on one 
of the parties meeting the required domicile for dissolution of marriage, 
the court shall direct that the pleadings be amended to seek a dissolution 
of the marriage. 
5. To the extent it has jurisdiction to do so, the court has 
considered, approved or made provisions for child custody, the support of 
any child common to the parties of the marriage entitled to support, the 
maintenance of any spouse and the disposition of the property. 
§314 - Pleadings; contents; defense; joinder of parties; confidentiality 
 A. The verified petition in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or 
legal separation shall allege that the marriage is irretrievably broken or that at 
least one of the parties desire to live separate and apart, and shall set forth: 
  1. The birth date, occupation and address of each party and the 
length of domicile in this state. 
 2. The date of the marriage and the place at which it was 
performed. 
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  3. The names, birth dates and addresses of all living children 
common to the parties and whether any spouse currently is pregnant. 
  4. The details of any agreements between the parties as to support, 
custody and parenting time of the children and maintenance of a spouse. 
  5. The relief sought. 
 B. Any party to the marriage may initiate the proceeding. 
 C. The only defense to a petition for the dissolution of a marriage or legal 
separation is that the marriage is not irretrievably broken.  
 D. The court may join additional parties necessary for the exercise of its 
authority. 
 E. This section does not require a victim of domestic violence or a resident 
of a domestic violence shelter as defined in section 36-3001 to divulge the 
person's address, except that a means of communicating with the resident, such as 
a post office box or address of the person's attorney, must be disclosed.  
§315 - Temporary order or preliminary injunction; effect; definition 
 A. In all actions for dissolution of marriage, for legal separation or for 
annulment, the clerk of the court pursuant to order of the superior court shall issue 
a preliminary injunction in the following manner: 
  1. The preliminary injunction shall be directed to each party to the 
action and contain the following orders: 
  (a) That all parties are enjoined from transferring, 
encumbering, concealing, selling or otherwise disposing of any of 
the joint, common or community property of the parties except if 
related to the usual course of business, the necessities of life or 
court fees and reasonable attorney fees associated with an action 
filed under this article, without the written consent of the parties or 
the permission of the court. 
    (b) That all parties are enjoined from: 
  (i) Molesting, harassing, disturbing the peace of or 
committing an assault or battery on the person of another 
party or any child of the parties. 
123 
  (ii) Removing any child of the parties then residing 
in Arizona from the jurisdiction of the court without the 
prior written consent of the parties or the permission of the 
court. 
  (iii) Removing or causing to be removed another 
party or the children of the parties from any existing 
insurance coverage, including medical, hospital, dental, 
automobile and disability insurance. 
  (c) That the parties shall maintain all insurance coverage in 
full force and effect. 
  2. The preliminary injunction shall include the following 
statement: 
Warning:                                        
This is an official court order. If you disobey this order the court may find 
you in contempt of court. You may also be arrested and prosecuted for the 
crime of interfering with judicial proceedings and any other crime you 
may have committed in disobeying this order. 
You or any of your spouses may file a certified copy of this order with 
your local law enforcement agency. A certified copy may be obtained 
from the clerk of the court that issued this order. If you are the person that 
brought this action, you must also file evidence with the law enforcement 
agency that this order was served on your spouse. 
This court order is effective until a final decree of dissolution, legal 
separation or annulment is filed or the action is dismissed. 
The preliminary injunction is effective against the petitioner when the 
petition is filed and against the respondent(s) on service of a copy of the 
order or on actual notice of the order, whichever is sooner. If service is by 
registered mail under the Arizona rules of family law procedure, the order 
is effective on receipt of the order. The order remains effective until 
further order of the court or the entry of a decree of dissolution, legal 
separation or annulment. 
At the time of filing the petition for dissolution, legal separation or 
annulment, the copies of the preliminary injunction shall be issued to the 
petitioner or the agent, servant or employee filing the petition for 
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dissolution, legal separation or annulment. The petitioner is deemed to 
have accepted service of the petitioner's copy of the preliminary injunction 
and to have actual notice of its contents by filing or causing to be filed a 
petition for dissolution, legal separation or annulment. The petitioner shall 
cause a copy of the preliminary injunction to be served on the 
respondent(s) with a copy of the summons and petition for dissolution, 
legal separation or annulment. 
The preliminary injunction has the force and effect of an order of the 
superior court signed by a judge and is enforceable by all remedies made 
available by law, including contempt of court.  
 B. In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, for legal separation, for 
annulment or for maintenance or support following dissolution of the marriage by 
a court that lacked personal jurisdiction over an absent spouse, any party may 
move for an order for equal possession of the liquid assets of the marital property, 
temporary maintenance or temporary support of a child common to the parties 
entitled to support. The court shall provide for an order for equitable possession of 
the liquid assets of the marital property that existed as of the date the petition for 
dissolution or legal separation or annulment was served, unless the court finds 
that there is good cause not to divide those assets. The court's division of liquid 
assets held by financial institutions does not invalidate applicable law or any 
provision of an account agreement that assesses penalties against the account 
holder for premature or unscheduled withdrawals of account funds. The motion 
shall be accompanied by an affidavit setting forth the factual basis for the motion 
and the amounts requested and, if appropriate, the liquid assets of the parties. An 
order for equal possession of the liquid assets of the marital property does not 
prejudice any final division of the marital community. This subsection does not 
eliminate the application of the preliminary injunction. 
 C. As a part of a motion for temporary maintenance or support or by 
independent motion accompanied by affidavit, any party may request the court to 
issue a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction for any of the 
following relief: 
  1. Excluding a party from the family home or from the home of 
another party on a showing that physical or emotional harm may otherwise 
result. 
  2. Providing other injunctive relief proper in the circumstances. 
 D. The court may issue a temporary restraining order without requiring 
notice to the other party only if it finds on the basis of the moving affidavit or 
other evidence that irreparable injury will result to the moving party if no order is 
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issued until the time for responding has elapsed. A bond is not required unless the 
court deems it appropriate. 
 E. On the basis of the showing made, and in conformity with sections 25-
318 and 25-319, the court may issue a preliminary injunction and an order for 
temporary maintenance or support in amounts and on terms just and proper in the 
circumstances. The court may also make temporary orders respecting the property 
of the parties, as may be necessary. 
 F. A temporary order or preliminary injunction: 
  1. Does not prejudice the rights of the parties or of any child that 
are to be adjudicated at the subsequent hearings in the proceeding. 
 2. May be revoked or modified before final decree on a showing 
by affidavit of the facts necessary to revocation or modification of a final 
decree under section 25-327. 
  3. That provided for equitable possession of liquid assets of the 
marital property does not prejudice any other party's claim for temporary 
maintenance, child support or attorney fees. 
  4. Terminates when the final decree is entered or when the petition 
for dissolution, legal separation or annulment is dismissed. 
 G. A person who disobeys or resists an injunction issued pursuant to 
subsection A, paragraph 1, subdivision (b) or subsection C, paragraph 1 of this 
section is subject to arrest and prosecution for interference with judicial 
proceedings pursuant to section 13-2810 and the following procedures apply: 
  1. Any party may cause a certified copy of the injunction and 
return of service on the other party to be registered with the sheriff having 
jurisdiction of the area in which the party resides. The party originally 
registering the injunction shall register any changes or modifications of the 
injunction with the sheriff. For enforcement by arrest and prosecution for 
interference with judicial proceedings, a certified copy of the injunction, 
whether or not registered with the sheriff, is presumed to be a valid 
existing order of the court until a final decree of dissolution, legal 
separation or annulment is entered or the action for dissolution or legal 
separation is dismissed. 
  2. A peace officer, with or without a warrant, may arrest a person if 
the peace officer has probable cause to believe that an offense under this 
subsection has been committed and has probable cause to believe that the 
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person to be arrested has committed the offense, whether the offense is a 
felony or a misdemeanor and whether such offense was committed within 
or without the presence of the peace officer. The release procedures 
available under section 13-3883, subsection A, paragraph 4 and section 
13-3903 are not applicable to arrests made pursuant to this subsection. 
  3. A peace officer making an arrest pursuant to this subsection is 
not civilly or criminally liable for the arrest if the officer acts on probable 
cause and without malice. 
 4. A person arrested pursuant to this subsection may be released 
from custody in accordance with the rules of criminal procedure or other 
applicable statute. An order for release, with or without an appearance 
bond, shall include pretrial release conditions necessary to provide for the 
protection of the alleged victim and other specifically designated persons 
and may provide additional conditions that the court deems appropriate, 
including participation in any counseling programs available to the 
defendant. 
  5. The remedies provided in this subsection for enforcement of the 
preliminary injunction are in addition to any other civil or criminal 
remedies available, including civil contempt of court. The use of one 
remedy does not prevent the simultaneous or subsequent use of any other. 
 H. For the purposes of this section, "liquid assets" means: 
  1. Cash. 
  2. Traveler's checks. 
  3. Cash in financial institutions or bank investments convertible to 
cash. 
  4. Lottery winnings. 
§316 - Irretrievable breakdown; finding 
 A. If any party by petition or otherwise states under oath or affirmation 
that the marriage is irretrievably broken or if one of the parties so states and the 
others does not deny it, the court shall make a finding as to whether or not the 
marriage is irretrievably broken. 
127 
 B. If one of the parties denies under oath or affirmation that the marriage 
is irretrievably broken, the court shall hold a hearing to consider all relevant 
factors as to the prospect of reconciliation and shall do either of the following: 
  1. Make a finding as to whether or not the marriage is irretrievably 
broken. 
  2. Continue the matter for further hearing, not more than sixty days 
later. At the request of any party or on its own motion, the court may order 
a conciliation conference. At the next hearing the court shall make a 
finding as to whether or not the marriage is irretrievably broken. 
 C. A finding that the marriage is irretrievably broken is a determination 
that there is no reasonable prospect of reconciliation. 
§317 - Separation agreement; effect 
 A. To promote amicable settlement of disputes between parties to a 
marriage attendant on the separation or dissolution of their marriage, the parties 
may enter into a written separation agreement containing provisions for 
disposition of any property owned by any of them, maintenance of any of them, 
and support, custody and parenting time of their children. A separation agreement 
may provide that its maintenance terms shall not be modified. 
 B. In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation, the 
terms of the separation agreement, except those providing for the support, custody 
and parenting time of children, are binding on the court unless it finds, after 
considering the economic circumstances of the parties and any other relevant 
evidence produced by the parties, on their own motion or on request of the court, 
that the separation agreement is unfair. 
 C. If the court finds the separation agreement unfair as to disposition of 
property or maintenance, it may request the parties to submit a revised separation 
agreement or may make orders for the disposition of property or maintenance. 
 D. If the court finds that the separation agreement is not unfair as to 
disposition of property or maintenance and that it is reasonable as to support, 
custody and parenting time of children, the separation agreement shall be set forth 
or incorporated by reference in the decree of dissolution or legal separation and 
the parties shall be ordered to perform them. If the separation agreement provides 
that its terms shall not be set forth in the decree, the decree shall identify the 
separation agreement as incorporated by reference and state that the court has 
found the terms as to property disposition and maintenance not unfair and the 
terms as to support, custody and parenting time of children reasonable. 
128 
 E. Terms of the agreement set forth or incorporated by reference in the 
decree are enforceable by all remedies available for enforcement of a judgment, 
including contempt. 
 F. Except for terms concerning the maintenance of any party and the 
support, custody or parenting time of children, entry of the decree shall thereafter 
preclude the modification of the terms of the decree and the property settlement 
agreement, if any, set forth or incorporated by reference. 
 G. Notwithstanding subsection F, entry of a decree that sets forth or 
incorporates by reference a separation agreement that provides that its 
maintenance terms shall not be modified prevents the court from exercising 
jurisdiction to modify the decree and the separation agreement regarding 
maintenance, including a decree entered before July 20, 1996. 
§318 - Disposition of property; retroactivity; notice to creditors; 
assignment of debts; contempt of court 
 A. In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage, or for legal separation, 
or in a proceeding for disposition of property following dissolution of the 
marriage by a court which previously lacked personal jurisdiction over an absent 
spouse or previously lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court shall 
assign each spouse's sole and separate property to such spouse. It shall also divide 
the community, joint tenancy and other property held in common equitably, 
though not necessarily in kind, without regard to marital misconduct. For the 
purposes of this section only, property acquired by any spouse outside this state 
shall be deemed to be community property if the property would have been 
community property if acquired in this state. 
 B. In dividing property, the court may consider all debts and obligations 
that are related to the property, including accrued or accruing taxes that would 
become due on the receipt, sale or other disposition of the property. The court 
may also consider the exempt status of particular property pursuant title 33, 
chapter 8. 
 C. This section does not prevent the court from considering all actual 
damages and judgments from conduct that resulted in criminal conviction of any 
spouse in which another spouse or a child was the victim or excessive or 
abnormal expenditures, destruction, concealment or fraudulent disposition of 
community, joint tenancy and other property held in common. 
 D. The community, joint tenancy and other property held in common for 
which no provision is made in the decree shall be from the date of the decree held 
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by the parties as tenants in common, each possessed of an undivided equal 
interest. 
  E. The court may impress a lien on the separate property of any party or 
the marital property awarded to any party in order to secure the payment of: 
  1. Any interest or equity another party has in or to the property. 
  2. Community debts that the court has ordered to be paid by the 
parties. 
  3. An allowance for child support or spousal maintenance, or both. 
  4. All actual damages and judgments from conduct that resulted in 
criminal conviction of a spouse in which another spouse or a child was the 
victim. 
 F. The decree or judgment shall specifically describe by legal description 
any real property affected and shall specifically describe any other property 
affected. 
 G. This section applies through both prospective and retrospective 
operation to property without regard to the date of acquisition. 
 H. In all actions for the dissolution of marriage or legal separation, the 
court shall require the following statement in the materials provided to the 
petitioner and to be served on all respondent(s): 
Notice  
In your property settlement agreement or decree of dissolution or legal 
separation, the court may assign responsibility for certain community 
debts to one spouse or the other. Please be aware that a court order that 
does this is binding on the spouses only and does not necessarily relieve 
any spouse from responsibility for these community debts. These debts are 
matters of contract between the community and its creditors (such as 
banks, credit unions, credit card issuers, finance companies, utility 
companies, medical providers and retailers). 
Since the creditors are not parties to this court case, they are not bound by 
court orders or any agreements reached in this case. On request, the court 
may impose a lien against the separate property of a spouse to secure 
payment of debts that the court orders that spouse to pay. 
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You may want to contact any creditors to discuss your debts as well as the 
possible effects of your court case on any debts. To assist you in 
identifying creditors, you may obtain a copy of a spouse's credit report by 
making a written request to the court for an order requiring a credit 
reporting agency to release the report to you. Within thirty days after 
receipt of a request from a spouse who is party to a dissolution of marriage 
or legal separation action, which includes the court and case number of the 
action, creditors are required by law to provide information as to the 
balance and account status of any debts for which the requesting spouse 
may be liable to the creditor. You may wish to use the following form, or 
one that is similar, to contact your creditors: 
Creditor notification: 
Date: ____________________ 
Creditor name and 
Address: ________________________________ 
Within thirty days after receipt of this notice, you are requested to provide 
the balance and account status of any debt identified by account number 
for which the requesting party may be liable to you. 
Name: ___________________________________ 
Address: ________________________________ 
Signature: _________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________ 
(printed name) 
 
 I. On the written request of any party to a pending dissolution of marriage 
or legal separation action, the court, except for good cause shown, shall issue an 
order requiring any credit reporting agency to release the credit report as to a 
spouse of the requesting party on payment by the requesting party of any 
customary fee for providing the credit report. 
 J. On the request of any party and except for good cause shown, the court 
shall require the parties to submit a debt distribution plan that states the following: 
131 
  1. How community creditors will be paid.  
  2. Whether any agreements have been entered into between the 
parties as to responsibility for the payment of community debts, including 
what, if any, collateral will secure the payment of the debt. 
  3. Whether the parties have entered into agreements with creditors 
through which a community debt will be the sole responsibility of any 
particular party or parties. 
 K. The following form may be used to verify agreements with creditors: 
Agreement with creditor 
The parties to this agreement include __________________ who are 
parties to a dissolution of marriage action filed in ________________ 
county superior court, Arizona, case number _______________; and 
______________ who is a duly authorized representative of 
__________________ (creditor). 
The undersigned parties agree that the debt owed by the parties to 
___________________ (creditor) is to be disposed of as follows (check 
one): 
___ The debt is the joint responsibility of the parties, with payment to be 
made on the following terms:________________  
 ___ The balance of the debt is the responsibility of 
________________________ and the creditor releases 
___________________ from any further liability for that debt, with 
payment to be made on the following terms: 
_____________________________________________ 
___ The debt has been paid in full as of this date. 
We the undersigned acknowledge this agreement.  
Dated: _________________________ 
Debtor(s) 
_________________________________ 
Creditor's representative 
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Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of ________, _____. 
________________________________ 
Notary Public 
 
 L. If the parties are not able to agree to a joint debt distribution plan 
pursuant to subsection J, the court may order each party to submit a proposed debt 
distribution plan to the court. In its orders relating to the division of property, the 
court shall reflect the debt distribution plan approved by the court and shall 
confirm that any community debts that are made the sole responsibility of one of 
the parties by agreement with a creditor are the sole responsibility of that party. 
  M. An agreement with a creditor pursuant to subsection K that assigns or 
otherwise modifies repayment responsibility for community debts secured by real 
property located in this state shall include all of the following: 
  1. A legal description of the real property. 
  2. A copy of the note and recorded security instrument, the 
repayment of which is to be assigned or modified by the agreement with a 
creditor. 
  3. A written and notarized acknowledgment that is executed by all 
parties to the debt, including the lender, and that states one of the 
following: 
  (a) The terms for the repayment of the debt remain 
unchanged. 
  (b) The terms for the repayment of the debt have been 
modified and, beginning on the date of the execution of the 
acknowledgment, the creditor has agreed that 
__________________ assumes exclusive responsibility for the 
debt and that the other debtor(s) is released from any further 
liability on the debt. 
  (c) The debt is paid in full and all parties to the debt are 
released from any further liability. 
 N. An agreement executed pursuant to subsection M shall be recorded by 
any party in the county in which the real property is located. 
 O. After an agreement is recorded pursuant to subsection N, any party may 
request that on payment of the title company's fees for the document a title 
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company authorized to do business in this state provide the requesting party with 
a lien search report or other documentary evidence of liens and other agreements 
of record in the title to the property. 
 P. If a party fails to comply with an order to pay debts, the court may enter 
orders transferring property of that spouse to compensate another party. If the 
court finds that a party is in contempt as to an order to pay community debts, the 
court may impose appropriate sanctions under the law. A party must bring an 
action to enforce an order to pay a debt pursuant to this subsection within two 
years after the date in which the debt should have been paid in full. 
 Q. Within thirty days after receipt of a written request for information 
from a spouse who is a party to a dissolution of marriage or legal separation 
action, which includes the court and case number of the action, a creditor shall 
provide the balance and account status of any debts of any spouse(s) identified by 
account number for which the requesting spouse may be liable to the creditor. 
 R. If any part of the court's division of joint, common or community 
property is in the nature of child support or spousal maintenance, the court shall 
make specific findings of fact and supporting conclusions of law in its decree. 
§318.01 - Military retirement benefits; disability related waiver 
In making a disposition of property pursuant to section 25-318 or 25-327, 
a court shall not do any of the following:  
1. Consider any federal disability benefits awarded to a veteran for 
service-connected disabilities pursuant to 38 United States Code chapter 
11. 
2. Indemnify the veteran's spouse or former spouse for any 
prejudgment or postjudgment waiver or reduction in military retirement or 
retainer pay related to receipt of the disability benefits. 
3. Award any other income or property of the veteran to a veteran's 
spouse or former spouse for any prejudgment or post-judgment waiver or 
reduction in military retirement or retainer pay related to receipt of the 
disability benefits.  
§319 - Maintenance; computation factors 
 A. In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation, or a 
proceeding for maintenance following dissolution of the marriage by a court that 
lacked personal jurisdiction over an absent spouse, the court may grant a 
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maintenance order for any spouse for any of the following reasons if it finds that 
the spouse seeking maintenance: 
  1. Lacks sufficient property, including property apportioned to the 
spouse, to provide for that spouse's reasonable needs. 
  2. Is unable to be self-sufficient through appropriate employment 
or is the custodian of a child whose age or condition is such that the 
custodian should not be required to seek employment outside the home or 
lacks earning ability in the labor market adequate to be self-sufficient. 
  3. Contributed to the educational opportunities of another spouse. 
  4. Had a marriage of long duration and is of an age that may 
preclude the possibility of gaining employment adequate to be self-
sufficient. 
 B. The maintenance order shall be in an amount and for a period of time as 
the court deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, and after considering 
all relevant factors, including: 
   1. The standard of living established during the marriage. 
  2. The duration of the marriage. 
  3. The age, employment history, earning ability and physical and 
emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance. 
  4. The ability of the spouse(s) from whom maintenance is sought 
to meet that spouse's needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking 
maintenance. 
  5. The comparative financial resources of the spouses, including 
their comparative earning abilities in the labor market. 
  6. The contribution of the spouse seeking maintenance to the 
earning ability of the other spouse(s). 
  7. The extent to which the spouse seeking maintenance has 
reduced his or her income or career opportunities for the benefit of the 
community. 
  8. The ability of all parties after the dissolution to contribute to the 
future educational costs of their mutual children. 
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  9. The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, 
including marital property apportioned to that spouse, and that spouse's 
ability to meet his or her own needs independently. 
  10. The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training 
to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment 
and whether such education or training is readily available. 
  11. Excessive or abnormal expenditures, destruction, concealment 
or fraudulent disposition of community, joint tenancy and other property 
held in common. 
  12. The cost for the spouse who is seeking maintenance to obtain 
health insurance and the reduction in the cost of health insurance for the 
other spouse(s) from whom maintenance is sought if the spouse(s) from 
whom maintenance is sought is able to convert family health insurance to 
employee health insurance after the marriage is dissolved. 
  13. All actual damages and judgments from conduct that results in 
criminal conviction of any spouse in which another spouse or child was 
the victim. 
 C. If both parties agree, the maintenance order and a decree of dissolution 
of marriage or of legal separation may state that its maintenance terms shall not be 
modified. 
 D. Except as provided in subsection C of this section or section 25-317, 
subsection G, the court shall maintain continuing jurisdiction over the issue of 
maintenance for the period of time maintenance is awarded. 
§320 - Child support; factors; methods of payment; additional 
enforcement provisions; definitions 
 A. In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, 
maintenance or child support, the court may order any of the parents owing a duty 
of support to a child, born to or adopted by the parents, to pay an amount 
reasonable and necessary for support of the child, without regard to marital 
misconduct. 
 B. If child support has not been ordered by a child support order and if the 
court deems child support appropriate, the court shall direct, using a retroactive 
application of the child support guidelines to the date of filing a dissolution of 
marriage, legal separation, maintenance or child support proceeding, the amount 
that the parents shall pay for the past support of the child and the manner in which 
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payment shall be paid, taking into account any amount of temporary or voluntary 
support that has been paid. Retroactive child support is enforceable in any manner 
provided by law. 
 C. If the parties lived apart before the date of the filing for dissolution of 
marriage, legal separation, maintenance or child support and if child support has 
not been ordered by a child support order, the court may order child support 
retroactively to the date of separation, but not more than three years before the 
date of the filing for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, maintenance or 
child support. The court must first consider all relevant circumstances, including 
the conduct or motivation of the parties in that filing and the diligence with which 
service of process was attempted on the obligor spouse(s) or was frustrated by the 
obligor spouse(s). If the court determines that child support is appropriate, the 
court shall direct, using a retroactive application of the child support guidelines, 
the amount that the parents must pay for the past support of the child and the 
manner in which payments must be paid, taking into account any amount of 
temporary or voluntary support that has been paid. 
 D. The supreme court shall establish guidelines for determining the 
amount of child support. The amount resulting from the application of these 
guidelines is the amount of child support ordered unless a written finding is made, 
based on criteria approved by the supreme court, that application of the guidelines 
would be inappropriate or unjust in a particular case. The supreme court shall 
review the guidelines at least once every four years to ensure that their application 
results in the determination of appropriate child support amounts. The supreme 
court shall base the guidelines and criteria for deviation from them on all relevant 
factors, including: 
   1. The financial resources and needs of the child. 
  2. The financial resources and needs of the custodial parent. 
  3. The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the 
marriage not been dissolved. 
  4. The physical and emotional condition of the child, and the 
child's educational needs. 
  5. The financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent(s). 
  6. The medical support plan for the child. The plan should include 
the child's medical support needs, the availability of medical insurance or 
services provided by the Arizona health care cost containment system and 
whether a cash medical support order is necessary. 
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  7. Excessive or abnormal expenditures, destruction, concealment 
or fraudulent disposition of community, joint tenancy and other property 
held in common. 
  8. The duration of parenting time and related expenses. 
 E. Even if a child is over the age of majority when a petition is filed or at 
the time of the final decree, the court may order support to continue past the age 
of majority if all of the following are true: 
  1. The court has considered the factors prescribed in subsection D 
of this section. 
  2. The child is severely mentally or physically disabled as 
demonstrated by the fact that the child is unable to live independently and 
be self-supporting. 
  3. The child's disability began before the child reached the age of 
majority. 
 F. If a child reaches the age of majority while the child is attending high 
school or a certified high school equivalency program, support shall continue to 
be provided during the period in which the child is actually attending high school 
or the equivalency program but only until the child reaches nineteen years of age 
unless the court enters an order pursuant to subsection E of this section. 
Notwithstanding any other law, a parent paying support for a child over the age of 
majority pursuant to this section is entitled to obtain all records related to the 
attendance of the child in the high school or equivalency program. 
  G. If a personal check for support payments and handling fees is rightfully 
dishonored by the payor bank or other drawee, the person obligated to pay support 
shall make any subsequent support payments and handling fees only by cash, 
money order, cashier's check, traveler's check or certified check. If a person 
required to pay support other than by personal check demonstrates full and timely 
payment for twenty-four consecutive months, that person may pay support by 
personal check if these payments are for the full amount, are timely tendered and 
are not rightfully dishonored by the payor bank or other drawee. 
 H. Subsection G of this section does not apply to payments made by 
means of an assignment. 
 I. If after reasonable efforts to locate the obligee the clerk or support 
payment clearinghouse is unable to deliver payments for the period prescribed in 
section 25-503 due to the failure of the person to whom the support has been 
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ordered to be paid to notify the clerk or support payment clearinghouse of a 
change in address, the clerk or support payment clearinghouse shall not deliver 
further payments and shall return the payments to the obligor consistent with the 
requirements of section 25-503.  
 J. An order for child support shall assign responsibility for providing 
medical insurance for the child who is the subject of the support order to one of 
the parents and shall assign responsibility for the payment of any medical costs of 
the child that are not covered by insurance according to the child support 
guidelines. Each parent shall provide information to the court regarding the 
availability of medical insurance for the child that is accessible and available at a 
reasonable cost. In title IV-D cases, the parent responsible pursuant to court order 
for providing medical insurance for the child shall notify the child support 
enforcement agency in the department of economic security if medical insurance 
has been obtained or if the child is no longer covered under an insurance plan. 
 K. If the court finds that no parent has the ability to obtain medical 
insurance for the child that is accessible and available at a reasonable cost, the 
court shall: 
  1. In a title IV-D case, in accordance with established title IV-D 
criteria, establish a reasonable monthly cash medical support order to be 
paid by the obligor(s). If medical assistance is being provided to a child 
under title XIX of the social security act, cash medical support is assigned 
to the state pursuant to section 46-407. On verification that the obligor(s) 
has obtained private insurance, the cash medical support order terminates 
by operation of law on the first day of the month after the policy's 
effective date or on the date the court, or the department in a title IV-D 
case, is notified that insurance has been obtained, whichever is later. If the 
private insurance terminates, the cash medical support order automatically 
resumes by operation of law on the first day of the month following the 
termination date of the policy. 
  2. Order a parent to provide medical insurance when it becomes 
accessible and available at a reasonable cost. 
  3. Order that medical costs in excess of the cash medical support 
amount shall be paid by each parent according to the percentage assigned 
for payment of uninsured costs. 
  L. In a title IV-D case, if the court orders a noncustodial parent to obtain 
medical insurance the court shall also set an alternative cash medical support 
order to be paid by that parent if the child is not covered under an insurance plan 
within ninety days after entry of the order or if the child is no longer covered by 
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insurance. The court shall not order the custodial parent to pay cash medical 
support. 
 M. In title IV-D cases the superior court shall accept for filing any 
documents that are received through electronic transmission if the electronically 
reproduced document states that the copy used for the electronic transmission was 
certified before it was electronically transmitted. 
 N. The court shall presume, in the absence of contrary testimony, that a 
parent is capable of full-time employment at least at the applicable state or federal 
adult minimum wage, whichever is higher. This presumption does not apply to 
noncustodial parents who are under the age of eighteen and who are attending 
high school. 
 O. An order for support shall provide for an assignment pursuant to 
sections 25-504 and 25-323. 
 P. Each licensing board or agency that issues professional, recreational or 
occupational licenses or certificates shall record on the application the social 
security number of the applicant and shall enter this information in its database in 
order to aid the department of economic security in locating parents or their assets 
or to enforce child support orders. This subsection does not apply to a license that 
is issued pursuant to title 17 and that is not issued by an automated drawing 
system. If a licensing board or agency allows an applicant to use a number other 
than the social security number on the face of the license or certificate while the 
licensing board or agency keeps the social security number on file, the licensing 
board or agency shall advise an applicant of this fact. 
 Q. For the purposes of this section: 
  1. "Accessible" means that insurance is available in the geographic 
region where the child resides. 
  2. "Child support guidelines" means the child support guidelines 
that are adopted by the state supreme court pursuant to 42 United States 
Code sections 651 through 669B. 
  3. "Date of separation" means the date the married parents ceased 
to cohabit. 
  4. "Reasonable cost" means an amount that does not exceed the 
higher of five per cent of the gross income of the obligated parent or an 
income-based numeric standard that is prescribed in the child support 
guidelines. 
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  5. "Support" has the same meaning prescribed in section 25-500. 
  6. "Support payments" means the amount of money ordered by the 
court to be paid for the support of the minor child or children.  
§320.02 - Self-employed parent; tax practitioner; definition 
 A. On request of any parent or on the court's own motion, before the court 
enters an order for child support pursuant to section 25-320, the court may order 
the parents to meet with a federally authorized tax practitioner if at least one of 
the parents is self-employed. The federally authorized tax practitioner shall 
review the accuracy of any self-employed parent's records and submit a written 
report to the court to help it determine the child support obligation. 
 B. Each parent may submit to the court the names of not more than two 
federally authorized tax practitioners. If the parents cannot agree on a federally 
authorized tax practitioner to conduct the review, the court shall make this choice 
from a list of names submitted by the parents. 
 C. The court shall determine which parent(s) shall pay for the cost of the 
federally authorized tax practitioner or determine each parent's share of this cost. 
 D. For the purposes of this section, "federally authorized tax practitioner" 
has the same meaning prescribed in section 42-2069.  
§321 - Representation of child by counsel; fees 
The court may appoint an attorney to represent the interests of a minor or 
dependent child with respect to the child's support, custody and parenting time. 
The court may enter an order for costs, fees and disbursements in favor of the 
child's attorney. The order may be made against any parents. 
§322 - Payment of maintenance or support; records; disclosure 
 A. Except as provided in section 46-441, the court shall order that 
maintenance or support payments be made to the support payment clearinghouse 
for remittance to the person entitled to receive the payments unless the parties 
agree otherwise. 
 B. The clerk of the court or the support payment clearinghouse shall 
maintain records listing the amount of payments, the date payments are required 
to be made, the names and addresses of the parties affected by the order and the 
name and address of the employer or employers of the party or parties ordered to 
pay support or spousal maintenance. 
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 C. Unless the court has ordered otherwise the parties affected by the order 
shall inform the clerk of the court or the support payment clearinghouse in writing 
on entry of the order of their residential address and within ten days of any change 
of address. A party ordered to pay support or maintenance shall also inform the 
clerk or the support payment clearinghouse in writing of the name and address of 
that person's employer or employers and within ten days of any change of 
employment. If a person fails to notify the clerk of the court or the support 
payment clearinghouse of a change in residential address or employment the court 
may hold the person in contempt of court. 
 D. If the person obligated to pay support has left or is beyond the 
jurisdiction of the court, any party may institute any other proceeding available 
under the laws of this state for enforcement of the duties of support and 
maintenance. 
 E. On application by any person entitled to receive child support or 
spousal maintenance and for good cause shown, the superior court may direct an 
agency or officer of this state to disclose information and documents in the 
agency's or officer's possession that may assist the applicant or the court to 
determine the obligor's income, residence, place of employment, assets and debts, 
except that the residence and place of employment shall not be disclosed if the 
court finds the obligor has been the victim of domestic violence. 
§323 - Assignments 
 A. Pursuant to the requirements of section 25-504, in any proceeding in 
which the court orders a person to pay support as defined in section 25-500 the 
court shall, and in any proceeding in which the court orders a person to pay 
spousal maintenance the court may, assign to the person or agency entitled to 
receive the support or spousal maintenance that portion of that person's earnings, 
income, entitlements or other monies without regard to source as necessary to pay 
the amount ordered by the court. 
 B. The court may also issue an ex parte order of assignment pursuant to 
section 25-504 for support as defined in section 25-500, spousal maintenance or 
arrearages of or interest on a judgment for spousal maintenance.  
 C. The court may terminate or adjust orders of assignment pursuant to 
section 25-504. 
§323.01 - Child support committee; membership; duties; report 
 A. The child support committee is established consisting of the following 
members: 
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  1. The director of the department of economic security or the 
director's designee. 
  2. The assistant director of the division of child support 
enforcement of the department of economic security. 
  3. A division or section chief from the office of the attorney 
general, or the division or section chief's designee, who has knowledge of 
or experience in child support enforcement and related issues and who is 
appointed by the attorney general. 
  4. The director of the administrative office of the supreme court or 
the director's designee. 
  5. Two presiding judges from the domestic relations division of the 
superior court who are appointed by the chief justice of the supreme court. 
One judge shall be from an urban county and one judge shall be from a 
rural county. 
  6. A title IV-D court commissioner who is appointed by the chief 
justice of the supreme court. 
   7. A clerk of the superior court who is appointed by the chief 
justice of the supreme court. 
  8. One county attorney who is appointed by the director of the 
department of economic security and who is from a county that is 
currently contracting with the state to provide child support enforcement 
services.  
  9. An executive assistant from the office of the governor who is 
appointed by the governor. 
  10. One person who is knowledgeable in child support issues and 
who is a noncustodial parent and one person who is knowledgeable in 
child support issues and who is a custodial parent. The president of the 
senate shall appoint these members. 
  11. One person who is knowledgeable in child support issues and 
who is a noncustodial parent and one person who is knowledgeable in 
child support issues and who is a custodial parent. The speaker of the 
house of representatives shall appoint these members. 
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  12. One parent who is knowledgeable in child support issues, who 
has joint custody and who is appointed jointly by the president of the 
senate and the speaker of the house of representatives. 
  13. One person from the executive committee of the family law 
section of the state bar of Arizona who is appointed by the chief justice of 
the supreme court. 
  14. One person from the business community who is appointed 
jointly by the president of the senate and the speaker of the house of 
representatives. 
  15. Two members of the senate from different political parties. The 
president of the senate shall appoint the members and designate one of the 
members as the co-chairperson. 
  16. Two members of the house of representatives from different 
political parties. The speaker of the house of representatives shall appoint 
the members and designate one of the members as the co-chairperson. 
 B. The committee shall prepare an annual written report on its work, 
findings and recommendations regarding child support guidelines, enforcement 
and related issues. The committee shall submit this report to the governor, the 
president of the senate, the speaker of the house of representatives and the chief 
justice of the supreme court on or before December 31 of each year and shall 
provide a copy of this report to the secretary of state and the director of the 
Arizona state library, archives and public records. Beginning July 1, 2011, the 
report shall be submitted electronically. 
 C. Nonlegislative members of the committee are not eligible to receive 
compensation but are eligible for reimbursement of expenses pursuant to title 38, 
chapter 4, article 2.  
§323.02 - Domestic relations committee; membership; duties; pilot 
programs; report 
  A. The domestic relations committee is established consisting of the 
following members: 
  1. Two noncustodial parents who are knowledgeable in domestic 
relations issues and who are not judges or commissioners. The president of 
the senate and the speaker of the House of Representatives shall each 
appoint one of these members. 
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  2. Two custodial parents who are knowledgeable in domestic 
relations issues and who are not judges or commissioners. The president of 
the senate and the speaker of the House of Representatives shall each 
appoint one of these members. 
  3. Two parents who have joint custody, who are knowledgeable in 
domestic relations issues and who are not judges or commissioners. The 
president of the senate and the speaker of the House of Representatives 
shall each appoint one of these members. 
  4. Two parents who are knowledgeable in domestic relations 
issues, who are not judges or commissioners and who are appointed by the 
governor. 
  5. Two active or retired judges or commissioners, or both, from the 
domestic relations department of the superior court who are appointed by 
the chief justice of the Supreme Court. One of these members shall be 
from an urban county and one member shall be from a rural county. 
  6. One domestic relations attorney who is appointed by the 
governor. 
  7. One clerk of the superior court who is appointed by the chief 
justice of the Supreme Court. 
  8. A professional domestic relations mediator who is appointed by 
the president of the senate. 
  9. A psychologist who is experienced in performing child custody 
evaluations and who is appointed by the speaker of the House of 
Representatives. 
  10. A domestic relations educator who is experienced in matters 
relating to parenting or divorce classes and who is appointed by the 
governor. 
  11. A representative of a statewide domestic violence coalition 
who is appointed by the president of the senate. 
  12. A representative of a conciliation court who is appointed by the 
chief justice of the Supreme Court. 
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  13. A marriage and family therapist who is knowledgeable in 
domestic relations issues and who is appointed by the speaker of the 
House of Representatives. 
   14. A representative from a faith-based organization who is 
knowledgeable in domestic relations issues and who is appointed by the 
governor. 
  15. An administrative officer of the Supreme Court who is 
appointed by the chief justice of the Supreme Court or the officer's 
designee. 
  16. A member of a law enforcement agency in this state who is 
appointed by the speaker of the House of Representatives. 
  17. A member of an agency that advocates for children who is 
appointed by the president of the senate.  
  18. One member of the family law section of the state bar of 
Arizona who is appointed by the chief justice of the Supreme Court. 
  19. Four members of the senate, not more than two of whom are 
members of the same political party. The president of the senate shall 
appoint these members and shall designate one of them as the co-
chairperson. 
  20. Four members of the House of Representatives, not more than 
two of whom are members of the same political party. The speaker of the 
House of Representatives shall appoint these members and designate one 
of them as the co-chairperson. 
 B. The committee shall prepare an annual written report regarding 
recommended changes to the domestic relations statutes, rules and procedures and 
other related issues designed to lead to a reform of the state's domestic relations 
statutes. The committee shall submit this report to the governor, the president of 
the senate, the speaker of the house of representatives and the chief justice of the 
supreme court on or before December 31 of each year and shall provide a copy of 
the report to the secretary of state and the director of the Arizona state library, 
archives and public records. Beginning July 1, 2011, the report shall be submitted 
electronically. 
 C. The committee shall develop minimum training standards on domestic 
violence and child abuse issues for persons conducting an investigation or 
preparing a report concerning child custodial arrangements pursuant to section 25-
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406. The committee shall approve the standards. The committee may modify the 
standards on or before December 31 of each year. 
 E. Non-legislative members of the committee are not eligible to receive 
compensation but are eligible for reimbursement of expenses pursuant to title 38, 
chapter 4, article 2.  
323.03 Forms; alternative forms 
 A. The petition or request for assignment, order for assignment, notices to 
obligor and employer, request for hearing and motion to quash or request to stop 
or modify the order of assignment shall be on forms prescribed by the supreme 
court and shall be furnished by the clerk of the superior court as required by law 
or on request of any obligor, payee or employer. 
B. Any party to a proceeding for assignment may use documents other 
than those provided pursuant to this section if the documents are substantially 
similar to those prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to this section.  
§324 - Attorney fees 
 A. The court from time to time, after considering the financial resources of 
all parties and the reasonableness of the positions each party has taken throughout 
the proceedings, may order a party to pay a reasonable amount to another party 
for the costs and expenses of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this 
chapter or chapter 4, article 1 of this title. On request of a party or another court of 
competent jurisdiction, the court shall make specific findings concerning the 
portions of any award of fees and expenses that are based on consideration of 
financial resources and that are based on consideration of reasonableness of 
positions. The court may make these findings before, during or after the issuance 
of a fee award. 
 B. If the court determines that a party filed a petition under one of the 
following circumstances, the court shall award reasonable costs and attorney fees 
to the other party: 
  1. The petition was not filed in good faith. 
  2. The petition was not grounded in fact or based on law. 
  3. The petition was filed for an improper purpose, such as to harass 
the other party, to cause an unnecessary delay or to increase the cost of 
litigation to the other party. 
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 C. For the purpose of this section, costs and expenses may include 
attorney fees, deposition costs and other reasonable expenses as the court finds 
necessary to the full and proper presentation of the action, including any appeal. 
 D. The court may order all amounts paid directly to the attorney, who may 
enforce the order in the attorney's name with the same force and effect, and in the 
same manner, as if the order had been made on behalf of any party to the action.  
§325 - Decree; finality; restoration of maiden name 
 A. A decree of dissolution of marriage or of legal separation is final when 
entered, subject to the right of appeal. An appeal from the decree of dissolution 
that does not challenge the finding that the marriage is irretrievably broken does 
not delay the finality of that provision of the decree that dissolves the marriage 
beyond the time for appealing from that provision, and the parties may remarry 
pending appeal. An order directing payment of money for support or maintenance 
of a spouse or a minor child or children shall not be suspended or the execution of 
the order stayed pending the appeal. 
 B. Any party to a decree of legal separation may file a petition for 
dissolution of marriage in accordance with the requirements of section 25-314. 
The petition shall be filed under the same case number as the legal separation but 
shall be considered and shall proceed as a new and separate action with service of 
process in accordance with rule 40 of the Arizona rules of family law procedure. 
The court may enter a decree of dissolution of marriage in the new action in 
accordance with section 25-312 on terms that are just and without regard to 
section 25-327, subsection A, except that the provisions as to property disposition 
in the decree of legal separation or any property settlement agreement approved 
by the court may not be revoked or modified, unless the court finds the existence 
of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state. 
 C. On request by a party at any time before the signing of the decree of 
dissolution or annulment by the court, the court shall order that the party's 
requested former name be restored.  
§326 - Independence of provisions of decree or temporary order; forms 
 A. If a party fails to comply with a provision of a decree or temporary 
order or injunction, the obligation of the party or parties to make payments for 
support or maintenance or to permit parenting time is not suspended, but the other 
party or parties may petition or request the court to grant an appropriate order. 
 B. The petition or request shall be in a form prescribed by the Supreme 
Court, which shall be furnished by the clerk of the superior court on request of 
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any party. The party may use a document other than one provided pursuant to this 
section if the document is substantially similar to the one prescribed by the 
supreme court pursuant to this section.  
§327- Modification and termination of provisions for maintenance, 
support and property disposition 
 A. Except as otherwise provided in section 25-317, subsections F and G, 
the provisions of any decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified 
or terminated only on a showing of changed circumstances that are substantial and 
continuing except as to any amount that may have accrued as an arrearage before 
the date of notice of the motion or order to show cause to modify or terminate. 
The addition of health insurance coverage as defined in section 25-531 or a 
change in the availability of health insurance coverage may constitute a 
continuing and substantial change in circumstance. The provisions as to property 
disposition may not be revoked or modified, unless the court finds the existence 
of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state. 
Modifications and terminations are effective on the first day of the month 
following notice of the petition for modification or termination unless the court, 
for good cause shown, orders the change to become effective at a different date 
but not earlier than the date of filing the petition for modification or termination. 
 B. Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, 
the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated on the death of any of the 
parties, obligors or obliges, or the remarriage of the obligee receiving 
maintenance. 
 C. Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, 
provisions for the support of a minor child are not terminated by the death of a 
parent obligated to support the child. If a parent obligated to pay support dies, the 
amount of future support may be modified, revoked or commuted to a lump sum 
payment to the extent just and appropriate in the circumstances and has priority 
equal to the right for family allowance in section 14-2404. Past due support has 
priority equal to claims provided for in section 14-3805, subsection A, paragraph 
6. 
 D. Notwithstanding any other law, pursuant to a petition filed pursuant to 
this section the court may suspend the imposition of future interest that accrues on 
a judgment for support issued pursuant to this article for the period of time that 
the party is incarcerated or physically or mentally disabled to the extent that the 
person is unable to maintain employment. 
§328 - Sequence of trials when custody or parenting time is an issue 
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 A. In all cases when custody or parenting time is a contested issue, the 
court shall first hear and decide all other issues including maintenance and child 
support if requested to do so by a party or the attorney of the child or children of 
the marriage. The request shall be in the form of a written demand filed with a 
motion to set or a controverting certificate. 
 B. On stipulation of the parties, the court shall first hear and decide 
custody or parenting time issues. 
 C. In the absence of a request or stipulation made pursuant to this section, 
the court may try any issue separately and in any sequence.  
§ 329 - Waiting period 
The court shall not consider a submission of a motion supported by 
affidavit or hold a trial or hearing on an application for a decree of dissolution of 
marriage or legal separation until thirty days after the date of service of process or 
the date of acceptance of process.  
§330 - Employer cooperation 
Any party to an order for support or maintenance or an agency that has 
obtained a judgment in its favor in an action to establish parentage or an action to 
establish child support may request information from an employer, payor or self-
employed person pursuant to section 25-513. 
§331 - Notification requirements 
 A. In all proceedings brought pursuant to this title, the court shall provide 
the following written notification to all parties: 
You may request conclusions of fact and law on the following issues, if 
they are contested: the issues of child custody, relocation requests, spousal 
maintenance, community property, community debt and child support. To 
request conclusions of fact and law, you must file a written request with 
the court before the trial or the evidentiary hearing. If you make a written 
request before the trial or evidentiary hearing, the court will make 
conclusions of fact and law as part of the final decision. 
 B. The court shall provide the notification required by subsection A to all 
parties in the minute entry setting the case for a trial or evidentiary hearing.  
Article 5: Domestic Relations Education on Children's Issues (§§351- 355)  
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§351 - Domestic relations education; plan; administration 
 A. The superior court in each county shall adopt and implement an 
educational program for the purpose of educating persons about the impact of 
divorce on adults and children. 
 B. The Supreme Court shall adopt minimum standards for educational 
programs. The presiding judge of the superior court in each county shall submit 
an educational program plan to the Supreme Court for approval. The plan shall be 
consistent with the minimum standards that are adopted by the Supreme Court, 
including the length and nature of the program, the qualifications of program 
providers and the means by which the program will be evaluated and maintained. 
Beginning January 1, 2013, these standards shall require that educational 
programs at a minimum include instruction related to all of the following: 
  1. The emotional, psychological, financial, physical and other 
short-term and long-term effects of divorce on adults and children. 
  2. Options available as alternatives to divorce. 
  3. Resources available to improve or strengthen marriage. 
  4. The legal process of divorce and options available for mediation. 
  5. Resources available after divorce. 
 C. Each program shall also include information regarding the notification 
requirements of section 25-403.05, subsection B. 
 D. The presiding judge of the superior court or a judge who is designated 
by the presiding judge shall administer the program in each county and may 
provide or contract with political subdivisions in this state or private entities to 
provide the program to participants who are required to attend.  
§352 - Applicability of program; compliance 
 A. In an action for dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment 
that involves a minor, unemancipated, or disabled child who is common to the 
parties or in any parentage proceeding under chapter 6, article 1 of this title in 
which a party has requested that the court determine custody, specific parenting 
time or child support, the court shall order the parties to complete an educational 
program as prescribed by this article, unless any of the following applies: 
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  1. On its own motion or the motion of either party the court 
determines that participation is not in the best interests of the parties or the 
child. 
  2. A party is or will be enrolled in an education program that the 
court deems comparable. 
  3. The court determines that a party previously has completed an 
educational program adopted pursuant to this article or a comparable 
program. The court may order a party to attend a program more than once. 
 B. In an action or proceeding involving child support or the modification 
or enforcement of parenting time or custody, the court may order a party to 
complete an educational program as prescribed by this article. 
 C. If the parties have a history of domestic violence as defined in section 
13-3601 the court may enter appropriate orders that set forth the manner in which 
the parties shall participate in the program and shall make reasonable efforts to 
protect the safety of the participants. 
 D. Each party shall complete the educational program within the time 
ordered by the judge. The judge may extend the deadline for compliance. 
§353 - Failure to comply 
Unless the court excuses a party's participation, if a party fails to complete 
the educational program as ordered pursuant to section 25-352 the court may deny 
relief in favor of that party, hold that party in contempt of court or impose any 
other sanction reasonable in the circumstances. 
§354 - Children's issues education fund; report 
 A. A children's issues education fund is established in each county 
treasury to implement an educational program as prescribed by this article. The 
presiding judge of the superior court in the county shall administer the fund. 
 B. The fund consists of monies collected pursuant to section 25-355. 
 C. The county treasurer shall disburse monies from the fund only at the 
direction of the presiding judge of the superior court. 
 D. On notice of the presiding judge of the superior court, the county 
treasurer shall invest monies in the fund and monies earned from investment shall 
be credited to the fund. 
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 E. Monies that are expended from the fund shall be used to supplement, 
not supplant, any state or county appropriations that would otherwise be available 
for programs that are established pursuant to this article. 
 F. On or before August 10 of each year, the county treasurer shall submit a 
report to the presiding judge that shows the amount of monies in the children's 
issues education fund. 
§355 - Fees; deferral or waiver 
Each person who attends the educational program required by the court 
pursuant to section 25-352 may be required to pay to the clerk of the superior 
court a fee not to exceed fifty dollars that covers the cost of the program. The fee 
may be deferred or waived pursuant to section 12-302. Notwithstanding any other 
law, fees paid under this section shall be used exclusively for the purposes of 
domestic relations education programs that are established pursuant to section 25-
351. The clerk shall transmit monthly the monies the clerk collects pursuant to 
this subsection to the county treasurer for deposit in the children's issues 
education fund established by section 25-354. 
Article 7: Court of Conciliation (25-381.01 - 25-381.24)  
 
§381.01 - Purposes of article 
The purposes of this article are to promote the public welfare by 
preserving, promoting and protecting family life and the institution of marriage to 
protect the rights of children and to provide means for the reconciliation of 
spouses and the amicable settlement of domestic and family controversies.  
§381.02 Definitions 
In this article, unless the context otherwise requires: "Conciliation court" 
means a court of conciliation provided for in this article.  
§381.03 Applicability of article; determination by superior court 
The provisions of this article shall apply in every county where the 
superior court has by rule or order established a conciliation court. Such superior 
court shall thereafter have jurisdiction under the provisions of this article.  
§381.04 Assignment of judges; number of sessions 
In counties having more than one judge of the superior court, the presiding 
judge may annually, in the month of January, designate at least one judge to hear 
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all cases under this article. The judge or judges so designated shall hold as many 
sessions of the conciliation court in each week as are necessary for the prompt 
disposition of the business before the court.  
§381.05 - Transfer of cases; reason; duties of transferee judge 
The judge of the conciliation court may transfer any case before the 
conciliation court pursuant to this article to the presiding judge of the superior 
court for trial or other proceedings by another judge of the court whenever, in the 
opinion of the judge of the conciliation court, such transfer is necessary to 
expedite the business of the conciliation court or to insure the prompt 
consideration of the case. When any case is so transferred, the judge to whom it is 
transferred shall act as the judge of the conciliation court in the matter.  
§381.06 - Court assistants; salaries; appointments 
 A. The superior court may appoint the following persons to assist the 
conciliation court in disposing of its business: 
  1. A competent person to act as director of conciliation. 
  2. Such associate directors, family counselors, social workers, 
investigators, stenographers and clerks as the court shall find necessary to 
carry out the work of the conciliation court. 
 B. The appointments provided for in this section shall be made by and 
may be terminated by the judge of the conciliation court and may be made in 
addition to all other appointments authorized by law. All of the employees 
provided for in this section shall be allowed actual traveling and necessary 
expenses incurred while engaged in the discharge of the duties of their office, and 
shall be paid salaries comparable to other personnel employed by the superior 
court in the discharge of its duties.  
§381.07 - Director of conciliation; powers and duties 
The director of conciliation shall, upon the order of the judge of the 
conciliation court: 
1. Investigate the facts upon which to base warrants, subpoenas, 
orders or directions in action or proceedings filed in or transferred to the 
conciliation court pursuant to this article. 
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2. Hold conciliation conferences with parties to, and hearings in, 
proceedings under this article, and report the results of such proceedings to 
the judge of the conciliation court. 
3. Provide such supervision in connection with the exercise of its 
jurisdiction as the judge of the conciliation court may order. 
4. Cause the orders and findings of the judge of the conciliation 
court to be entered in the same manner as orders and findings are entered 
in domestic relations cases in superior court. 
5. Cause such reports to be made, such statistics to be compiled, 
and such reports to be kept as the judge of the conciliation court may 
direct.  
§381.08 - Jurisdiction 
Whenever any controversy exists between spouses which may, unless a 
reconciliation is achieved, result in the legal separation, dissolution or annulment 
of the marriage or in the disruption of the household, and there is any minor child 
of the spouses or either of them whose welfare might be affected thereby, the 
conciliation court shall have jurisdiction over the controversy, and over the parties 
thereto and all persons having any relation to the controversy, as further provided 
in this article.  
§381.09 - Petition invoking jurisdiction or for transfer of action to 
conciliation court 
Prior to the filing of any action for annulment, dissolution of marriage, or 
legal separation, any spouse may file in the conciliation court a petition invoking 
the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of preserving the marriage by 
effecting a conciliation between the parties or for amicable settlement of the 
controversy between the spouses so as to avoid further litigation over the issues 
involved. In any case where an action for annulment, dissolution of marriage, or 
legal separation has been filed, any party thereto may by petition filed therein 
have the cause transferred to the conciliation court for proceedings in the same 
manner as though action had been instituted in the conciliation court in the first 
instance.  
381.10 Petition; caption 
The petition shall be captioned substantially as follows: In the Superior 
Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of _________________ Upon 
the petition of Petition for __________________conciliation (Petitioner) and 
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concerning under the Court ________________ and of Conciliation 
_______________ respondents Law. 
§381.11 - Petition; contents 
The petition shall: 
1. Allege that a controversy exists between the spouses and request 
the aid of the conciliation court to effect reconciliation or an amicable 
settlement of the controversy. 
2. State the name and age of each minor child whose welfare may 
be affected by the controversy. 
3. State the name and address of the parties. 
4. If the petition is presented by one spouse only, name the other 
spouse(s) as a respondent(s) and state the address of the spouse(s). 
5. Name as an additional respondent any other person who has any 
relation to the controversy and state the address of the person if known to 
the petitioner. 
6. State such other information as the conciliation court may by 
rule require.  
§381.12 - Blank forms; assistance in preparing and presenting petition 
The clerk of the court shall provide, at the expense of the county, blank 
forms for petitions for filing pursuant to this article. The employees of the 
conciliation court shall assist any person in the preparation and presentation of 
any such petition when requested to do so. 
§381.13 - Fees 
No fee shall be charged for filing the petition, nor shall any fee be charged 
by any officer for the performance of any duty pursuant to this article.  
§381.14 - Hearing; time; place; notice; citation; witnesses 
The judge of the conciliation court shall fix a reasonable time and place 
for hearing on the petition, said hearing to be held within thirty days of the date of 
the filing of the petition, unless the court for good cause orders such hearing to be 
held within forty-five days from the date of filing the petition. The court shall 
cause notice of the filing of the petition and of the time and place of the hearing as 
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it deems necessary to be given to the respondents. The court may, when it deems 
it necessary, issue a citation to any respondent requiring him or her to appear at 
the time and place stated in the citation, and may require the attendance of 
witnesses as in other civil suits.  
§381.15 - Time and place of holding hearings 
Hearings pursuant to this article may be held at any time and place within 
the county, and may be held in chambers or otherwise, except that the time and 
place for hearing shall not be different from the time and place provided by law 
for the trial of civil actions if any party, prior to the hearing, objects to any 
different time or place.  
§381.16 - Conduct of hearing; recommendations; aid of specialists; 
expense; confidential communications 
 A. A person designated by the judge of the conciliation court shall conduct 
an informal hearing as a conference or series of conferences to effect a 
reconciliation of the spouses or an amicable adjustment or settlement of the 
issues. 
 B. At the conclusion of the hearing the designated person shall submit a 
report to the director of conciliation who shall review it and shall report the results 
of the hearing to the judge of the conciliation court. The judge of the conciliation 
court may, and on request of one or both of the parties shall, order further 
hearings in pursuance of this article. 
 C. To facilitate and promote the purposes of this article, the court may, 
with the consent of the parties to the action, recommend or invoke the aid of 
appropriate resources such as physicians, psychiatrists, social agencies or other 
individuals or agencies including clergymen of the religious denomination to 
which the parties belong or may request. No reports of any such individual or 
agency available to the court shall be filed with or become a part of the records of 
the case. Any such aid shall not be at the expense of the court or of the county 
unless the county board of supervisors shall authorize such aid. 
 D. Hearings or conferences conducted pursuant to this article for the 
purpose of effecting a reconciliation of the spouses or an amicable adjustment or 
settlement of issues shall be held in private, and the court shall exclude all persons 
except the officers of the court, the parties, their counsel and witnesses. Hearings 
or conferences may be held with each party and counsel separately and, in the 
discretion of the judge, commissioner or counselor conducting the hearing or 
conference, counsel for one party may be excluded when an adverse party is 
present. All communications, verbal or written, from the parties to the judge, 
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commissioner or counselor in a proceeding under this article shall be deemed 
confidential communications, and shall not be disclosed without the consent of 
the party making such communication.  
§381.17 - Orders; duration of effectiveness; reconciliation agreement 
 A. The judge of the conciliation court shall have full power to make, alter, 
modify, and enforce all orders or temporary orders, orders for custody of children, 
restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and orders affecting possession of 
property, as may appear just and equitable, but such orders shall not be effective 
for more than the period of the stay under section 25-381.18, unless the parties 
mutually consent to a continuation of such time. 
 B. Any reconciliation agreement between the parties may be reduced to 
writing and, with the consent of the parties, a court order may be made requiring 
the parties to comply fully therewith.  
§381.18 - Dissolution of marriage; legal separation; annulment; stay of 
right to file; jurisdiction for pending actions 
 A. During a period beginning on the filing of a petition for conciliation 
and continuing until sixty days after the filing of the petition for conciliation, no 
spouse shall file any action for annulment, dissolution of marriage or legal 
separation, and, on the filing of a petition for conciliation, proceedings then 
pending in the superior court are stayed and the case shall be transferred to the 
conciliation court for hearing and further disposition as provided in this article. 
All restraining, support, maintenance or custody orders issued by the superior 
court remain in full force and effect until vacated or modified by the conciliation 
court or until they expire by their own terms.  
 B. If any party wishes to extend the stay prescribed pursuant to subsection 
A, that party must file a petition with the court that states the basis for the 
extension and includes a plan for reconciliation or a counseling schedule. The 
court may grant a reasonable extension of up to one hundred twenty days if the 
moving party establishes good cause for the extension. The court shall not grant 
an extension if another party objects with good cause. 
 C. If, after the expiration of the period prescribed in subsection A and any 
extension granted pursuant to subsection B, the controversy between the spouses 
has not been terminated, any spouse may institute proceedings for annulment of 
marriage, dissolution of marriage or legal separation by filing in the clerk's office 
additional pleadings complying with the requirements relating to annulment of 
marriage, dissolution of marriage or legal separation, respectively, or either 
spouse may proceed with the action previously stayed, and the conciliation court 
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has full jurisdiction to hear, try and determine the action for annulment of 
marriage, dissolution of marriage or legal separation and to retain jurisdiction of 
the case for further hearings on decrees or orders to be made. The conciliation 
provisions of this article may be used in regard to post-dissolution problems 
concerning maintenance support, parenting time or contempt or for modification 
based on changed conditions in the discretion of the conciliation court. 
 D. On the filing of an action for annulment, dissolution of marriage or 
legal separation and after the expiration of sixty days from the service or the 
acceptance of service of process on or by the defendant, any spouse without the 
consent of the other may file a petition invoking the jurisdiction of the 
conciliation court, as long as the domestic relations case remains pending, unless 
it appears to the court that the filing will not delay the orderly processes of the 
pending action, in which event the court may accept the petition and the filing of 
the petition has the same effect as the filing of any such petition within such sixty 
days after the service or acceptance of process. 
§381.19 - transfer of certain actions where minor child involved 
Whenever any action for annulment of marriage, dissolution of marriage, 
or legal separation is filed in the superior court and it appears to the court at any 
time during the pendency of the action that there is any minor child of the spouses 
or any spouse whose welfare may be adversely affected by the dissolution or 
annulment of the marriage, legal separation or the disruption of the household, 
and there appears to be some reasonable possibility of a reconciliation being 
effected, the case may be transferred to the conciliation court for proceedings for 
reconciliation of the spouses or amicable settlement of issues in controversy in 
accordance with the provisions of this article.  
§381.20 - Procedure in actions where no child is involved; conciliation 
court may accept case 
Whenever application is made to the conciliation court for conciliation 
proceedings in respect to a controversy between spouses or a contested action for 
annulment of marriage, dissolution of marriage, or legal separation, but there is no 
minor child whose welfare might be affected by the results of the controversy, and 
it appears to the court that reconciliation of the spouses or amicable adjustment of 
the controversy can probably be achieved, and that the work of the court in cases 
involving children will not be seriously impeded by acceptance of the case, the 
court may accept and dispose of the case in the same manner as similar cases 
involving the welfare of children are disposed of. In the event of such application 
and acceptance, the court shall have the same jurisdiction over the controversy 
and the parties thereto or having any relation thereto that it has under this article 
in similar cases involving the welfare of children.  
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§381.21 - Construction of article 
Except as specifically and expressly so provided, nothing in this article is 
intended or shall be construed to repeal, modify, or change in any respect 
whatsoever the laws relating to annulment of marriage, dissolution of marriage, or 
legal separation, and the court of conciliation shall, when application for such 
relief is made as provided in this article, apply such laws in the same manner as if 
action had been brought thereunder in the first instance in the superior court, but 
the conciliation procedures of the conciliation court shall be applied to arrive at an 
amicable settlement of all issues in controversy.  
§381.22 - Subsequent petition filed within one year 
Once a petition by any spouse has been filed as permitted by section 25-
381.09, the filing of any subsequent petition under such section within one year 
thereafter by another of the spouses shall not stay any action for annulment, 
dissolution of marriage, or legal separation then pending nor prohibit the filing of 
such an action by another spouse. The filing of a subsequent petition by another 
spouse more than one year after the filing of any previous petition with such 
effect shall have the same effect toward staying any domestic relations action then 
pending and toward prohibiting the filing of any such action as provided in 
section 25-381.18.  
§381.23 Option for mandatory conciliation 
In those counties in which the superior court has by rule or order 
established a conciliation court, the judge or judges of the conciliation court may, 
by local rule, with the approval of the presiding judge of the superior court in that 
county, require one or more hearings or conferences at which the parties must 
attend in order to further the purposes of this article. The court may also grant 
exemptions from such a local and mandatory rule if to do otherwise would cause 
undue hardship. 
§381.24 Counseling 
The conciliation court, in counties having a population of less than two 
hundred thousand persons according to the most recent United States census, may 
contract with qualified counselors to provide counseling services.  
 D: Child Custody and Visitation  
 The proposed new chapter 4 retains most of the existing statutory scheme 
but with some important changes.  The changes are not just semantics, as in 
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understanding  the singular to include the plural and removing gendered 
pronouns.  The changes allow this law to be applied to all kinds of parents—those 
who provide fiduciary support, daily care-taking duties, and decisional-authority.   
The changes provide varying degrees of custody and visitation based in the type 
of parenting each parent provides for each child and allows for multiple parents 
regardless of their sex.  For instance, one man may be the biological progenitor 
(and therefore financial provider) of one child and the daily care-giver as well as 
financial provider for another.  A woman may be a biological progenitor of a 
child but did so without any intention, and therefore obligations, regarding 
parentage of that child.   
Article 1: Child Custody (§§401 - 415)  
§401 - Jurisdiction; commencement of proceedings 
 A. Jurisdiction for child custody proceedings is governed by chapter 8 of 
this title. 
 B. A child  custody proceeding is commenced in the superior court: 
  1. By filing a petition for either of the following: 
   (a) Dissolution or legal separation. 
  (b) Custody of a child for which there has been a prior 
establishment of parentage.  
  2. By a person other than a parent, by filing a petition for custody 
of the child in the county in which the child is permanently resides or is 
found, but only if the child is not in the physical custody of a parent. 
  3. At the request of any person who is a party to a parentage 
proceeding pursuant to chapter 6, article 1 of this title. 
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§402 - Definitions 
In this article, unless the context otherwise requires: 
1. "Joint custody" means shared legal custody or shared physical 
custody, or both. 
2. "Joint legal custody" means the condition under which multiple 
parents share legal custody and no parent's rights are superior, except with 
respect to specified decisions as set forth by the court or the parents in the 
final judgment or order. 
3. "Joint physical custody" means the condition under which the 
physical residence of the child is shared by the parents in a manner that 
assures that the child has substantially equal time and contact with the 
parents. 
4. "Parenting time" means the condition under which a parent has 
the right to have a child physically with the parent and the right and 
responsibility to make, during that placement, routine daily decisions 
regarding the child's care consistent with the major decisions made by any 
parents having legal and/or physical custody. 
5. "Sole custody" means the condition under which one person has 
exclusive legal and physical custody.  
§403 - Custody; best interests of child 
 A. The court shall determine custody, either originally or on a petition for 
modification, in accordance with the best interests of the child. The court shall 
consider all relevant factors, including: 
  1. The wishes of the child's parents as to custody. 
  2. The wishes of the child as to the custodian. 
  3. The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's 
parent or parents, the child's siblings and any other person who may 
significantly affect the child's best interest. 
  4. The child's adjustment to home, school and community. 
  5. The mental and physical health of all individuals involved. 
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  6. Which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent and 
meaningful continuing contact with other parents. This paragraph does not 
apply if the court determines that a parent is acting in good faith to protect 
the child from witnessing an act of domestic violence or being a victim of 
domestic violence or child abuse. 
  7. Which parent has provided primary care of the child. 
  8. The nature and extent of coercion or duress used by a parent in 
obtaining an agreement regarding custody. 
  9. Whether a parent has complied with chapter 3, article 5 of this 
title. 
  10. Whether a parent was convicted of an act of false reporting of 
child abuse or neglect under section 13-2907.02. 
  11. Whether there has been domestic violence or child abuse as 
defined in section 25-403.03. 
 B. In a contested custody case, the court shall make specific findings on 
the record about all relevant factors and the reasons for which the decision is in 
the best interests of the child.  
§403.01 - Sole and joint custody 
 A. In awarding child custody, the court may order sole or joint custody. 
This section does not create a presumption in favor of one arrangement over 
another. The court in determining custody shall not prefer a parent as custodian 
because of that parent's sex. 
 B. The court may issue an order for joint custody over the objection of one 
of the parents if the court makes specific written findings of why the order is in 
the child's best interests. In determining whether joint custody is in the child's best 
interests, the court shall consider the factors prescribed in section 25-403, 
subsection A and all of the following: 
  1. The agreement or lack of an agreement by the parents regarding 
joint custody. 
  2. Whether a parent's lack of agreement is unreasonable or is 
influenced by an issue not related to the best interests of the child. 
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  3. The past, present and future abilities of the parents to cooperate 
in decision-making about the child to the extent required by the order of 
joint custody. 
  4. Whether the joint custody arrangement is logistically possible.  
 C. The court may issue an order for joint custody of a child if the parents 
agree and submit a written parenting plan and the court finds such an order is in 
the best interests of the child. The court may order joint legal custody without 
ordering joint physical custody.  
§403.02 – Parenting plans 
A. Before an award of joint custody is made, the parents shall submit a 
proposed parenting plan that includes at least the following: 
  1. Each parent's rights and responsibilities for the personal care of 
the child and for decisions in areas such as education, health care and 
religious training. 
  2. A schedule of the physical residence of the child, including 
holidays and school vacations. 
  3. A procedure by which proposed changes, disputes and alleged 
breaches may be mediated or resolved, which may include the use of 
conciliation services or private counseling. 
  4. A procedure for periodic review of the plan's terms by the 
parents. 
  5. A statement that the parties understand that joint custody does 
not necessarily mean equal parenting time. 
  6. A statement that each party has read, understands and will abide 
by the notification requirements of section 25-403.05, subsection B. 
 B. If the parents are unable to agree on any element to be included in a 
parenting plan, the court shall determine that element. The court may determine 
other factors that are necessary to promote and protect the emotional and physical 
health of the child.  
§403.03 - Domestic violence and child abuse 
 A. Notwithstanding subsection D of this section, joint custody shall not be 
awarded if the court makes a finding of the existence of significant domestic 
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violence pursuant to section 13-3601 or if the court finds by a preponderance of 
the evidence that there has been a significant history of domestic violence. 
 B. The court shall consider evidence of domestic violence as being 
contrary to the best interests of the child. The court shall consider the safety and 
well-being of the child to be of primary importance. The court shall consider a 
perpetrator's history of causing or threatening to cause physical harm to another 
person. 
 C. To determine if a person has committed an act of domestic violence the 
court, subject to the rules of evidence, shall consider all relevant factors including 
the following: 
  1. Findings from another court of competent jurisdiction. 
  2. Police reports. 
  3. Medical reports. 
  4. Child protective services records. 
  5. Domestic violence shelter records. 
  6. School records. 
  7. Witness testimony.  
 D. If the court determines that a parent who is seeking custody has 
committed an act of domestic violence there is a rebuttable presumption that an 
award of custody to the parent who committed the act of domestic violence is 
contrary to the child's best interests. This presumption applies equally to all 
parents who have committed an act of domestic violence. For the purposes of this 
subsection, a person commits an act of domestic violence if that person does any 
of the following: 
  1. Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes or attempts to 
cause sexual assault or serious physical injury. 
  2. Places a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious 
physical injury to any person. 
  3. Engages in a pattern of behavior for which a court may issue an 
ex parte order to protect the parent who is seeking child custody or to 
protect the child and the child's siblings.  
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 E. To determine if the parent has rebutted the presumption the court shall 
consider all of the following: 
  1. Whether the parent has demonstrated that being awarded sole 
custody or joint physical or legal custody is in the child's best interests. 
  2. Whether the parent has successfully completed a batterer's 
prevention program. 
  3. Whether the parent has successfully completed a program of 
alcohol or drug abuse counseling, if the court determines that counseling is 
appropriate. 
  4. Whether the parent has successfully completed a parenting class, 
if the court determines that a parenting class is appropriate. 
  5. If the parent is on probation, parole or community supervision, 
whether the parent is restrained by a protective order that was granted after 
a hearing. 
  6. Whether the parent has committed any further acts of domestic 
violence. 
 F. If the court finds that a parent has committed an act of domestic 
violence, that parent has the burden of proving to the court's satisfaction that 
parenting time will not endanger the child or significantly impair the child's 
emotional development. If the parent meets this burden to the court's satisfaction, 
the court shall place conditions on parenting time that best protect the child and 
the parent from further harm. The court may: 
   1. Order that an exchange of the child must occur in a protected 
setting as specified by the court. 
  2. Order that an agency specified by the court must supervise 
parenting time. If the court allows a family or household member to 
supervise parenting time, the court shall establish conditions that this 
person must follow during parenting time.  
  3. Order the parent who committed the act of domestic violence to 
attend and complete, to the court's satisfaction, a program of intervention 
for perpetrators of domestic violence and any other counseling the court 
orders. 
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  4. Order the parent who committed the act of domestic violence to 
abstain from possessing or consuming alcohol or controlled substances 
during parenting time and for twenty-four hours before parenting time. 
  5. Order the parent who committed the act of domestic violence to 
pay a fee to the court to defray the costs of supervised parenting time. 
  6. Prohibit overnight parenting time. 
  7. Require a bond from the parent who committed the act of 
domestic violence for the child's safe return. 
  8. Order that the address of the child and the parent remain 
confidential.  
  9. Impose any other condition that the court determines is 
necessary to protect the child, the parent and any other family or 
household member. 
 G. The court shall not order joint counseling between a victim and the 
perpetrator of domestic violence. The court may refer a victim to appropriate 
counseling and shall provide a victim with written information about available 
community resources related to domestic violence. 
 H. The court may request or order the services of the division of children 
and family services in the department of economic security if the court believes 
that a child may be the victim of child abuse or neglect as defined in section 8-
201. 
 I. In determining whether the absence or relocation of a parent shall be 
weighed against that parent in determining custody or parenting time, the court 
may consider whether the absence or relocation was caused by an act of domestic 
violence by another parent.  
§403.04 - Drug offenses 
 A. If the court determines that a parent has been convicted of any drug 
offense under title 13, chapter 34 or any violation of section 28-1381, 28-1382 or 
28-1383 within twelve months before the petition or the request for custody is 
filed, there is a rebuttable presumption that sole or joint custody by that parent is 
not in the child's best interests. In making this determination the court shall state 
its: 
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  1. Findings of fact that support its determination that the parent 
was convicted of the offense. 
  2. Findings that the custody or parenting time arrangement ordered 
by the court appropriately protects the child. 
 B. To determine if the person has rebutted the presumption, at a minimum 
the court shall consider the following evidence: 
  1. The absence of any conviction of any other drug offense during 
the previous five years. 
  2. Results of random drug testing for a six month period that 
indicate that the person is not using drugs as proscribed by title 13, chapter 
34.  
§403.05 - Sexual offenders; murderers; custody and parenting time; 
notification of risk to child 
 A. Unless the court finds that there is no significant risk to the child and 
states its reasons in writing, the court shall not grant a person sole or joint 
physical or legal custody of a child or unsupervised parenting time with a child if 
the person: 
  1. Is a registered sex offender. 
  2. Has been convicted of murder in the first degree and the victim 
of the murder was another parent of the child who is the subject of the 
order. In making its finding, the court may consider, among other factors, 
the following: 
  (a) Credible evidence that the convicted parent was a 
victim of domestic violence, as defined in section 13-3601, 
committed by the murdered parent. 
  (b) Testimony of an expert witness that the convicted 
parent suffered trauma from abuse committed by the murdered 
parent. 
 B. A child's parent or custodian must immediately notify another parent(s) 
or custodian(s) if the parent or custodian knows that a convicted or registered sex 
offender or a person who has been convicted of a dangerous crime against 
children as defined in section 13-705 may have access to the child. The parent or 
custodian must provide notice by first class mail, return receipt requested, by 
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electronic means to an electronic mail address that the recipient provided to the 
parent or custodian for notification purposes or by other communication accepted 
by the court.  
§403.06 - Parental access to records 
 A. Unless otherwise provided by court order or law, on reasonable request 
all parents are entitled to have equal access to documents and other information 
concerning the child's education and physical, mental, moral and emotional health 
including medical, school, police, court and other records directly from the 
custodian of the records or from another parent(s). 
 B. A person who does not comply with a reasonable request shall 
reimburse the requesting parent for court costs and attorney fees incurred by that 
parent to force compliance with this section. 
 C. A parent who attempts to restrict the release of documents or 
information by the custodian without a prior court order is subject to appropriate 
legal sanctions.  
§403.07 - Identification of a primary caretaker and public assistance 
The court may specify one parent as the primary caretaker of the child and 
one home as the primary residence of the child for the purposes of defining 
eligibility for public assistance. This finding does not diminish the rights of any 
other parent and does not create a presumption for or against another parent in a 
proceeding for the modification of a custody order.  
§403.08 - Resources and fees 
A. In a proceeding regarding sole custody or joint custody, any party may 
request attorney fees, costs and expert witness fees to enable the party with 
insufficient resources to obtain adequate legal representation and to prepare 
evidence for the hearing. 
B. If the court finds there is a financial disparity between the parties, the 
court may order payment of reasonable fees, expenses and costs to allow adequate 
preparation.  
§403.09 - Child support 
 A. For any custody order entered under this article, the court shall 
determine an amount of child support in accordance with section 25-320 and 
guidelines established pursuant to that section. 
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 B. An award of joint custody does not diminish the responsibility of 
another parent to provide for the support of the child.  
§404 - Temporary orders 
 
A. A party to a custody proceeding may move for a temporary custody order. 
This motion must be supported by pleadings as provided in section 25-411. The 
court may award temporary custody under the standards of section 25-403 after a 
hearing, or, if there is no objection, solely on the basis of the pleadings. 
 
 B. If a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation is 
dismissed, any temporary custody order is vacated unless a parent or the child's 
custodian moves that the proceeding continue as a custody proceeding and the 
court finds, after a hearing, that the circumstances of the parents and the best 
interest of the child require that a custody decree be issued. 
 C. If a custody proceeding commenced in the absence of a petition for 
dissolution of marriage or legal separation is dismissed, any temporary custody 
order thereby is vacated.  
§405 - Interviews by court; professional assistance 
 A. The court may interview the child in chambers to ascertain the child's 
wishes as to the child's custodian and as to parenting time. 
 B. The court may seek the advice of professional personnel, whether or 
not employed by the court on a regular basis. The advice given shall be in writing 
and shall be made available by the court to counsel, on request, under such terms 
as the court determines. Counsel may examine as a witness any professional 
personnel consulted by the court, unless that right is waived.  
§406 - Investigations and reports 
 A. In contested custody proceedings, and in other custody proceedings if a 
parent or the child's custodian so requests, the court may order an investigation 
and report concerning custodial arrangements for the child. The investigation and 
report may be made by the court social service agency, the staff of the juvenile 
court, the local probation or welfare department, or a private person. The report 
must include a written affirmation by the person completing the report that the 
person has met the training requirements prescribed in subsection C. 
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 B. If an investigation or report is ordered pursuant to this section or if the 
court appoints a family court advisor, the court shall allocate cost based on the 
financial circumstances of the parties. 
 C. The court shall require any person who conducts an investigation or 
prepares a report pursuant to this section to receive training that meets the 
minimum standards prescribed by the domestic relations committee, established 
pursuant to section 25-323.02 as follows: 
  1. Six initial hours of domestic violence training. 
  2. Six initial hours of child abuse training. 
  3. Four subsequent hours of training every two years on domestic 
violence and child abuse. 
 D. A person that has completed professional training to become licensed 
or certified may use that training to completely or partially fulfill the requirements 
in subsection C if the training included at least six hours each on domestic 
violence and child abuse if the training meets the minimum standards prescribed 
by the domestic relations committee. Subsequent professional training in these 
subject matters may be used to partially or completely fulfill the training 
requirements prescribed in subsection C if the training meets the minimum 
standards prescribed by the domestic relations committee.  
 E. A physician who is licensed pursuant to title 32, chapter 13 or 17 is 
exempt from the training requirements prescribed in subsection C. 
 F. In preparing a report concerning a child, the investigator may consult 
any person who may have information about the child or the child's potential 
custodial arrangements. 
 G. The court shall mail the investigator's report to counsel at least ten days 
prior to the hearing. The investigator shall make available to counsel the names 
and addresses of all persons whom the investigator has consulted. Any party to 
the proceeding may call for examination of the investigator and any person 
consulted by the investigator.  
§407 - Custody hearings; priority; costs; record 
 A. Custody proceedings shall receive priority in being set for hearing. 
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 B. The court may tax as costs the payment of necessary travel and other 
expenses incurred by any person whose presence at the hearing the court deems 
necessary to determine the best interest of the child. 
 C. The court, without a jury, shall determine questions of law and fact. If it 
finds that a public hearing may be detrimental to the child's best interest, the court 
may exclude the public from a custody hearing, but may admit any person who 
has a direct and legitimate interest in the particular case or a legitimate 
educational or research interest in the work of the court. 
 D. If the court finds that to protect the child's welfare, the record of any 
interview, report, investigation, or testimony in a custody proceeding should be 
kept secret, the court may then make an appropriate order sealing the record.  
§408 - Rights of noncustodial parent; parenting time; relocation of child; 
exception; enforcement; access to records 
 A. A parent who is not granted custody of the child is entitled to 
reasonable parenting time to ensure that the minor child has continuing contact 
with the noncustodial parent unless the court finds, after a hearing, that parenting 
time would endanger seriously the child's physical, mental, moral or emotional 
health. 
 B. If by written agreement or court order all parents are entitled to custody 
or parenting time and all parents reside in the state, at least sixty days' advance 
written notice shall be provided to another parent(s) before a parent may do either 
of the following: 
  1. Relocate the child outside the state. 
  2. Relocate the child more than one hundred miles within the state. 
 C. The notice required by this section shall be made by certified mail, 
return receipt requested, or pursuant to the Arizona rules of family law procedure. 
The court shall sanction a parent who, without good cause, does not comply with 
the notification requirements of this subsection. The court may not impose a 
sanction that will affect custody or parenting time unless it also is in accordance 
with the child's best interests on separate grounds. 
 D. Within thirty days after notice is made the nonmoving parent may 
petition the court to prevent relocation of the child. After expiration of this time 
any petition or other application to prevent relocation of the child may be granted 
only on a showing of good cause. This subsection does not prohibit a parent who 
is seeking to relocate the child from petitioning the court for a hearing, on notice 
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to another parent, to determine the appropriateness of a relocation that may 
adversely affect another parents’ custody or parenting time rights. 
 E. Subsection B of this section does not apply if provision for relocation of 
a child has been made by a court order or a written agreement of the parties that is 
dated within one year of the proposed relocation of the child. 
 F. Pending the determination by the court of a petition or application to 
prevent relocation of the child: 
  1. A parent with sole custody or a parent with joint custody and 
primary physical custody who is required by circumstances of health or 
safety or employment to relocate in less than sixty days after written 
notice has been given to another parent may temporarily relocate with the 
child. 
  2. A parent who shares joint custody and substantially equal 
physical custody and who is required by circumstances of health or safety 
or employment to relocate in less than sixty days after written notice has 
been given to another parent may temporarily relocate with the child only 
if both parents execute a written agreement to permit relocation of the 
child. 
 G. The court shall determine whether to allow the parent to relocate the 
child. 
§409 - Visitation  
 A. The superior court may grant reasonable visitation rights to a child 
during the child's minority only upon a finding that the visitation would be in the 
best interests of the child and any of the following is true if the petitioner enjoys 
and maintains a position as a beneficial member of the child’s parental unit.   
 B. In determining the child's best interests the court shall consider all 
relevant factors, including but not limited to: 
  1. The historical relationship, if any, between the child and the 
person seeking visitation. 
  2. The motivation of the requesting party in seeking visitation. 
  3. The motivation of the person(s) denying visitation. 
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  4. The quantity of visitation time requested and the potential 
adverse impact that visitation will have on the child's customary activities. 
  5. The benefit in maintaining an extended familial relationship. 
 C. All visitation granted under this section automatically terminates if the 
child has been adopted or is placed for adoption.  This subsection does not apply 
to the adoption of the child by the spouse of a parent or another member of the 
child’s parental unit.   
§410 – Judicial supervision 
 A. Except as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing, the custodian may 
determine the child's upbringing, including the child's education, health, care and 
religious training, unless, on motion by a noncustodial parent, the court, after a 
hearing, finds that in the absence of a specific limitation of the custodian's 
authority, the child's physical health would be endangered or the child's emotional 
development would be significantly impaired. 
 B. If either parent requests the order, or if all contestants agree to the 
order, or if the court finds that in the absence of the order the child's physical 
health would be endangered or the child's emotional development would be 
significantly impaired, and if the court finds that the best interests of the child 
would be served, the court shall order a local social service agency to exercise 
continuing supervision over the case to assure that the custodial or parenting time 
terms of the decree are carried out. At the discretion of the court, reasonable fees 
for the supervision may be charged to the parents, provided that the fees have 
been approved by the Supreme Court.  
§411 Modification of custody decree; affidavit; contents; military families 
 A. A person shall not make a motion to modify a custody decree earlier 
than one year after its date, unless the court permits it to be made on the basis of 
affidavits that there is reason to believe the child's present environment may 
seriously endanger the child's physical, mental, moral or emotional health. At any 
time after a joint custody order is entered, a parent may petition the court for 
modification of the order on the basis of evidence that domestic violence 
involving a violation of section 13-1201 or 13-1204, spousal abuse or child abuse 
occurred since the entry of the joint custody order. Six months after a joint 
custody order is entered, a parent may petition the court for modification of the 
order based on the failure of another parent to comply with the provisions of the 
order. A motion or petition to modify a custody order shall meet the requirements 
of this section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a custodial parent 
is a member of the United States armed forces, the court shall consider the terms 
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of that parent's military family care plan to determine what is in the child's best 
interest during the custodial parent's military deployment. 
 B. If the parent with whom the parent's child resides a majority of the time 
receives temporary duty, deployment, activation or mobilization orders from the 
United States military that involve moving a substantial distance away from the 
parent's residence a court shall not enter a final order modifying parental rights 
and responsibilities and parent-child contact in an existing order until ninety days 
after the deployment ends, unless a modification is agreed to by the deploying 
parent.  
 C. The court shall not consider a parent's absence caused by deployment 
or mobilization or the potential for future deployment or mobilization as the sole 
factor supporting a real, substantial and unanticipated change in circumstances 
pursuant to this section. 
 D. On motion of a deploying or nondeploying, mobilizing or absent 
military parent, the court, after a hearing, shall enter a temporary order modifying 
parental rights and responsibilities or parent-child contact during the period of 
deployment or mobilization if: 
  1. A military parent who has custody or parenting time pursuant to 
an existing court order has received notice from military leadership that 
the military parent will deploy or mobilize in the near future. 
  2. The deployment or mobilization would have a material effect on 
the military parent's ability to exercise parental rights and responsibilities 
or parent-child contact. 
 E. On motion of a deploying parent, if reasonable advance notice is given 
and good cause is shown, the court shall allow that parent to present testimony 
and evidence by electronic means with respect to parenting time or parent-child 
contact matters instituted pursuant to this section if the deployment of that parent 
has a material effect on that parent's ability to appear in person at a regularly 
scheduled hearing. For the purposes of this subsection, "electronic means" 
includes communication by telephone or video teleconference. 
 F. The court shall hear motions for modification because of deployment as 
expeditiously as possible. 
 G. If a military parent receives military temporary duty, deployment, 
activation or mobilization orders that involve moving a substantial distance away 
from the military parent's residence or that otherwise have a material effect on the 
military parent's ability to exercise parenting time, at the request of the military 
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parent, for the duration of the military parent's absence the court may delegate the 
military parent's parenting time, or a portion of that time, to a child's family 
member, including a stepparent, or to another person who is not the child's parent 
but who has a close and substantial relationship to the minor child, if the court 
determines that is in the child's best interest. The court shall not allow the 
delegation of parenting time to a person who would be subject to limitations on 
parenting time. The parties shall attempt to resolve disputes regarding delegation 
of parenting time through the dispute resolution process specified in their 
parenting plan, unless excused by the court for good cause shown. A court order 
pursuant to this subsection does not establish separate rights to parenting time for 
a person other than a parent. 
 H. All temporary modification orders pursuant to this section shall include 
a specific transition schedule to facilitate a return to the predeployment order 
within ten days after the deployment ends, taking into consideration the child's 
best interests. 
 I. A custody decree or order that a court enters in contemplation of or 
during the military deployment of a custodial parent outside of the continental 
United States shall specifically reference the deployment and include provisions 
governing the custody of the minor child after the deployment ends. Any parent 
may file a petition with the court after the deployment ends to modify the decree 
or order, in compliance with subsection L of this section. The court shall hold a 
hearing or conference on the petition within thirty days after the petition is filed. 
 J. The court may modify an order granting or denying parenting time 
rights whenever modification would serve the best interest of the child, but the 
court shall not restrict a parent's parenting time rights unless it finds that the 
parenting time would endanger seriously the child's physical, mental, moral or 
emotional health. 
 K. If after a custody or parenting time order is in effect one of the parents 
is charged with a dangerous crime against children as defined in section 13-705, 
child molestation as defined in section 13-1410 or an act of domestic violence as 
prescribed in section 13-3601 in which the victim is a minor, another parent may 
petition the court for an expedited hearing. Pending the expedited hearing, the 
court may suspend parenting time or change custody ex parte. 
 L. To modify any type of custody order a person shall submit an affidavit 
or verified petition setting forth detailed facts supporting the requested 
modification and shall give notice, together with a copy of the affidavit or verified 
petition, to other parties to the proceeding, who may file opposing affidavits. The 
court shall deny the motion unless it finds that adequate cause for hearing the 
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motion is established by the pleadings, in which case it shall set a date for hearing 
on why the requested modification should not be granted. 
 M. The court shall assess attorney fees and costs against a party seeking 
modification if the court finds that the modification action is vexatious and 
constitutes harassment. 
§412 - Expedited child support and parenting time fund 
 A. Each county treasurer shall establish an expedited child support and 
parenting time fund consisting of monies received pursuant to section 12-284, 
subsection D. 
 B. The presiding judge of the superior court shall use fund monies to 
establish, maintain and enhance programs designed to expedite the processing of 
petitions filed pursuant to section 25-326 and to establish, enforce and modify 
court orders involving children. 
 C. The county treasurer may invest monies in the fund and shall deposit 
interest earned in the fund. 
 D. Monies received from this fund shall be used to supplement and not 
supplant monies allocated by the county.  
§413- Domestic relations education and mediation fund; report 
 A. Each county treasurer shall establish a domestic relations education and 
mediation fund consisting of monies received pursuant to section 12-284, 
subsection C. 
 B. The presiding judge of the superior court shall use fund monies to 
establish, maintain and enhance programs designed to educate persons about 
impacts on children of restructuring of families and programs for mediation of 
visitation or custody disputes under this chapter or chapter 6 of this title. 
 C. The county treasurer shall disburse monies from the fund only at the 
direction of the presiding judge of the superior court. 
 D. On notice of the presiding judge, the county treasurer shall invest 
monies in the fund and monies earned from investment shall be credited to the 
fund. 
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 E. Monies that are expended from the fund shall be used to supplement, 
and not supplant, any state or county appropriations that would otherwise be 
available for programs described in subsection B of this section. 
 F. On or before August 10 of each year, the county treasurer shall submit a 
report to the presiding judge that shows the amount of monies in the domestic 
relations education and mediation fund. 
§414 - Violation of visitation or parenting time rights; penalties 
 A. If the court, based on a verified petition and after it gives reasonable 
notice to an alleged violating parent and an opportunity for that person to be 
heard, finds that a parent has refused without good cause to comply with a 
visitation or parenting time order, the court shall do at least one of the following: 
  1. Find the violating parent in contempt of court. 
  2. Order visitation or parenting time to make up for the missed 
sessions. 
  3. Order parent education at the violating parent's expense. 
  4. Order family counseling at the violating parent's expense. 
  5. Order civil penalties of not to exceed one hundred dollars for 
each violation. The court shall transmit monies collected pursuant to this 
paragraph each month to the county treasurer. The county treasurer shall 
transmit these monies monthly to the state treasurer for deposit into the 
alternative dispute resolution fund established by section 12-135. 
  6. Order all parents to participate in mediation or some other 
appropriate form of alternative dispute resolution at the violating parent's 
expense. 
  7. Make any other order that may promote the best interests of the 
child or children involved. 
 B. Within twenty-five days of service of the petition the court shall hold a 
hearing or conference before a judge, commissioner or person appointed by the 
court to review noncompliance with a visitation or parenting time order. 
 C. Court costs and attorney fees incurred by a nonviolating parent 
associated with the review of noncompliance with a visitation or parenting time 
order shall be paid by a violating parent. In the event the custodial parent prevails, 
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the court in its discretion may award court costs and attorney fees to the custodial 
parent. 
§415 - Custody by nonparent; presumption; grounds; definitions 
 A. In addition to section 25-401, a child custody proceeding may be 
commenced in the superior court by a person other than a legal parent by filing a 
verified petition, or by filing a petition supported by an affidavit, in the county in 
which the child is permanently a resident or is found. The petition shall include 
detailed facts supporting the petitioner's right to file the petition. The petitioner 
shall provide notice as required by subsection E of this section. Notice shall 
include a copy of the petition and any affidavits. The court shall summarily deny 
a petition unless it finds that the petitioner by the pleadings established that all of 
the following are true: 
  1. The person filing the petition stands in loco parentis to the child. 
  2. It would be significantly detrimental to the child to remain 
alienated from the Petitioner.  
  3. A court of competent jurisdiction has not entered or approved an 
order concerning the child's custody within six months of the filing of a 
petition pursuant to this section, unless there is reason to believe the 
child's present environment may seriously endanger the child's physical, 
mental, moral or emotional health. 
  4. One of the following applies: 
  (a) The child’s current parental unit consists of a single 
parent.  
  (b) There is a pending proceeding to determine parentage at 
the time the petition is filed. 
 B. If a person other than a member of the child’s parental unit is seeking 
custody there is a rebuttable presumption that it is in the child's best interest to 
award custody to a legal parent.  To rebut this presumption that person must show 
by clear and convincing evidence that awarding custody to a legal parent is not in 
the child's best interests. 
 C. Notice of a custody or visitation proceeding filed pursuant to this 
section shall be served pursuant to the Arizona rules of family law procedure to 
all of the following: 
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  1. The child's parents. 
  2. A person who has court ordered custody or visitation rights. 
  3. The child's guardian or guardian ad litem. 
  4. A person or agency that has physical custody of the child or that 
claims to have custody or visitation rights. 
  5. Any other person or agency that has previously appeared in the 
action. 
 D. A person shall file proceedings for custody or visitation under this 
chapter in the same action in which a previous custody order has been entered 
regarding the child. 
 E. For the purposes of this chapter: 
  1. "In loco parentis" means a person who has been treated as a 
parent by the child and who has formed a meaningful parental relationship 
with the child for a substantial period of time. 
  2. "Legal parent" means a parent whose parental rights have been 
recognized by a court of competent jurisdiction.  
 E: Family Support Duties  
 
 The duties outlined in this section are largely unchanged except to adjust 
the language to tolerate multiple payors and, receivers as needed, of support for a 
child.  In other words, both the biological progenitor and the former spouse of an 
adult now raising a child on his own may need to contribute to the support of 
child.  Two of four parents may be required to pay support to two others.  The 
important point here is that one may have a greater obligation than another but, 
one adult’s obligation to a child does not obviate that of another adult.  Because 
the changes here are, for the most part, changes in language to allow for broader 
180 
application of the rules but not necessarily a dramatic change in the rules 
themselves, I have included the entirety of this chapter as an appendix.     
 F: Parentage 
  
This chapter provides the rules and criteria for determining parentage.  It 
supplies a framework within which courts can decide who is responsible for a 
child or children and precisely in what way.  Recall that recognition of 
reproductive conduct beyond coitus entails recognition of parents in varying 
degrees.  Recall also that the 3 overall functions of a parent can be satisfied by 
any number of adults and their sex and relationships to each other remain 
insignificant relative to their ability to be parents to a child.   
 The changes in this chapter are not insignificant and not largely semantic 
so this chapter is included, as rewritten, here in its entirety.  
Article 1: Parentage Proceedings (§§801 - 818)  
  
§801 - Jurisdiction 
The superior court has original jurisdiction in proceedings to establish 
parentage. All such proceedings shall be civil actions.  
§802 - Venue 
Proceedings to establish parentage may be originated in the county where 
the child or children that are the subject of the action are found. The fact that the 
petitioner or child or both are not, or never have been, residents of Arizona does 
not bar the proceeding.  
§803 – Reproductive contracts; prohibition; custody; definition 
A. Any agreement to intended to result in the creation of a child is a 
reproductive contract.   
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B. A woman who gestates and gives birth to a child under such a contract 
is presumed a legal parent of that child. This presumption is rebuttable by 
reaffirmation of a contract to allow others to become the parent(s) of the child.  
C.  The spouses of a woman who gestates and gives birth to a child under 
such contract also are presumed the parents of the resulting child. This 
presumption is rebuttable by reaffirmation of a contract to allow others to become 
the parent(s) of the child. 
§803 - Persons who may originate proceedings; custody; parenting time; 
conciliation court 
 A. Proceedings to establish the parentage of a child or children and to 
compel support under this article may be commenced by any of the following: 
  1. A biological progenitor or other adult who stands in loco 
parentis to the child or children.  
  3. The guardian, conservator or guardian ad litem of a child or 
children.   
  4. A public welfare official or agency of the county where the child 
or children reside or may be found. 
  5. The state pursuant to section 25-509. 
 B. An adult may bring an action to establish the adult's biological parent. 
 C. Any party to a proceeding under this article other than the state may 
request that custody and specific parenting time be determined as a part of the 
proceeding. When parentage is established the court may award custody and 
parenting time as provided in section 25-408. The attorney general or county 
attorney shall not seek or defend any ancillary matters such as custody or 
parenting time. 
 D. In any case in which parentage is established the parent with whom the 
child has resided for the greater part of the last six months shall have legal 
custody unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
 E. The services of the conciliation court may be used in regard to disputed 
matters of custody and parenting time. 
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§804 Time for instituting proceedings 
Proceedings to establish parentage of the child may be instituted during 
gestation or after the birth of the child.  For purposes of establishing a duty to pay 
support or past support, the proceedings must be instituted before the child's 
eighteenth birthday. 
§805 - Effect of death, absence or insanity of plaintiff 
If after the petition is filed the petitioner dies, becomes insane, departs the 
state or fails to litigate the issue, the proceedings do not abate but may be 
continued, with the state as petitioner, as to any child in the legal custody of any 
state agency, or as to any child who is the beneficiary of any state or federal 
financial assistance.  
§806 - Petition 
 A. Parentage proceedings are commenced by the filing of a verified 
petition that alleges that the respondent is a parent of the child or children. 
 B. The procedure on the filing of the petition shall be as in other civil 
cases. 
 C. If the respondent does not file a response or if the respondent files a 
written response admitting parentage, the court may immediately enter a 
judgment of parentage. If other relevant issues are raised in the petition or 
response or in a separate petition filed after entry of a parentage judgment, the 
court shall proceed to resolve all relevant issues in the case pursuant to the rules 
of procedure applicable to family law cases.  
 D. A trial held pursuant to this section shall be made to the court.  
§807 - Precedence of parentage proceedings; delay for DNA tests; court 
order; evidentiary use; alternative tests; out-of-state orders; immunity 
 A. Proceedings to establish parentage have precedence over other civil 
proceedings. The case shall be set for trial within sixty days from the filing of an 
answer by the respondent. 
 B. A delay in determining parentage in an action commenced before the 
birth of the child shall be granted until after the birth of the child for purposes of 
DNA tests if any party to the proceedings requests. 
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 C. The court, on its own motion or on motion of any party to the 
proceedings, shall order the parents, the child or children and the alleged parents 
to submit to genetic testing and shall direct that inherited physical characteristics 
to determine parentage, including blood and tissue type, be determined by 
appropriate testing procedures conducted by an accredited laboratory. If a parent 
is unavailable or fails to cooperate by refusing to submit to genetic testing, testing 
of the alleged parent and child or children may be appropriate. An expert duly 
qualified as an examiner of genetic markers shall be agreed on by the parties or 
appointed by the court to analyze and interpret the results and report to the court. 
 D. If the results of the genetic tests indicate that the likelihood of the 
alleged parent’s parentage is ninety-five per cent or greater, the alleged parent is 
presumed to be the parent of the child and the party opposing the establishment of 
the alleged parentage shall establish by clear and convincing evidence that the 
alleged parent is not a parent of the child. 
 E. The examiner's report shall be admitted at trial unless a timely written 
challenge to the examiner's report is filed with the court within twenty days of the 
date the report was filed with the court. If the results of the examiner's report have 
been challenged and on the reasonable request of a party, the court shall order an 
additional test to be made by the same laboratory or an independent laboratory at 
the expense of the party requesting additional testing. 
 F. If a timely written challenge is not filed pursuant to subsection E, the 
examiner's report is admissible in evidence without the need for foundation 
testimony or other proof of authenticity or accuracy. 
 G. The court, on application of either party, shall determine the proportion 
and time in which the initial test costs shall be paid. 
 H. On motion of a party to the proceedings, the court may order that 
experts perform alternative or additional tests including medical, scientific and 
genetic tests. 
 I. Either party may apply for summary judgment on the issue of parentage. 
 J. A state or local agency in this state, including the department of 
economic security, the state department of corrections and any other correctional 
facility that has custody of a person who is the subject of the genetic testing order, 
shall treat a genetic testing order issued in another state that appears to be in good 
order as if it were issued by a court of this state. 
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 K. Notwithstanding any other law, an agency, agency employee or agency 
contractor that acts in good faith to cooperate in obtaining genetic testing samples 
under this section is not subject to civil or criminal liability.  
 
§ 809 Judgment 
A. Except as provided in section 25-501, subsection F, if a respondent 
admits parentage or if the issue is decided in the affirmative in an action instituted 
during the child's minority, the court shall direct, subject to applicable equitable 
defenses and using a retroactive application of the current child support 
guidelines, the amount, if any, the parties shall pay for the past support of the 
child and the manner in which payment shall be made. 
 B. The court shall enter an order for support determined to be due for the 
period between the commencement of the proceeding and the date that current 
child support is ordered to begin. The court shall not order past support retroactive 
to more than three years before the commencement of the proceeding unless the 
court makes a written finding of good cause after considering all relevant 
circumstances, including: 
  1. The circumstances, conduct or motivation of the party who 
claims entitlement to past support in not seeking an earlier establishment 
of  or parentage. 
  2. The circumstances, conduct or motivation of the party from 
whom past support is sought in impeding the establishment of parentage. 
  3. The diligence with which service of process was attempted on 
the respondent. 
 C. The court shall also direct the amount a parent shall pay for the actual 
costs of the pregnancy, childbirth and any genetic testing and other related costs 
subject to production of billing statements or other documentation. This 
documentation is prima facie evidence of amounts incurred and is admissible in 
evidence without the need for foundation testimony or other proof of authenticity 
or accuracy. 
 D. In any proceeding under this article the court shall order any parent to 
pay any monies reasonable and necessary for the support of the minor 
unemancipated child until the child reaches the age of majority or is emancipated. 
In determining the amount of support for the child, the court shall apply the child 
support guidelines pursuant to section 25-320, subsection D. If a child reaches the 
age of majority while the child is attending high school or a certified high school 
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equivalency program, support shall continue to be provided while the child is 
actually attending high school or the equivalency program but only until the child 
reaches nineteen years of age unless the court enters an order pursuant to 
subsection F of this section. 
 E. The court may modify an order of support pursuant to section 25-503. 
 F. Even if a child is over the age of majority when a petition is filed or at 
the time of the final decree, the court may order support to continue past the age 
of majority if all of the following are true: 
  1. The court has considered the factors prescribed in subsection D 
of this section. 
  2. The child is severely mentally or physically disabled as 
demonstrated by the fact that the child is unable to live independently and 
be self-supporting. 
  3. The child's disability began before the child reached the age of 
majority. 
 G. After considering the financial resources of the parties and the 
reasonableness of the positions each party has taken throughout the proceedings, 
the court may order a party to pay a reasonable amount another other party for the 
costs and expenses of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this article. 
The court may order the party to pay these amounts directly to the attorney. The 
attorney may enforce the order in the attorney's name with the same force and 
effect and in the same manner as if the order had been made on behalf of any 
party to the action. For the purposes of this subsection, "costs and expenses" 
includes attorney fees, deposition costs, appellate costs and other reasonable 
expenses the court determines were necessary. 
 H. The court has contempt powers to enforce its orders. 
 I. The parties may terminate an action brought under this article by 
agreement and compromise only if the court has approved the terms of the 
agreement and compromise.  
§810 - Liability of parents if putative parent is a minor; periodic payments 
 A. Except as provided pursuant to section 25-501, subsection F, a parent 
or parents having custody or control of a putative parent may be joined as 
respondents in the action if the putative parent is a minor or was a minor at the 
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time the action was commenced. The parents may be held jointly and severally 
liable with the minor until the minor reaches the age of majority. 
 B. The court may order that a judgment made against a parent pursuant to 
this section be satisfied through periodic payments as other child support orders. 
 C. In addition to the enforcement of support remedies provided pursuant to 
section 25-508, an order made pursuant to this section that provides for periodic 
payments shall be enforced pursuant to this chapter. 
§812 - Voluntary acknowledgment of parentage; action to overcome 
parentage 
 A. This state or a parent of a child may establish the parentage of a child 
by filing one of the following with the clerk of the superior court, the department 
of economic security or the department of health services: 
  1. A notarized or witnessed statement that contains the social 
security numbers of the parents and that is signed by the parents 
acknowledging parentage or separate substantially similar notarized or 
witnessed statements acknowledging parentage. If the voluntary 
acknowledgment is filed with the court, the filing party must redact any 
social security numbers and file them separately pursuant to section 25-
501, subsection G. If another person is presumed to be the child's parent 
pursuant to section 25-814, an acknowledgment of parentage is valid only 
with the presumed parent’s written consent or as prescribed pursuant to 
section 25-814. A statement that is witnessed by an employee of the 
department of economic security or the department of health services or 
by an employee of a hospital must contain the printed name and residential 
or business address of the witness. A statement that is witnessed by any 
other person must contain the printed name and residential address of the 
witness. If the acknowledgment of parentage is witnessed, the witness 
must be an adult who is not related to any parent by blood or by marriage. 
  2. An agreement by the parents to be bound by the results of 
genetic testing including any genetic test previously accepted by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, or any combination of genetic testing agreed to by 
the parties, and an affidavit from a certified laboratory that the tested 
parent has not been excluded. 
 B. On filing a document required in subsection A of this section with the 
clerk of the superior court, the clerk or authorized court personnel shall issue an 
order establishing parentage, which may amend the name of the child or children, 
if requested by the parents. The clerk shall transmit a copy of the order of 
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parentage to the department of health services and the department of economic 
security. 
 C. On entry of an order by the clerk of the superior court, the parentage 
determination has the same force and effect as a judgment of the superior court. In 
a non-title IV-D case, the clerk shall transmit a copy of an order granted under 
this subsection to the state title IV-D agency. The case filing fee prescribed by 
section 12-284 shall not be charged to any person who, in the same county, 
initiates or responds to a proceeding to establish child support or to obtain an 
order for custody or parenting time within ninety days after an order establishing 
parentage is issued under subsection B of this section. 
 D. A voluntary acknowledgment of parentage executed pursuant to 
subsection A, paragraph 1 of this section may be filed with the department of 
economic security, which shall provide a copy to the department of health 
services. A voluntary acknowledgment of parentage made pursuant to this section 
is a determination of parentage and has the same force and effect as a superior 
court judgment. 
 E. Pursuant to rule 85(c) of the Arizona rules of family law procedure, a 
parent, or a party to the proceeding on a rule 85(c) motion, may challenge a 
voluntary acknowledgment of parentage established in this state at any time after 
the sixty day period only on the basis of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact, 
with the burden of proof on the challenger and under which the legal 
responsibilities, including child support obligations of any signatory arising from 
the acknowledgment shall not be suspended during the challenge except for good 
cause shown. The court shall order the parents, child or children and the alleged 
parent to submit to genetic testing and shall direct that appropriate testing 
procedures determine the inherited characteristics, including blood and tissue 
type. If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that demonstrate that the 
established parent is not the biological father of the child, the court shall vacate 
the determination of parentage and terminate the obligation of that party to pay 
ongoing child support. An order vacating the determination of parentage operates 
prospectively only and does not alter the obligation to pay child support 
arrearages or, unless otherwise ordered by the court, any other amount previously 
ordered to be paid pursuant to section 25-809. 
 F. Before signing a voluntary acknowledgment of parentage pursuant to 
this section, the parties shall be provided notice of the alternatives to, the legal 
consequences of and the rights and responsibilities that arise from signing the 
acknowledgment. 
 G. The department of economic security shall notify the department of 
health services of all parentage determinations and rescissions. 
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 H. A parent may rescind the acknowledgment of parentage within the 
earlier of: 
  1. Sixty days after the last signature is affixed to the notarized 
acknowledgment of parentage that is filed with the department of 
economic security, the department of health services or the clerk of the 
court. 
  2. The date of a proceeding relating to the child, including a child 
support proceeding in which the parent is a party. 
 I. A rescission authorized pursuant to subsection H of this section must be 
in writing and a copy of each rescission of parentage shall be filed with the 
department of economic security. The department of economic security shall mail 
a copy of the rescission of parentage to other parent(S) and to the department of 
health services. 
 J. Voluntary acknowledgments of parentage and rescissions of parentage 
filed pursuant to this section shall contain data elements in accordance with the 
requirements of the United States secretary of health and human services.  
§813 - Default order of parentage 
In an action to establish parentage, the court shall enter an order of 
parentage if either: 
1. The service of summons is complete and the respondent fails to 
appear or otherwise answer. 
2. An order for genetic or blood testing has been entered and the 
respondent fails to appear without cause for an appointment to take a 
blood or genetic test or fails to take a blood or genetic test.  
§814 - Presumption of parentage 
 A. A person is presumed to be a parent of the child if: 
  1. He or she and another parent of the child were married at any 
time, in the ten months immediately preceding the birth, or the child is 
born within ten months after the marriage is terminated by death, 
annulment, declaration of invalidity or dissolution of marriage or after the 
court enters a decree of legal separation. 
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  2. Genetic testing affirms at least a ninety-five per cent probability 
of parentage. 
  3. A birth certificate is signed by the parents of a child at or near 
birth.  
  4. A notarized or witnessed statement is signed by the parents 
acknowledging parentage or separate substantially similar notarized or 
witnessed statements are signed by the parents acknowledging parentage. 
 B. If another person is presumed to be the child's parent under subsection 
A, paragraph 1, an acknowledgment of parentage may be effected only with the 
written consent of the presumed parent or after the presumption is rebutted.  If the 
presumed parent has died or cannot reasonably be located, parentage may be 
established without written consent. 
 C. Any presumption under this section may be rebutted by clear and 
convincing evidence. If two or more presumptions apply, the presumption that the 
court determines, on the facts, is based on weightier considerations of policy and 
logic will control. A court decree establishing parentage of the child by another 
rebuts the presumption. 
§815 - Parentage; full faith and credit 
If parentage has been established in another state by a court or 
administrative order or voluntary acknowledgment, the determination of 
parentage has the same force and effect in this state as if the determination of 
parentage was granted by a court in this state.  
§816 Title IV-D child support; parentage establishment; genetic testing 
 A. On receipt of a sworn statement by a parent or the alleged parent 
alleging parentage and setting forth the facts establishing a reasonable possibility 
of the requisite reproductive conduct of the parties, the department of economic 
security or its agent may order the parent, her child or children and the alleged 
parent to submit to the drawing of blood or tissue samples for genetic testing of a 
type generally acknowledged as reliable by accreditation bodies. If a parent 
cannot be located the department or its agent may order the caretaker of the child 
or children to present the child or children for genetic testing. The order shall be 
served by first class mail or delivered at least ten business days before the genetic 
testing. The department or its agent shall pay the costs of the test subject to 
repayment from the parents if paternity is established. An order of genetic testing 
issued by the department or its agent has the same force and effect as a superior 
court order. 
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 B. If the results of the genetic testing indicate that the likelihood of the 
alleged parent’s parentage is ninety-five per cent or greater, the alleged parent is 
presumed to be the parent of the child and the party opposing the establishment of 
the alleged parent’s parentage shall establish by clear and convincing evidence 
that he is not a parent of the child. 
 C. A person who is tested pursuant to this section may contest the test 
results in writing to the department or its agent within thirty days after the 
department or its agent mails the results to that person. If the original test results 
are contested in a timely manner, on request and advance payment by the 
requesting party, the department or its agent shall order a second genetic test 
pursuant to subsection A. 
§817 Temporary orders; presumption of parentage 
 A. Pending a judicial determination of parentage, the court shall issue a 
temporary order of support, and may issue a temporary order regarding custody 
and parenting time, if any of the following applies: 
  1. Genetic testing affirms at least a ninety-five per cent probability 
of parentage. 
  2. A notarized or witnessed statement is signed by the parents 
acknowledging parentage or separate substantially similar notarized or 
witnessed statements are signed acknowledging parentage and filed with 
the department of health services pursuant to section 36-334 or filed with 
the department of economic security. 
  3. The respondent admits or does not deny parentage in a written 
response filed with the clerk of the court. 
 B. A temporary order issued pursuant to this section does not prejudice the 
rights of a person or child that are adjudicated at subsequent hearings in the 
proceeding. 
 C. A temporary order issued pursuant to this section may be revoked or 
modified and terminates when the final support, custody or parenting time order is 
entered or when the petition for support, custody or parenting time is dismissed.  
§818 - Parentage registry; acknowledgments and parentage orders; 
recording requirements 
 A. The department of economic security shall maintain a parentage case 
registry for this state. Public and private entities that obtain or receive a voluntary 
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acknowledgment of parentage shall promptly transmit the original signed and 
completed acknowledgment to the department of economic security. This 
requirement does not apply to the superior court. 
 B. The department of economic security may dispose of an original 
voluntary acknowledgment of parentage not sooner than one year after the date of 
the last signature on the acknowledgment and only after it makes an electronic 
copy of the original acknowledgment. 
 C. The clerk of the superior court shall transmit a copy of each order of 
parentage to the department of economic security. 
 D. The department of economic security shall maintain automated records 
regarding the parents and any child whose name is stated in a voluntary 
acknowledgment of parentage or an order of parentage. 
 E. The clerk of the superior court, the department of economic security 
and the department of health services shall cooperate to ensure that the state 
registrar of vital records receives a copy of a voluntary acknowledgment of 
parentage or order of parentage relating to any child born in this state.  
 G: Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and 
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act  
 Chapters 8 and 9 are similar to chapter 5 in that the changes needed are 
largely semantic or linguistic.  Again I changed the singular to include the plural 
to accommodate more than two parents and changed the gendered pronouns to 
account for any combination of sexes of the adults involved in the reproductive 
conduct.    
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APPENDIX A 
TITLE 25 OF THE NEWLY REVISED ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES 
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Chapter 1-MARRIAGE 
 
Article 1-Marriages 
25-101 -Void and prohibited marriages 
25-102 -Consent required for marriage of minors 
25-103 -Purposes of title; application of title 
 
Article 2-Validity of Marriages 
25-111 -Requirement of license and solemnization; covenant marriages 
25-112 -Marriages contracted in another state; validity and effect 
 
Article 3-Marriage License, Ceremony and Record 
25-121 -Marriage license; application; affidavit 
25-122 -Consent of parent or guardian of minor 
25-123 -Recording licenses; endorsement of solemnization; recording return; lost 
licenses 
25-124 -Persons authorized to perform marriage ceremony; definition 
25-125 -Marriage ceremony; official; witnesses; marriage license; covenant 
marriages 
25-126 -Application to justice of the peace for marriage and covenant marriage 
licenses; issuance; violation; classification 
25-127 -Issuance of marriage license by a city or town; transfer of fees; handling 
fee 
25-128 -Unlawful acts of person authorized to solemnize marriages; classification 
25-129 -Unlawful acts of person authorized to issue marriage license or make 
marriage records; classification 
25-130 -Abstract of marriage in lieu of reproducing marriage license 
 
Chapter 2-Marital Property 
 
Article 1-Arizona Uniform Premarital Agreement Act 
25-201 -Definitions 
25-202 -Enforcement of premarital agreements; exception 
25-203 -Scope of agreement 
25-204 -Amendment or revocation of agreement 
25-205 -Limitation of actions 
 
Article 2-Property Rights and Contract Powers 
25-211 -Property acquired during marriage as community property; exceptions; 
effect of service of a petition 
25-213 -Separate property 
25-214 -Management and control 
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25-215 -Liability of community property and separate property for community 
and separate debts 
25-217 -Ownership of property acquired after moving into state 
 
Chapter 3-DISSOLUTION  
 
Article 1-Dissolution of Marriage 
25-311 -Jurisdiction; form of petition; award of decree 
25-312 -Dissolution of marriage; findings necessary 
25-313 -Decree of legal separation; findings necessary 
25-314 -Pleadings; contents; defense; joinder of parties; confidentiality 
25-315 -Temporary order or preliminary injunction; effect; definition 
25-316 -Irretrievable breakdown; finding 
25-317 -Separation agreement; effect 
25-318 -Disposition of property; retroactivity; notice to creditors; assignment of 
debts; contempt of court 
25-318.01 -Military retirement benefits; disability related waiver 
25-319 -Maintenance; computation factors 
25-320 -Child support; factors; methods of payment; additional enforcement 
provisions; definitions 
25-320.02 -Self-employed parent; tax practitioner; definition 
25-321 -Representation of child by counsel; fees 
25-322 -Payment of maintenance or support; records; disclosure 
25-323 -Assignments 
25-323.01 -Child support committee; membership; duties; report 
25-323.02 -Domestic relations committee; membership; duties; pilot programs; 
report 
25-323.03 -Forms; alternative forms 
25-324 -Attorney fees 
25-325 -Decree; finality; restoration of maiden name 
25-326 -Independence of provisions of decree or temporary order; forms 
25-327 -Modification and termination of provisions for maintenance, support and 
property disposition 
25-328 -Sequence of trials when custody or parenting time is an issue 
25-329 -Waiting period 
25-330 -Employer cooperation 
25-331 -Notification requirements 
 
Article 5-Domestic Relations Education on Children's Issues 
25-351 -Domestic relations education; plan; administration 
25-352 -Applicability of program; compliance 
25-353 -Failure to comply 
25-354 -Children's issues education fund; report 
195 
25-355 -Fees; deferral or waiver 
 
Article 7-Court of Conciliation 
25-381.01 -Purposes of article 
25-381.02 -Definitions 
25-381.03 -Applicability of article; determination by superior court 
25-381.04 -Assignment of judges; number of sessions 
25-381.05 -Transfer of cases; reason; duties of transferee judge 
25-381.06 -Court assistants; salaries; appointments 
25-381.07 -Director of conciliation; powers and duties 
25-381.08 -Jurisdiction 
25-381.09 -Petition invoking jurisdiction or for transfer of action to conciliation 
court 
25-381.10 -Petition; caption 
25-381.11 -Petition; contents 
25-381.12 -Blank forms; assistance in preparing and presenting petition 
25-381.13 -Fees 
25-381.14 -Hearing; time; place; notice; citation; witnesses 
25-381.15 -Time and place of holding hearings 
25-381.16 -Conduct of hearing; recommendations; aid of specialists; expense; 
confidential communications 
25-381.17 -Orders; duration of effectiveness; reconciliation agreement 
25-381.18 -Dissolution of marriage; legal separation; annulment; stay of right to 
file; jurisdiction for pending actions 
25-381.19 -Transfer of certain actions where minor child involved 
25-381.20 -Procedure in actions where no child is involved; conciliation court 
may accept case 
25-381.21 -Construction of article 
25-381.22 -Subsequent petition filed within one year 
25-381.23 -Option for mandatory conciliation 
25-381.24 -Counseling 
 
Chapter 4- CUSTODY AND VISITATION 
 
Article 1-Child Custody 
25-401 -Jurisdiction; commencement of proceedings 
25-402 -Definitions 
25-403 -Custody; best interests of child 
25-403.01 -Sole and joint custody 
25-403.02 -Parenting plans 
25-403.03 -Domestic violence and child abuse 
25-403.04 -Drug offenses 
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25-403.05 -Sexual offenders; murderers; custody and parenting time; notification 
of risk to child 
25-403.06 -Parental access to records 
25-403.07 -Identification of a primary caretaker and public assistance 
25-403.08 -Resources and fees 
25-403.09 -Child support 
25-404 -Temporary orders 
25-405 -Interviews by court; professional assistance 
25-406 -Investigations and reports 
25-407 -Custody hearings; priority; costs; record 
25-408 -Rights of noncustodial parent; parenting time; relocation of child; 
exception; enforcement; access to records 
25-409 -Visitation rights of grandparents and great-grandparents 
25-410 -Judicial supervision 
25-411 -Modification of custody decree; affidavit; contents; military families 
25-412 -Expedited child support and parenting time fund 
25-413 -Domestic relations education and mediation fund; report 
25-414 -Violation of visitation or parenting time rights; penalties 
25-415 -Custody by nonparent; presumption; grounds; definitions 
 
Chapter 5-FAMILY SUPPORT  DUTIES 
 
Article 1-General Provisions 
25-500 -Definitions 
25-501 -Duties of support; exemption 
25-502 -Jurisdiction, venue and procedure; additional enforcement provisions 
25-503 -Order for support; methods of payment; modification; termination; 
statute of limitations; judgment on arrearages; notice; security 
25-503.01 -Self-employed parent; monies held as security for payment of support 
25-504 -Order of assignment; ex parte order of assignment; responsibilities; 
violation; termination 
25-505 -Limited income withholding orders; definition 
25-505.01 -Administrative income withholding order; notice; definition 
25-506 -Order for assignment; foreign support order 
25-507 -Forms; alternative forms 
25-508 -Enforcement of support orders; fee prohibition 
25-509 -Representation by attorney general or county attorney; modification of 
order by attorney general or county attorney 
25-510 -Receiving and disbursing support and maintenance monies; arrearages; 
interest 
25-511 -Failure of parent to provide for child; classification 
25-511.01 -Spousal maintenance order; violation; classification 
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25-512 -Consumer credit reports; use of child support or spousal maintenance 
obligation information 
25-513 -Employer cooperation; violation; classification 
25-514 -Priority of action and judgments 
25-516 -Lien; notice; priority; recording; reciprocity 
25-517 -Title IV-D agency; license suspension; notice; administrative review or 
hearing 
25-518 -Child support arrearage; license suspension; hearing 
25-519 -Regulatory entities; suspension of license 
25-520 -Child support enforcement; administrative subpoena; civil penalty 
25-521 -Levy; seizure of property for collection of support debt; definitions 
25-522 -Administrative review; notice; determination; judicial review; definitions 
25-523 -Financial institutions data match; nonliability; prohibited disclosure; 
liability; civil liability; definition 
25-524 -Financial institutions; surrender of assets; nonliability 
25-525 -Administrative enforcement; interstate cases; definition 
25-526 -Child support enforcement information; internet posting 
25-527 -Child support; overpayment; reimbursement 
25-528 -Title IV-D recipients; fee 
25-529 -Title IV-D cases; alternative medical insurance coverage 
25-530 -Spousal maintenance; veterans disability benefits 
 
Article 2-Child Medical Support 
25-531 -Definitions 
25-532 -Enrollment of child 
25-533 -Insurer obligations 
25-534 -Employer obligations 
25-535 -Enforcement of health insurance coverage; medical support notice; 
administrative review; service 
 
Article 3-Spousal Maintenance Enforcement 
25-551 -Clerk of the court 
25-552 -Jurisdiction; priority of action 
25-553 -Request for arrearages; deadline 
 
Article 5-Child Support Arrest Warrants 
25-681 -Child support arrest warrant; definition 
25-682 -Time and manner of execution; information 
25-683 -Procedure after arrest; payment for release from custody 
25-684 -Preexisting warrants 
25-685 -Entry into criminal information system 
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Chapter 6- PARENTAGE  
 
Article 1- Parentage Proceedings 
25-801 -Jurisdiction 
25-802 -Venue 
25-803 - Surrogate parentage contracts; prohibition; custody; definition 
 
25-804 - Persons who may originate proceedings; custody; parenting time; 
conciliation court 
25-805 - Time for instituting proceedings 
25-806 - Effect of death, absence or insanity of plaintiff 
25-807 - Petition 
25-809 - Precedence of parentage proceedings; delay for parentage tests; court 
order; evidentiary use; alternative tests; out-of-state orders; immunity 
25-810 - Judgment 
25-812 - Liability of parents if putative parent is a minor; periodic payments 
Voluntary  
25-813 - Acknowledgment of parentage; action to overcome parentage  
25-814 - Default order of parentage  
25-815 - Presumption of parentage  
25-816 - Parentage; full faith and credit  
25-817 - Title IV-D child support; parentage establishment; genetic testing  
25-818 - Temporary orders; presumption of parentage  
25-819 - Parentage case registry; acknowledgments and parentage orders; 
recording requirements 
 
Chapter 7- UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND 
ENFORCEMENT ACT 
 
Article 1-General Provisions 
25-1001 -Short title 
25-1002 -Definitions 
25-1003 -Proceeding governed by other law 
25-1004 -Application to Indian tribes 
25-1005 -International application of chapter 
25-1006 -Effect of child custody determination 
25-1007 -Priority 
25-1008 -Notice to persons outside this state 
25-1009 -Appearance and limited immunity 
25-1010 -Communication between courts; definition 
25-1011 -Taking testimony in another state 
25-1012 -Cooperation between courts; preservation of records 
25-1013 -Military deployment; home state 
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Article 2-Jurisdiction 
25-1031 -Initial child custody jurisdiction 
25-1032 -Exclusive continuing jurisdiction 
25-1033 -Jurisdiction to modify determination 
25-1034 -Temporary emergency jurisdiction 
25-1035 -Notice; opportunity to be heard; joinder 
25-1036 -Simultaneous proceedings 
25-1037 -Inconvenient forum 
25-1038 -Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct 
25-1039 -Information to be submitted to court 
25-1040 -Appearance of parties and child 
 
Article 3-Enforcement 
25-1051 -Definitions 
25-1052 -Enforcement under Hague convention 
25-1053 -Duty to enforce 
25-1054 -Temporary visitation 
25-1055 -Registration of child custody determination 
25-1056 -Enforcement of registered determination 
25-1057 -Simultaneous proceedings 
25-1058 -Expedited enforcement of child custody determination 
25-1059 -Service of petition and order 
25-1060 -Hearing and order 
25-1061 -Warrant to take physical custody of child 
25-1062 -Costs, fees and expenses 
25-1063 -Recognition and enforcement 
25-1064 -Appeals 
25-1065 -Role of attorney general 
25-1066 -Role of law enforcement 
25-1067 -Costs and expenses 
 
Chapter 8-UNIFORM INTERESTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT 
 
Article 1-General Provisions 
25-1201 -Short title 
25-1202 -Definitions 
25-1204 -Remedies cumulative 
 
Article 2-Jurisdiction 
25-1221 -Bases for jurisdiction over nonresident 
25-1222 -Duration of personal jurisdiction 
25-1223 -Initiating and responding tribunal of state 
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25-1224 -Simultaneous proceedings 
25-1225 -Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify child support order 
25-1226 -Continuing jurisdiction to enforce child support order 
25-1227 -Determination of controlling child support order 
25-1228 -Child support orders for two or more obligees 
25-1229 -Credit for payments 
25-1230 -Application of chapter to nonresident subject to personal jurisdiction 
25-1231 -Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify spousal support order 
 
Article 3-Civil Provisions of General Application 
25-1241 -Proceedings under this chapter 
25-1242 -Proceeding by minor parent 
25-1243 -Application of law of state 
25-1244 -Duties of initiating tribunal 
25-1245 -Duties and powers of responding tribunal 
25-1246 -Inappropriate tribunal 
25-1247 -Duties of support enforcement agency 
25-1248 -Duty of the attorney general 
25-1249 -Private counsel 
25-1250 -Duties of department of economic security 
25-1251 -Pleadings and accompanying documents 
25-1252 -Nondisclosure of information in exceptional circumstances 
25-1253 -Costs and fees 
25-1254 -Limited immunity of petitioner 
25-1255 -Nonparentage as defense 
25-1256 -Special evidence and procedure 
25-1257 -Communications between tribunals 
25-1258 -Assistance with discovery 
25-1259 -Receipt and disbursement of payments 
 
Article 4-Establishment of Support Order 
25-1271 -Petition to establish support order 
 
Article 5-Enforcement of Order of Another State without Registration 
25-1281 -Employer's receipt of income withholding order of another state 
25-1282 -Employer's compliance with income withholding order of another state 
25-1283 -Employer's compliance with two or more income withholding orders 
25-1284 -Immunity from civil liability 
25-1285 -Penalties for noncompliance 
25-1286 -Contest by obligor 
25-1287 -Administrative enforcement of orders 
 
Article 6-Registration, Enforcement and Modification of Support Order 
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25-1301 -Registration of order for enforcement 
25-1302 -Procedure to register order for enforcement 
25-1303 -Effect of registration for enforcement 
25-1304 -Choice of law 
25-1305 -Notice of registration of order 
25-1306 -Procedure to contest validity or enforcement of registered order 
25-1307 -Contest of registration or enforcement 
25-1308 -Confirmed order 
25-1309 -Procedure to register child support order of another state for 
modification 
25-1310 -Effect of registration for modification 
25-1311 -Modification of child support order of another state 
25-1312 -Recognition of order modified in another state 
25-1313 -Jurisdiction to modify child support order of another state if individual 
parties reside in this state 
25-1314 -Notice to issuing tribunal of modification 
25-1315 -Jurisdiction to modify child support order of foreign country or political 
subdivision 
 
Article 7-Determination of Parentage 
25-1331 -Proceeding to determine parentage 
 
Article 8-Interstate Rendition 
25-1341 -Grounds for rendition 
25-1342 -Conditions of rendition 
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APPENDIX B 
CHAPTER 5 OF TITLE 25 OF THE NEWLY REVISED ARIZONA REVISED 
STATUTES 
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Chapter 5: Family Support Duties (Article 1 - 5)  
 The duties outlined in this Chapter 5 are largely unchanged except to 
adjust the language to tolerate multiple payors and, receivers as needed, of 
support for a child.  In other words, both the biological progenitor and the former 
spouse of an adult now raising a child on his own may need to contribute to the 
support of child.  Two of four parents may be required to pay support to two 
others.  The important point here is that one may have a greater obligation than 
another but, one adult’s obligation to a child does not obviate that of another 
adult.  Because the changes here are, for the most part, changes in language to 
allow for broader application of the rules but not necessarily a dramatic change in 
the rules themselves, I have included the entirety of this chapter as an appendix.     
Article 1: General Provisions (§§500 - 530)  
 
§ 500 - Definitions 
In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires: 
1. "Arrearage" means the total unpaid support owed, including 
child support, past support, spousal maintenance and interest. 
2. "Business day" means a day when state offices are open for 
regular business. 
3. "Child support guidelines" means the child support guidelines 
that are adopted by the state supreme court. 
4. "Child support subpoena" means a subpoena issued pursuant to 
section 25-520. 
5. "Department" means the department of economic security. 
6. "Income" means any form of payment owed to an individual, 
regardless of source, including wages, salaries, commissions, bonuses, 
workers' compensation, disability payments, payments pursuant to a 
pension or retirement program and interest. 
7. "Obligee" means a person or agency entitled to receive support. 
8. "Obligor" means a person obligated to pay support. 
9. "Support" means the provision of maintenance or subsistence 
and includes medical insurance coverage, or cash medical support, and 
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uncovered medical costs for the child, arrearages, interest on arrearages, 
past support, interest on past support and reimbursement for expended 
public assistance. In a title IV-D case, support includes spousal 
maintenance that is included in the same order that directs child support.  
10. "Support payment clearinghouse" means the clearinghouse 
established pursuant to section 46-441. 
11. "Title IV-D" means title IV-D of the social security act.  
§501 - Duties of support; exemption 
 A. Except as provided in subsection F of this section, every person has the 
duty to provide all reasonable support for that person's unemancipated children, 
regardless of the presence or residence of the child in this state. In the case of 
mentally or physically disabled children, if the court, after considering the factors 
set forth in section 25-320, subsection D, deems it appropriate, the court may 
order support to continue past the age of majority. If a child reaches the age of 
majority while the child is attending high school or a certified high school 
equivalency program, support shall continue to be provided while the child is 
actually attending high school or the equivalency program but only until the child 
reaches nineteen years of age unless the court enters an order pursuant to section 
25-320, subsection E. 
 B. A child who is born as the result of Assisted Reproductive Technology  
is entitled to support from all of the adults who engaged in the reproductive 
conduct. 
 C. The child support guidelines shall be used in determining the ability to 
pay child support and the amount of payments. The obligation to pay child 
support is primary and other financial obligations are secondary. 
 D. All duties of support as prescribed in this chapter may be enforced by 
all civil and criminal remedies provided by law. 
 E. Remedies provided by this chapter are cumulative and do not affect the 
availability of remedies under other law. 
 F. The court may determine that a biological progenitor is not obligated to 
contribute to the support of a resulting child if parentage is the result of: 
  1. the reproductive conduct of others and the biological progenitor 
has agreed to provide genetic material to others without an intention to 
become a parent.  
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  2. sexual contact with a person who, as a result of that contact, has 
been found guilty of sexual conduct with a minor under section 13-1405 or 
sexual assault under section 13-1406. The court may also apply this 
exemption to the parent's parents or legal guardian. 
 G. In any action filed pursuant to this title, if a duty of support for another 
person exists or may exist the parties shall file the social security numbers of each 
party and any affected children in the record of the proceeding in a manner that is 
consistent with the requirements of the Arizona rules of family law relating to 
sensitive data. The court shall include this information in the state case registry 
and shall maintain this information in a manner that is consistent with the 
requirements of the Arizona rules of family law relating to sensitive data. 
§502 - Jurisdiction, venue and procedure; additional enforcement 
provisions 
 A. The superior court has original jurisdiction in proceedings brought by 
the department, its agents, a person having physical custody of a child or a party 
to the case to establish, enforce or modify the duties of support as prescribed in 
this chapter. All such proceedings are civil actions except as provided in section 
25-511. Proceedings to enforce the duties of support as prescribed in this chapter 
may be originated in the county of residence of the respondent or the petitioner or 
of the child or children who are the subject of the action. 
 B. A proceeding to establish support must originate in the county where 
the child resides or, if the child resides out of state, the county of this state where 
the party filing the petition to establish support resides, if either of the following 
applies: 
  1. An action does not exist under this title. 
  2. Parentage was established without a court order pursuant to 
section 36-334. 
 C. A person or the department or its agent must file a petition to establish 
or modify a child support order in the superior court in the county of the last order 
issued under this title if an order exists in this state. If a person wishes the case 
transferred to the county of this state where the child resides or, if the child 
resides out of state, the county of this state where the party requesting the transfer 
resides, the person must file a request for transfer with the clerk of the superior 
court that issued the last order. 
 D. A request for transfer pursuant to subsection C of this section must 
include a petition or motion regarding support, a statement of payments in default, 
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if applicable, and the transmittal fee prescribed in section 12-284. The responding 
party may object to the transfer by filing an objection and affidavit within twenty 
days after service of the request to transfer. 
 E. If the clerk does not receive an objection and affidavit pursuant to 
subsection D of this section, the clerk shall issue the transfer order and transfer 
the proceeding and all related court files to the other county within thirty days 
after service of the request to transfer. If the clerk receives an objection and 
affidavit within the time prescribed in subsection D of this section, the clerk shall 
notify all parties of the date of the hearing at least ten days before the hearing 
date. The court may hear evidence relevant only to the issue of the transfer. If 
after that hearing the court orders the transfer, the clerk shall transfer the 
proceeding and court files within ten days after the order. The county to which the 
transfer is made retains the court files and venue for all purposes and the 
transferring county shall not retain a copy of those files.  
 F. The county to which a transfer is made pursuant to subsection D or E of 
this section shall proceed as if the proceeding was brought in that county 
originally. A judgment from that county has the same effect and may be enforced 
or modified as a judgment from the original county.  
§503 - Order for support; methods of payment; modification; termination; 
statute of limitations; judgment on arrearages; notice; security 
 A. In any proceeding in which there is at issue the support of a child, the 
court may order any or all parents to pay any amount necessary for the support of 
the child. If the court order does not specify the date when current support begins, 
the support obligation begins to accrue on the first day of the month following the 
entry of the order. If a personal check for support payments and handling fees is 
rightfully dishonored by the payor bank or other drawee, any subsequent support 
payments and handling fees shall be paid only by cash, money order, cashier's 
check, traveler's check or certified check. The department may collect from the 
drawer of a dishonored check or draft an amount allowed pursuant to section 44-
6852. Pursuant to sections 35-146 and 35-147, the department shall deposit 
monies collected pursuant to this subsection in a child support enforcement 
administration fund. If a party required to pay support other than by personal 
check demonstrates full and timely payment for twenty-four consecutive months, 
that party may pay support by personal check if these payments are for the full 
amount, are timely tendered and are not rightfully dishonored by the payor bank 
or other drawee. On a showing of good cause, the court may order that the party 
or parties required to pay support give reasonable security for these payments. If 
the court sets an appearance bond and the obligor fails to appear, the bond is 
forfeited and credited against any support owed by the party required to pay 
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support. This subsection does not apply to payments that are made by means of a 
wage assignment. 
 B. On a showing that an income withholding order has been ineffective to 
secure the timely payment of support and that an amount equal to six months of 
current support has accrued, the court shall require the obligor to give security, 
post bond or give some other guarantee to secure overdue support. 
 C. In title IV-D cases, and in all other cases subject to an income 
withholding order issued on or after January 1, 1994, after notice to the party 
entitled to receive support, the department or its agent may direct the party 
obligated to pay support or other payor to make payment to the support payment 
clearinghouse. The department or its agent shall provide notice by first class mail. 
 D. The obligation for current child support shall be fully met before any 
payments under an order of assignment may be applied to the payment of 
arrearages. If a party is obligated to pay support for more than one family and the 
amount available is not sufficient to meet the total combined current support 
obligation, any monies shall be allocated to each family as follows: 
  1. The amount of current support ordered in each case shall be 
added to obtain the total support obligation. 
  2. The ordered amount in each case shall be divided by the total 
support obligation to obtain a percentage of the total amount due. 
  3. The amount available from the obligor's income shall be 
multiplied by the percentage under paragraph 2 of this subsection to obtain 
the amount to be allocated to each family. 
 E. Any order for child support may be modified or terminated on a 
showing of changed circumstance that is substantial and continuing, except as to 
any amount that may have accrued as an arrearage before the date of notice of the 
motion or order to show cause to modify or terminate. The addition of health 
insurance coverage as defined in section 25-531 or a change in the availability of 
health insurance coverage may constitute a continuing and substantial change in 
circumstance. Modification and termination are effective on the first day of the 
month following notice of the petition for modification or termination unless the 
court, for good cause shown, orders the change to become effective at a different 
date but not earlier than the date of filing the petition for modification or 
termination. The order of modification or termination may include an award of 
attorney fees and court costs to the prevailing party. 
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 F. On petition of a person who has been ordered to pay child support 
pursuant to a presumption of parentage established pursuant to section 25-814, the 
court may order the petitioner's support to terminate if the court finds based on 
clear and convincing evidence that parentage was established by fraud, duress or 
material mistake of fact. Except for good cause shown, the petitioner's support 
obligations continue in effect until the court has ruled in favor of the petitioner. 
The court shall order the petitioner, each child who is the subject of the petition 
and the child's progenitors or parents to submit to genetic testing and shall order 
the appropriate testing procedures to determine the child's inherited 
characteristics, including blood and tissue type. If the court finds that the 
petitioner is not the child's biological father, the court shall vacate the 
determination of parentage and terminate the support obligation. Unless otherwise 
ordered by the court, an order vacating a support obligation is prospective and 
does not alter the petitioner's obligation to pay child support arrearages or any 
other amount previously ordered by the court. If the court finds that it is in the 
child's best interests, the court may order the biological father to pay restitution to 
the petitioner for any child support paid before the court ruled in favor of the 
petitioner pursuant to this subsection. 
 G. Notwithstanding subsection E of this section, in a title IV-D case a 
party, or the department or its agent if there is an assignment of rights under 
section 46-407, may request every three years that an order for child support be 
reviewed and, if appropriate, adjusted. The request may be made without a 
specific showing of a changed circumstance that is substantial and continuing. 
The department or its agent shall conduct the review in accordance with the child 
support guidelines of this state. If appropriate, the department shall file a petition 
in the superior court to adjust the support amount. Every three years the 
department or its agent shall notify the parties of their right to request a review of 
the order for support. The department or its agent shall notify the parties by first 
class mail at their last known address or by including the notice in an order. 
 H. If a party in a title IV-D case requests a review and adjustment sooner 
than three years, the party shall demonstrate a changed circumstance that is 
substantial and continuing. 
 I. The right of a party entitled to receive support or the department to 
receive child support payments as provided in the court order vests as each 
installment falls due. Each vested child support installment is enforceable as a 
final judgment by operation of law. The department or its agent or a party entitled 
to receive support may also file a request for written judgment for support 
arrearages. 
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 J. If the obligee, the department or their agents make efforts to collect a 
child support debt more than ten years after the emancipation of the youngest 
child subject to the order, the obligor may assert as a defense, and has the burden 
to prove, that the obligee or the department unreasonably delayed in attempting to 
collect the child support debt. On a finding of unreasonable delay a tribunal, as 
defined in section 25-1202, may determine that some or all of the child support 
debt is no longer collectible after the date of the finding. 
 K. Notwithstanding any other law, any judgment for support and for 
associated costs and attorney fees is exempt from renewal and is enforceable until 
paid in full. 
 L. If a party entitled to receive child support or spousal maintenance or the 
department or its agent enforcing an order of support has not received court 
ordered payments, the party entitled to receive support or spousal maintenance or 
the department or its agent may file with the clerk of the superior court a request 
for judgment of arrearages and an affidavit indicating the name of the party 
obligated to pay support and the amount of the arrearages. The request must 
include notice of the requirements of this section and the right to request a hearing 
within twenty days after service in this state or within thirty days after service 
outside this state. The request, affidavit and notice must be served pursuant to the 
Arizona rules of family law procedure on all parties including the department or 
its agents in title IV-D cases. In a title IV-D case, the department or its agent may 
serve all parties by certified mail, return receipt requested. Within twenty days 
after service in this state or within thirty days after service outside this state, a 
party may file a request for a hearing if the arrearage amount or the identity of the 
person is in dispute. If a hearing is not requested within the time provided, or if 
the court finds that the objection is unfounded, the court must review the affidavit 
and grant an appropriate judgment against the party obligated to pay support.  
 M. If after reasonable efforts to locate the obligee the clerk or support 
payment clearinghouse is unable to deliver payments for a period of one hundred 
twenty days after the date the first payment is returned as undeliverable due to the 
failure of a party to whom the support has been ordered to be paid to notify the 
clerk or support payment clearinghouse of a change in address, the clerk or 
support payment clearinghouse shall return that and all other unassigned 
payments to the obligor unless there is an agreement of the obligor to pay 
assigned arrears and other debts owed to the state. 
 N. If the obligee of a child support order marries the obligor of the child 
support order, that order automatically terminates on the last day of the month in 
which the marriage takes place and arrearages do not accrue after that date. 
However, the obligee or the state may collect child support arrearages that 
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accrued before that date. The obligee, the obligor or the department or its agent in 
a title IV-D case may file a request or stipulation to terminate or adjust any 
existing order of assignment, pursuant to section 25-504 or section 25-505.01. 
 O. For the purposes of this chapter, a child is emancipated: 
  1. On the date of the child's marriage. 
  2. On the child's eighteenth birthday.  
  3. When the child dies. 
  4. On the termination of the support obligation if support is 
extended beyond the age of majority pursuant to section 25-501, 
subsection A or section 25-320, subsections E and F.  
§503.01 - Self-employed parent; monies held as security for payment of 
support 
 A. On a showing of good cause, the court may order that a self-employed 
parent who is required to make child support payments forward an amount equal 
to not more than six months of child support to the department to hold as security. 
The department shall release these monies to compensate an obligee for missed 
current child support payments. 
 B. This section does not apply unless the self-employed parent is in arrears 
for three months or more. 
 C. This section does not limit other remedies available to an obligee, the 
department or its agents. 
 D. If a self-employed parent who is required to forward monies to the 
department pursuant to this section demonstrates full and timely support payments 
for twenty-four consecutive months, the department shall release to that self-
employed parent any monies that remain.  
§504- Order of assignment; ex parte order of assignment; responsibilities; 
violation; termination 
 A. In a proceeding in which the court orders a person to pay support the 
court shall, and in a proceeding in which the court orders a person to pay spousal 
maintenance the court may, assign to the person or agency entitled to receive the 
support or spousal maintenance that portion of the person's income necessary to 
pay the amount ordered by the court. In a proceeding in which spousal 
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maintenance is ordered to be paid the court shall order the assignment on either 
party's request. 
 B. A person who is obligated by an order to pay support or spousal 
maintenance, the person to whom support or spousal maintenance is ordered to be 
paid or the department or its agent in a title IV-D case may file a verified request 
with the clerk of the superior court requesting the clerk to issue an ex parte order 
of assignment for support or spousal maintenance. The ex parte order of 
assignment may include a payment for current support and any other support, 
current spousal maintenance, spousal maintenance arrearages and interest on 
spousal maintenance arrearages. A request filed by the department or its agent 
need not be verified. The request shall state: 
  1. The name of the person or agency entitled to receive support or 
spousal maintenance. 
  2. The monthly amount of any current support and the monthly 
amount of any spousal maintenance ordered by the court. 
  3. The specific amount requested for any support arrearages, 
spousal maintenance arrearages or interest. 
  4. The name and address of the payor to whom it is requested the 
order of assignment be directed and the name of the person obligated to 
pay support or spousal maintenance. 
 C. After receipt of a request for an ex parte order of assignment the clerk 
of the superior court, without a hearing or notice to the person obligated to pay 
support or spousal maintenance, shall issue an order of assignment of that portion 
of the person's income as is sufficient to pay the amount requested to the person 
or agency entitled to receive the support or spousal maintenance. The order of 
assignment shall include the social security number of the obligated person. On 
issuance of an ex parte order of assignment, the clerk shall issue a notice directed 
to the obligor in substantially the following form, which shall also be in Spanish: 
Notice 
To: The obligor (the person ordered to pay support or spousal 
maintenance)  
This is to notify you that part of your income or other monies is being 
taken away by the enclosed order of assignment that was issued on a 
request for an order of assignment that also is enclosed. The order of 
assignment has been issued for currently accruing child support or spousal 
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maintenance, or both, based on the requesting party's claim that you are 
obligated to pay this. In addition, the requesting party may be claiming a 
right to collect other support, as defined in section 25-500, Arizona 
Revised Statutes, arrearages on spousal maintenance or interest on a 
judgment for unpaid spousal maintenance. 
If you believe the enclosed order of assignment is improper or unlawful, 
that your property is exempt by law or that your employer or other payor 
is withholding more than is permitted by law, you may request a hearing 
before the superior court. You must file a request to terminate or adjust the 
order of assignment on forms provided by the clerk of the court within 
seven days after your receipt of the order for assignment, request for an 
order of assignment and this notice. If you request a hearing, it will be 
held no more than ten days after you file your request with the court. 
Here are some other important things you should know: 
The order of assignment is effective immediately on service of the order 
on your employer or another payor. The first employer or payor served 
shall not withhold or deduct amounts specified in the ex parte order of 
assignment for fourteen calendar days from the date of service to allow 
you, the obligor, an opportunity to contest the order of assignment as 
provided in section 25-504, Arizona Revised Statutes. A future employer 
or payor may begin deductions sooner than the fourteen day period after 
the order of assignment is received. 
If you request a hearing, the court, after considering the financial 
resources of both parties and the reasonableness of the positions each 
party has taken, may order a party to pay a reasonable amount to the other 
for the attorney fees and costs of filing or defending the request. 
Under state law (section 33-1131, Arizona Revised Statutes) no more than 
one-half of your disposable earnings for any pay period may be taken to 
satisfy an order issued for support or spousal maintenance. The amount of 
disposable earnings exempt from the order of assignment must be paid to 
you when due. Disposable income means the remaining portion of your 
wages, salary or compensation for personal services, including bonuses 
and commissions, or otherwise, and includes payments pursuant to a 
pension or retirement program or a deferred compensation plan, after 
deducting from such earnings the amounts required by law to be withheld. 
An employer or other payor who receives the order of assignment may 
deduct from amounts due to you one dollar for each pay period, but not 
more than four dollars per month, for costs. The employer or payor also 
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must deduct a monthly amount for the support payment handling fee 
required by state law (section 25-510, Arizona Revised Statutes). 
The employer or other payor on whom the order of assignment is served 
will continue to withhold the amount set in the order and will forward the 
payment to the support payment clearinghouse until you file with the clerk 
one of the following: 
 1. A verified request to adjust the order of assignment, and the 
court adjusts the order of assignment because there has been a change of 
circumstances since the time of the issuance of the order or there is other 
good cause to do so. 
 2. A verified request for a hearing to terminate the order of 
assignment and, after a hearing, the court terminates the order of 
assignment if all obligations have been satisfied or will be satisfied within 
ninety days. 
 3. A notarized stipulation stating that the obligation to pay support 
or spousal maintenance has ended and that all arrearages either have been 
satisfied or have been waived, and the clerk terminates the order of 
assignment. 
An employer may not refuse to hire, may not discharge or may not 
otherwise discipline you as a result of the order of assignment. If you are 
wrongfully refused employment, discharged or otherwise disciplined you 
may recover damages suffered, plus reinstatement if appropriate, plus 
reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred against the employer. 
Unless a court has expressly ordered otherwise, you must notify the clerk 
of the court or the support payment clearinghouse in writing of the address 
of your residence and of your employment and, within ten days, of a 
change in either one. Your failure to do so may subject you to sanctions 
for contempt of court, including reasonable attorney fees and costs 
pursuant to state law (section 25-504, subsection R, Arizona Revised 
Statutes). Official notices will be delivered to you at the most recent 
addresses you have provided to the clerk or support payment 
clearinghouse. 
 D. Any order of assignment shall be issued only for support, spousal 
maintenance, spousal maintenance arrearages, interest on spousal maintenance 
arrearages and handling fees. The order of assignment shall state the total amount 
that the payor shall withhold. The order of assignment also shall specify the 
monthly amount of current support and any other payment ordered for support, 
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the monthly amount of any current spousal maintenance, the monthly amount of 
any spousal maintenance arrearages and any monthly interest payment. If the 
obligor's disposable earnings from the primary employer or other payor do not 
meet the support obligation, the court shall issue an order of assignment to a 
secondary employer or other payor of the obligor in order to meet the full support 
obligation. 
 E. An order of assignment shall be served on any employer or other payor 
by first class mail, electronic transmission or personal delivery or pursuant to the 
Arizona rules of family law procedure. The order of assignment is effective 
immediately on receipt by any employer or other payor and any future employer 
or future payor. Any employer or other payor of monies shall begin withholding 
no later than fourteen days after receipt of an order of assignment. The employer 
or other payor, if feasible, may begin withholding sooner than the fourteen day 
period if a payment to the obligor is due sooner. 
 F. Two copies of an ex parte order of assignment and of the request for an 
order of assignment, together with a copy of the notice required by this section, 
shall be served on any employer or other payor in the same manner as other 
orders of assignment under this section. Within five days after receipt, the 
employer or payor shall serve by personal delivery or by registered mail one copy 
of the ex parte order of assignment and of the request and the notice on the 
employee or other payee. The ex parte order of assignment is effective on any 
employer or other payor, and as an assignment by operation of law is effective on 
any future employers or other future payors, immediately on receipt. The first 
employer or other payor served shall not withhold or deduct amounts specified in 
the ex parte order of assignment for fourteen calendar days to allow the obligor an 
opportunity to contest the order of assignment as provided in this section. Any 
future employers or future payors shall begin withholding not later than fourteen 
days after receipt of an ex parte order of assignment but, if feasible, may begin 
withholding sooner than fourteen days if a payment to the obligor is due sooner. 
 G. After service of an ex parte order of assignment on the employer or 
payor that initially receives the order of assignment, an obligor may request a 
hearing to contest the ex parte order of assignment. The request shall be made in 
writing, and the obligor shall state under oath the specific reason for the request. 
The request shall be filed with the court together with a notice of hearing form. 
The court shall hold a hearing within ten days after the request and notice of 
hearing form is filed. Immediately on the scheduling of the hearing, the obligor 
shall serve a copy of the request for and notice of hearing on the person entitled to 
receive support, and in a title IV-D case to the department. If the obligor files a 
request for hearing within seven days after receipt of the order of assignment, the 
court may order the support payment clearinghouse not to disburse any monies 
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received pursuant to the order of assignment until further order of the court. The 
obligor may contest the withholding for any of the following reasons: 
  1. There is an error in the identity of the obligor.  
  2. There is an error in the amount of support or spousal 
maintenance. 
  3. Invalidity of the order for support or spousal maintenance. 
  4. Current support or spousal maintenance is no longer owed, if the 
order of assignment includes a payment for current support or spousal 
maintenance. 
  5. Arrearages are not owed if the order of assignment includes a 
payment for arrearages. 
 H. Any employer or other payor who has received any order of assignment 
shall withhold the amount specified in the order of assignment, together with the 
handling fee as provided in section 25-510, from the income of the person 
obligated to pay support or spousal maintenance and shall transmit the withheld 
monies to the support payment clearinghouse within two business days after the 
obligor is paid or after the payment to the obligor is due. The handling fee shall be 
deducted and transmitted monthly. For the cost of compliance the employer or 
payor may also withhold and retain an additional one dollar per payment but not 
more than four dollars per month for each obligor. An employer or payor may 
combine in a single payment withheld monies for more than one obligor, shall 
separately identify the portion of the remittance that is attributable to each obligor 
and shall include each obligor's social security number. An employer or payor 
shall notify the clerk or support payment clearinghouse in writing when the 
obligor is no longer employed or the right to receive income or other monies has 
been terminated. The employer or payor shall also notify the clerk or support 
payment clearinghouse in writing of the obligor's social security number and last 
known address and the name and address of the obligor's new employer, if 
known, within ten days. In a non-title IV-D case, within ten days after receiving 
this information the support payment clearinghouse shall notify the clerk of the 
superior court in the county where the support or maintenance order was issued. If 
within ninety days of the last payment, the employer or other payor reemploys the 
obligor or becomes obligated to pay the obligor, the employer or payor is again 
bound by the order of assignment and is required to perform as required by this 
section. In a title IV-D case the order of assignment may be reinstated pursuant to 
section 25-505.01. An employer or payor who fails without good cause to comply 
with the terms of an order of assignment is liable for amounts not paid to the clerk 
or support payment clearinghouse pursuant to the order of assignment and 
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reasonable attorney fees, costs and other expenses incurred in procuring 
compliance and may be subject to contempt. 
 I. If a person is obligated to pay child support for more than one family 
and the amount available for withholding is not sufficient to meet the total 
combined current child support obligation, any monies withheld from the 
obligor's income shall be allocated to each family by the employer or payor as 
follows: 
  1. The amount of current child support ordered in each case shall 
be added together to obtain the total current child support obligation. 
  2. The amount of current child support ordered in each case shall 
be divided by the total current child support obligation to obtain the 
percentage of the total current child support obligation to be allocated to 
each case. 
  3. The amount withheld from the obligor shall be multiplied by the 
percentage for each case to obtain the amount to be allocated to each case.  
 J. The person or agency entitled to receive support or spousal maintenance 
shall notify the clerk of the superior court or support payment clearinghouse in 
writing of any change of residential address and of any other information required 
pursuant to section 46-443, within ten days of any change. If after reasonable 
efforts to locate the obligee the clerk or support payment clearinghouse is unable 
to deliver payments under an order of assignment for the period prescribed in 
section 25-503 due to the failure of an obligee to comply with the notice 
requirement of this subsection, the clerk or support payment clearinghouse shall 
not make further payment under the order of assignment and shall return 
payments to the obligor as prescribed in section 25-503. Under these 
circumstances the court, clerk or department or its agent shall order the release of 
the employer or payor from the order of assignment on request of the employer, 
the payor, the department or its agent or on the clerk's own initiative. Any order of 
assignment from which an employer or payor has been released may be reinstated 
by following the procedures for obtaining an ex parte order of assignment 
pursuant to this section or, in a title IV-D case, an administrative income 
withholding order pursuant to section 25-505.01. 
 K. Unless a court has ordered otherwise, the person ordered to pay support 
or spousal maintenance shall notify the clerk of the superior court or the support 
payment clearinghouse in writing of the obligor's residential address and the name 
and address of any employer, and within ten days of any change. Failure to do so 
may subject the person to sanctions for contempt of court, including reasonable 
attorney fees and costs. 
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 L. Any order of assignment may be adjusted if there has been a change of 
circumstances since the date the order of assignment was issued or for good 
cause. The department or its agent or a person obligated to pay or entitled to 
receive support or spousal maintenance shall file with the clerk of the superior 
court a request to adjust the order of assignment and a proposed order of 
assignment. The request shall specify the adjustment sought and the reason for the 
request. A copy of the request shall be served pursuant to the Arizona rules of 
family law procedure, or by the department or its agent in a title IV-D case by 
first class mail, on all other parties and on the state if the department is providing 
title IV-D support services or has a claim for arrearages. The party receiving the 
request and proposed order may request a hearing within twenty days or within 
thirty days if service is made outside this state. On proof of service and if a 
hearing has not been requested within the time allowed, the clerk shall issue the 
order of assignment as appropriate. Within two business days after the date the 
order of assignment is issued, the clerk shall transmit a copy of the order of 
assignment to the employer or payor, the department or its agent and all parties. 
Unless ordered otherwise by the court, in a title IV-D case any order of 
assignment may be adjusted pursuant to section 25-505.01. 
 M. The department or its agent or a person obligated to pay or entitled to 
receive support or spousal maintenance may file a request to terminate any order 
of assignment if the obligation to pay support or spousal maintenance has ended 
or will end within ninety days after the filing of the request and if all arrearages 
either have been paid or will be paid within the period or have been waived. The 
request shall state the reason why termination is requested and shall contain the 
name and address of the employer or payor of the person obligated to pay support. 
A copy of the request shall be served pursuant to the Arizona rules of family law 
procedure, or by the department or its agent in a title IV-D case by first class mail, 
on all other parties and on the state if the department is providing title IV-D 
support services or has a claim for arrearages. A party receiving this notice may 
request a hearing within twenty days or within thirty days if service is made 
outside this state. On proof of service and if a hearing has not been requested 
within the time allowed, the clerk shall issue an order terminating the order of 
assignment as appropriate. Within two business days after the date the order is 
issued, the clerk shall transmit a copy of the order terminating the order of 
assignment to the employer or payor and to the department or its agent. If a 
hearing is requested, the court shall set the hearing within twenty days after 
receiving the request and shall issue an appropriate order. A person who is 
ordered to pay support may request the court to terminate an order of assignment 
at any time if an employer is making deductions on multiple assignments for an 
obligation for the same minor children. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, 
the clerk shall not charge a fee to a person who files a request to terminate an 
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order of assignment if an employer is making deductions on multiple assignments 
for an obligation for the same minor children. 
 N. If a request to adjust or terminate an order of assignment is filed, the 
court in its discretion may order that the clerk of the superior court or support 
payment clearinghouse not disburse any monies in dispute until further order of 
the court. 
 O. The clerk of the superior court shall issue an order terminating the 
order of assignment if the parties, including the department or its agent in a title 
IV-D case, file a notarized stipulation with the clerk that all obligations of support 
or spousal maintenance have been satisfied and that the obligor is no longer 
obligated to pay support or spousal maintenance. The stipulation shall state that 
the current obligation of support or spousal maintenance no longer exists and that 
all arrearages either have been satisfied or waived. The stipulation shall also 
contain the name and address of the employer or payor of the person obligated to 
pay support or spousal maintenance. Within five business days after the date the 
stipulation is filed, the clerk shall transmit a copy of the order terminating the 
order of assignment to the employer or payor and to the department or its agent. 
Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the clerk shall not charge a fee to a party 
who files a stipulation pursuant to this subsection.  
 P. An assignment ordered pursuant to this section has priority over all 
other executions, attachments or garnishments. An obligation for current child 
support shall be fully met before any payments pursuant to an order of assignment 
may be applied to any other support obligation. An assignment ordered under this 
section does not apply to amounts made exempt under section 33-1131 or any 
other applicable exemption law. 
 Q. Any employer or other payor shall not refuse to hire a person and shall 
not discharge or otherwise discipline an obligor because of service of an order of 
assignment authorized by this section. An employer or payor who refuses to hire a 
person or who discharges or otherwise disciplines an employee or obligor because 
of service of an order of assignment is subject to contempt and sanctions as may 
be ordered by the court. A person who is wrongfully refused employment, 
wrongfully discharged or otherwise disciplined is entitled to recover damages 
sustained by the prohibited conduct, reinstatement, if appropriate, and attorney 
fees and costs incurred. 
 R. In any proceeding under this section the court, after considering the 
financial resources of the parties and the reasonableness of the positions each 
party has taken, may order a party to pay a reasonable amount to another party for 
the costs and expenses, including attorney fees, of maintaining or defending the 
proceeding.  
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§505 - Limited income withholding orders; definition 
 A. The department or its agent may issue a limited income withholding 
order to any employer, payor or other holder of a nonperiodic or lump sum 
payment that is owed or held for the benefit of an obligor. The department or its 
agent shall serve the order in the same manner as prescribed in section 25-505.01 
for service of income withholding orders. The employer, payor or holder shall 
deliver or mail by first class mail a copy of the order to the obligor within ten 
days after service on the employer, payor or holder. 
 B. The limited income withholding order shall state the amount of current 
support and any arrearages owed by an obligor and shall direct the employer, 
payor or holder to withhold and pay to the support payment clearinghouse the 
amount specified in the order and not otherwise exempt by law. 
 C. The limited income withholding order shall include a notice to the 
obligor of the right to an administrative review pursuant to section 25-522. The 
obligor, employer, payor or holder may contest the limited income withholding 
order in the same manner prescribed in section 25-505.01 to contest an income 
withholding order.  
 D. Notwithstanding sections 23-351 through 23-355, the employer, payor 
or holder who receives an income withholding order pursuant to section 25-
505.01 or an order of assignment pursuant to section 25-504 shall withhold the 
amount specified and transmit that amount to the support payment clearinghouse 
immediately. 
 E. For the purposes of this section, "lump sum payment" includes: 
  1. Severance pay.  
  2. Sick pay.  
  3. Vacation pay.  
  4. Bonuses.  
  5. Insurance settlements.  
  6. Commissions.  
  7. Stock options. 
  8. Excess proceeds. 
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  9. Retroactive disability proceeds. 
  10. Personal injury awards.  
§ 05.01 - Administrative income withholding order; notice; definition 
 A. In a title IV-D case, if a person is obligated to pay support, the 
department or its agent, without prior notice to the obligor, shall issue an income 
withholding order using the format prescribed by the United States secretary of 
health and human services. The order shall include the obligor's social security 
number. The withholding order shall include payment for current child support or 
spousal maintenance and may include an installment payment for arrearages 
pursuant to subsection B of this section or any other support. A withholding order 
under this section does not apply to amounts exempt under section 33-1131, 
subsection C or any other applicable exemption law. The withholding order shall 
direct the holder of the monies to withhold and pay to the person or agency 
entitled to receive the support the amount ordered by the department. The 
withholding order shall be accompanied by a written notice of withholding as 
prescribed in this section. 
 B. In addition to current support an income withholding order may include 
an installment for arrearages or any other support if: 
  1. At the time of issuance, the arrearage is an amount equal to at 
least two months but not more than six months of the obligor's current 
support obligation, the income withholding order shall include an 
additional amount equal to twenty-five per cent of the current support 
obligation. 
  2. At the time of issuance, the arrearage is an amount equal to 
more than six months of the obligor's current support obligation, the 
income withholding order shall include an additional amount equal to 
thirty-three per cent of the current support obligation. 
  3. At the time of issuance, the arrearage is an amount equal to one 
year or more of the obligors's support obligation, an income withholding 
order may include an additional amount that exceeds thirty-three per cent 
of the support obligation. 
 C. If the obligor does not owe current support but arrearages remain 
unpaid, the department or its agent may issue or adjust an income withholding 
order only for arrearages. The income withholding order shall be in the amount of 
the most recent current support order or the most recent order regarding the 
payment on arrearages, whichever is greater. 
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 D. The department shall serve the order and notice on an employer or 
payor by first class mail or by electronic means. Service by mail as authorized in 
this section is complete as to the employer or payor when the mailing is received. 
Service by electronic means is complete on transmission to the employer or 
payor. The income withholding order shall direct the employer or payor to deliver 
or mail by first class mail a copy of the income withholding notice and order to 
the obligor within ten days after service on the employer or payor. 
 E. The income withholding order is an assignment and is binding fourteen 
days after receipt on an existing and future employer or payor of the person 
ordered to pay support or spousal maintenance on whom a copy of the income 
withholding order and notice of withholding is served. The employer or payor 
shall withhold the amount specified in the order from the income of the person 
obligated to pay support and shall transmit that amount to the support payment 
clearinghouse within two business days after the date the employee is paid. The 
employer or payor shall advise the support payment clearinghouse of the date the 
monies were withheld, may combine withheld amounts for several employees in a 
single payment and shall separately identify the portion of the payment that is 
attributable to each employee. The employer or other payor may also withhold 
and retain for application to the employer's or payor's cost of compliance an 
additional one dollar per pay period or four dollars per month. 
 F. If the obligor's disposable income from the primary employer or payor 
does not meet the support obligation, the department shall issue an income 
withholding order to a secondary employer of the obligor in order to meet the full 
support obligation. 
 G. Any obligor, employer or other payor may challenge the income 
withholding order issued by the department or its agent by filing a written request 
for administrative review with the department or its agent within ten days after 
receipt of the notice of income withholding order from the employer or payor. 
The administrative review shall be conducted pursuant to section 25-522. On 
receipt of a request for administrative review the department or its agent shall 
delay implementation of the income withholding order. 
 H. A change in income withholding pursuant to subsection B of this 
section is not a sufficient basis for a modification of the current support order. 
 I. Notwithstanding section 25-504, in a title IV-D case, if all obligations of 
support have been satisfied and the person obligated to pay support is no longer 
obligated and if the parties, including the department or its agent in a title IV-D 
case, submit a stipulation that the current obligation of support no longer exists 
and that all arrearages either have been satisfied or waived, the department or its 
agent shall issue an order terminating the income withholding order. The order 
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shall state that the current obligation of support no longer exists and that all 
arrearages either have been satisfied or waived. The stipulation shall also contain 
the name and address of the employer or payor of the person obligated to pay 
support. Within five business days after the date the stipulation is submitted, the 
department or its agent shall send by first class mail a copy of the order 
terminating the income withholding order to the employer or payor, the parties 
and the clerk of the court. 
 J. Notwithstanding section 25-504, in a title IV-D case, the department or 
its agent on its own initiative, or the parties to a child support proceeding on 
request to the department, may terminate an income withholding order issued 
pursuant to this section or section 25-504, if the obligation to pay support has 
ended or will end within ninety days after the date the request is submitted and if 
all arrearages either have been paid or will be paid within the period or have been 
waived. The request shall include a statement of why the termination is requested, 
supporting documentation and the name and address of the employer and person 
obligated to pay support. The requesting party shall notify each party by first class 
mail of the request to terminate the order. The employer or payor shall continue to 
withhold and transmit support or spousal maintenance until otherwise ordered. On 
receipt of a request to terminate an income withholding order the department or 
its agent may suspend disbursements until a determination is issued. A party that 
receives notice of a request to terminate an income withholding order may object 
to the request and provide the department or its agent with the basis for the 
objection and supporting documents within ten days after receipt of the notice. 
Within forty-five days after the request the department or its agent shall issue a 
determination to all parties based on the information available. On a 
determination to terminate an income withholding order, the department or its 
agent within two business days shall send by first class mail a copy of the order 
terminating or adjusting the order to the employer or payor and to the support 
payment clearinghouse. 
 K. The employer or payor shall notify the support payment clearinghouse 
in writing when the person ordered to pay support or spousal maintenance is no 
longer employed by the employer or the right to receive income has been 
terminated. The employer shall notify the support payment clearinghouse in 
writing of the former employee's last known address and the name and address of 
the new employer, if known. If the employer or payor is again obligated to pay 
income to a person ordered to pay support within ninety days after termination of 
this right, the employer or payor is again bound by the income withholding order 
and is required to perform pursuant to this section. 
 L. The obligation for current child support shall be fully met before any 
payments under an order of assignment may be applied to payments of arrearages. 
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If a person is obligated to pay child support for more than one family and the 
amount available for withholding is not sufficient to meet the total combined child 
support obligation, any monies withheld from the obligor's income shall be 
allocated to each family by the employer or payor as follows: 
  1. The amount of current child support ordered in each case shall 
be added to obtain the total child support obligation. 
  2. The ordered amount in each case shall be divided by the total 
child support obligation to obtain a percentage of the total amount due. 
  3. The amount available from the obligor's income shall be 
multiplied by the percentage under paragraph 2 of this subsection to obtain 
the amount to be allocated to each family. 
 M. An income withholding order shall include a statement that an 
employer shall not refuse to hire a person or shall not discharge or otherwise 
discipline an employee as a result of an income withholding order authorized by 
this section, and an employer who refuses to hire a person or who discharges or 
otherwise disciplines an employee as a result of the income withholding order is 
subject to contempt and fines as established by the court. Any person wrongfully 
refused employment or an employee wrongfully discharged or otherwise 
disciplined is entitled to recovery of damages suffered, reinstatement if 
appropriate, plus attorney fees and costs incurred. Any employer or other payor 
who fails without good cause to comply with the terms of the income withholding 
order may be liable for amounts not paid to the support payment clearinghouse 
pursuant to the income withholding order, reasonable attorney fees and costs 
incurred and may be subject to contempt. The department may initiate an action in 
superior court to enforce this subsection. 
 N. On issuance of an income withholding order the department or its agent 
shall issue a notice of withholding directed to the person ordered to pay support. 
The notice shall advise the obligor that: 
  1. An income withholding order has been issued against the 
obligor's income for payment of currently accruing child support or 
spousal maintenance, or both. 
  2. The income withholding order may include an amount for child 
support arrearages, or any other support. 
  3. The obligor may file a written request for administrative review 
with the department pursuant to section 25-522 within ten days after 
receipt of this notice if the obligor believes that: 
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   (a) The income withholding order is improper or unlawful. 
   (b) The obligor's property is exempt by law. 
  (c) The employer or other payor is withholding more than 
permitted by law. 
  4. An income withholding order made pursuant to this section 
becomes binding on the employer or payor or any future employers or 
future payors fourteen days after receipt of a copy of the order and notice 
of withholding. 
  5. The employer or payor shall withhold the amount specified in 
the order from the income of the person obligated to pay support. 
  6. Not more than one-half of the obligor's disposable income for 
any period may be taken to satisfy an income withholding order issued for 
the support of any person. 
  7. The amount of disposable income exempt from the income 
withholding order must be paid to the obligor on the regular payday for 
the pay period in which income is earned. 
  8. The employer or other payor shall continue to withhold the 
amount set forth in the order each pay period and shall forward the amount 
to the child support payment clearinghouse until either: 
  (a) The obligor files a request for administrative review 
with the department or its agent and after review the department or 
its agent modifies or terminates the income withholding order. 
  (b) The obligor files a petition with the court and, after a 
hearing, the court modifies or terminates the income withholding 
order. 
  9. An employer may not refuse to hire, may not discharge or may 
not otherwise discipline the obligor as a result of this income withholding 
order. If the obligor is wrongfully refused employment, discharged or 
otherwise disciplined, the obligor may recover damages suffered, 
reinstatement of employment if appropriate and reasonable attorney fees 
and costs incurred against the employer. 
  10. Unless ordered otherwise, the obligor has a duty to notify the 
support payment clearinghouse in writing of the address of the obligor's 
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residence and employment and, within ten days, of a change in either one. 
The department or its agent shall use these addresses to notify the obligor 
of all subsequent actions to enforce support. Failure of the obligor to 
advise the department of changes in residential or employment address 
may subject the obligor to sanctions for contempt of court, including 
reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
 O. An income withholding order issued pursuant to this section has the 
same force and effect as an order of the superior court, has priority over all other 
attachments, executions, garnishments or assignments and may be enforced 
against the obligor and employer in superior court. 
 P. For purposes of this section, "arrearages" means past due support, 
including interest.  
§506 - Order for assignment; foreign support order 
 A. A petition for an ex parte order for assignment may be filed by an 
agency based on an order for support issued by a court or an agency in a state 
other than this state. The petition shall include the information required by section 
25-504 and the following documents: 
  1. A certified copy of the support order with all modifications. 
  2. A certified copy of an income withholding order, if any, still in 
effect. 
  3. A copy of the income withholding law of the jurisdiction that 
issued the support order. 
  4. A sworn statement of arrearages. 
  5. The assignment of support rights, if any. 
 B. On receipt of a petition pursuant to subsection A of this section, the 
clerk of the court shall enter an order for ex parte assignment. The order for wage 
assignment is binding on any employer or payor who is doing business in this 
state and who employs or is obligated to make periodic payments to the person 
owing child support or spousal maintenance and is subject to this section. 
Participation in a proceeding under this subsection does not confer jurisdiction on 
a court over any of the parties to the proceeding in any other proceeding. If an 
obligor does not have periodic earnings, income or entitlements, the court shall 
order an assignment against any monies owed to the obligor or held for the benefit 
of the obligor. The order of assignment shall direct the holder of the monies to 
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withhold and pay to the person or agency entitled to receive the child support the 
amount necessary to pay the amount ordered by the court. 
 C. If the obligor seeks to quash the assignment, the attorney general or 
county attorney shall immediately notify the petitioning state of the date, time and 
place of the hearing and of the obligee's right to attend. The only bases for the 
obligor to contest the withholding are that: 
  1. The withholding is not proper because of a mistake of fact that is 
not res judicata. 
  2. The court or agency that issued the support order lacked 
personal jurisdiction over the obligor. 
  3. The order was obtained by fraud. 
  4. The statute of limitations precludes enforcement of all or a part 
of the arrearages. 
 D. The court, on request of any party, shall continue the hearing on the 
motion to quash to permit evidence relative to the defense to be adduced by either 
party. 
 E. On a motion to quash, the court, for good cause, may quash the portion 
of an assignment order relating to arrearages without prejudice to the petitioner. 
 F. The obligation for current child support shall be fully met before any 
payments under an order of assignment may be applied to the payment of 
arrearages. If a person is obligated to pay child support for more than one family 
and the amount available for withholding is not sufficient to meet the total 
combined child support obligation, any monies withheld from the obligor's 
earnings, income, entitlements or other monies shall be allocated to each family 
by the employer or payor as follows: 
  1. The amount of current child support ordered in each case shall 
be added to obtain the total child support obligation. 
  2. The ordered amount in each case shall be divided by the total 
child support obligation to obtain a percentage of the total amount due. 
  3. The amount withheld from the obligor's earnings, income, 
entitlements or other monies shall be multiplied by the percentage under 
paragraph 2 of this subsection to obtain the amount to be allocated to each 
family. 
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§507 - Forms; alternative forms 
 A. The request for assignment, order of assignment, notices to obligor and 
employer, request for hearing and request to adjust or terminate the order of 
assignment shall be on forms prescribed by the supreme court and shall be 
furnished by the clerk of the superior court as required by law or on request of any 
obligor, payee or employer. 
 B. Any party may use documents other than those provided pursuant to 
this section if the documents are substantially similar to those prescribed by the 
supreme court pursuant to this section. 
§508 - Enforcement of support orders; fee prohibition 
 A. Any judgment, order or decree, whether arising from a dissolution, 
divorce, separation, annulment, custody determination, parentage determination 
or dependency proceeding or from a uniform interstate enforcement of support act 
proceeding and any interlocutory support award in any such proceeding or in any 
other proceeding regarding support that provides for alimony, spousal 
maintenance or child support may be enforced as a matter of right by lien, 
execution, attachment, garnishment, levy, appointment of a receiver, provisional 
remedies or any other form of relief provided by law as an enforcement remedy 
for civil judgments. An affidavit regarding all payments in default under the 
support order, along with a copy of the underlying support order, shall be filed 
with the clerk of the superior court along with the appropriate writ, application, 
petition or motion. 
 B. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a department of this state or 
its political subdivisions shall not charge the department or its agents a fee for 
performing an act necessary to enforce a support order as provided by this section. 
§509 - Representation by attorney general or county attorney; 
modification of order by attorney general or county attorney 
 A. The attorney general or county attorney on behalf of this state may 
initiate an action or intervene in an action to establish, modify or enforce a duty of 
child support, including medical support, regardless of the welfare or nonwelfare 
status of the person to whom the duty of support is owed. The attorney general or 
county attorney may establish, modify or enforce such a duty of support by all 
means available, including all civil and criminal remedies provided by law. An 
attorney-client relationship does not exist between the attorney and an applicant 
or recipient of child support enforcement services. 
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 B. This state may initiate an action or may intervene in an action involving 
child support. Intervention by the state in an existing action is by unconditional 
right and is accomplished by the state filing an entry of appearance. 
 C. The attorney general or county attorney shall not seek or defend any 
ancillary matters, such as custody or parenting time, raised in these proceedings. 
The attorney general or county attorney may petition for modification of child 
support or medical support for children. 
§510 - Receiving and disbursing support and maintenance monies; 
arrearages; interest 
 A. The support payment clearinghouse established pursuant to section 46-
441 shall receive and disburse all monies, including fees and costs, applicable to 
support and maintenance unless the court has ordered that support or maintenance 
be paid directly to the party entitled to receive the support or maintenance. Within 
two business days the clerk of the superior court shall transmit to the support 
payment clearinghouse any maintenance and support payments received by the 
clerk. Monies received by the support payment clearinghouse in cases not 
enforced by the state pursuant to title IV-D of the social security act shall be 
distributed in the following priority: 
  1. Current child support or current court ordered payments for the 
support of a family when combined with the child support obligation. 
  2. Current spousal maintenance. 
  3. The current monthly fee prescribed in subsection D of this 
section for handling support or spousal maintenance payments. 
  4. Past due support reduced to judgment and then to associated 
interest. 
  5. Past due spousal maintenance reduced to judgment and then to 
associated interest. 
  6. Past due support not reduced to judgment and then to associated 
interest. 
  7. Past due spousal maintenance not reduced to judgment and then 
to associated interest. 
  8. Past due amounts of the fee prescribed in subsection D of this 
section for handling support or spousal maintenance payments. 
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 B. In any proceeding under this chapter regarding a duty of support, the 
records of payments maintained by the clerk or the support payment 
clearinghouse are prima facie evidence of all payments made and disbursed to the 
person or agency to whom the support payment is to be made and are rebuttable 
only by a specific evidentiary showing to the contrary. 
 C. At no cost to the clerk of the superior court, the department shall 
provide electronic access to all records of payments maintained by the support 
payment clearinghouse, and the clerk shall use this information to provide 
payment histories to all litigants, attorneys and interested persons and the court. 
For all non-title IV-D support cases, the clerk shall load new orders, modify order 
amounts, respond to payment inquiries, research payment related issues, release 
payments pursuant to orders of the court and update demographic and new 
employer information. The clerk shall forward orders of assignment to employers 
for non-title IV-D support orders. Within five business days the clerk shall 
provide to the department any new address, order of assignment or employment 
information the clerk receives regarding any support order. The information shall 
be provided as prescribed by the department of economic security in consultation 
with the administrative office of the courts. 
 D. The support payment clearinghouse shall receive a monthly fee for 
handling support and maintenance payments. The director, by rule, may establish 
this fee. The court shall order payment of the handling fee as part of the order for 
support or maintenance. The handling fee shall not be deducted from the support 
or maintenance portion of the payment. 
 E. In calculating support arrearages not reduced to a final written money 
judgment, interest accrues at the rate of ten per cent per annum beginning at the 
end of the month following the month in which the support payment is due, and 
interest accrues only on the principal and not on interest. A support arrearage 
reduced to a final written money judgment accrues interest at the rate of ten per 
cent per annum and accrues interest only on the principal and not on interest. 
 F. Past support reduced to a final written money judgment before 
September 26, 2008 and pursuant to section 25-320, subsection C or section 25-
809, subsection B accrues interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum beginning 
on entry of the judgment by the court and accrues interest only on the principal 
and not on interest. Past support reduced to a final written money judgment 
beginning on September 26, 2008 and pursuant to section 25-320, subsection C or 
section 25-809, subsection B does not accrue interest for any time period. 
 G. Any direct payments not paid through the clearinghouse or any 
equitable credits of principal or interest permitted by law and allowed by the court 
after a hearing shall be applied to support arrearages as directed in the court order. 
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The court shall make specific findings in support of any payments or credits 
allowed. If the court order does not expressly state the dates the payments or 
credits are to be applied, the payments or credits shall be applied on the date of 
the entry of the order that allows the payments or credits. In a title IV-D case, if a 
court order does not indicate on its face that the state was either represented at or 
had notice of the hearing or proceeding where the payments or credits were 
determined, the court order shall not reduce any sum owed to the department or 
its agent without written approval of the department or its agent. 
 H. Any credit against support arrearages, other than by court order, shall 
be made only by written affidavit of direct payment or waiver of support 
arrearages signed by the person entitled to receive the support or by that person 
and the person ordered to make the support payment. The affidavit of direct 
payment or waiver of support arrearages shall be filed directly with the clerk of 
the court, who shall enter the information into the statewide case registry. Any 
credits against support arrearages shall be applied as of the dates contained in the 
affidavit or the date of the affidavit if no other date is specified in the affidavit. In 
a title IV-D case, the affidavit of direct payment or waiver of support arrearages 
shall not reduce any sum owed to the department or its agent without written 
approval of the department or its agent. 
 I. An arrearage calculator may be developed by a government agency 
using an automated transfer of data from the clearinghouse and the child support 
registry. The arrearage figure produced by this calculator is presumed to be the 
correct amount of the arrearage.  
§511 - Failure of parent to provide for child; classification 
 A. Except as provided in section 25-501, subsection F, any parent of a 
minor child who knowingly fails to furnish reasonable support for the parent's 
child is guilty of a class 6 felony. 
 B. It is an affirmative defense to a charge of a violation of subsection A of 
this section that the defendant has complied with a valid court order that was in 
effect for the time period charged and that set forth an amount of support for the 
minor child or was unable to furnish reasonable support. Inability to furnish 
reasonable support is not a defense if the defendant voluntarily remained idle, 
voluntarily decreased his income or voluntarily incurred other financial 
obligations. 
 C. The trier of fact, in determining whether the defendant has failed to 
furnish reasonable support, shall consider all assets, earnings and entitlements of 
the defendant and whether the defendant has made all reasonable efforts to obtain 
the necessary funds. On a showing of previous employment or lack of a physical 
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or mental disability precluding employment, the trier of fact may infer that the 
defendant is capable of full-time employment at least at the federal adult 
minimum wage. This inference does not apply to noncustodial parents who are 
under the age of eighteen and who are still attending high school.  
§511 - 01 Spousal maintenance order; violation; classification 
A person who is obligated to pay spousal maintenance pursuant to an 
order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction is guilty of a class 1 
misdemeanor if the person has notice of the order and willfully and without 
lawful excuse fails to comply with the terms of that order.  
§512 - Consumer credit reports; use of child support or spousal 
maintenance obligation information 
 A. A consumer reporting agency as defined in title 44, chapter 11, article 6 
shall include as part of a consumer report information regarding: 
  1. A court order or judgment obligating a person to pay child 
support or spousal maintenance. 
  2. A court order for assignment under section 25-323 or 25-504. 
  3. An income withholding order issued by the department of 
economic security or its agent pursuant to section 25-505.01. 
 B. The state or a person entitled to receive support or spousal maintenance 
may provide a consumer reporting agency with a copy of a court order or 
judgment described in this section. 
 C. The department or its agent may provide a consumer reporting agency 
with electronic or documentary information that an order or judgment for support 
or spousal maintenance exists. 
 D. The department shall report to a consumer reporting agency the name 
of an obligor who is delinquent in the payment of support and the amount of the 
support owed. 
 E. The department shall provide written notice to an obligor that it shall 
report the amount of the support owed by the obligor to a consumer reporting 
agency. The department shall provide this notice by first class mail at the obligor's 
current address, or after a reasonable attempt to ascertain the obligor's location, at 
the obligor's last known address. The notice shall state the following: 
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  1. The obligor's name and the amount of the arrearage. 
  2. The address and telephone number of the department or its 
agent. 
  3. That the obligor may make a written request to the department 
or its agent for an administrative review pursuant to section 25-522 to 
contest the arrearages within fifteen days after the date of mailing of the 
notice. 
  4. That if the obligor requests an administrative review the 
department shall not release the report to the consumer reporting agency 
until a final determination has been made at the administrative review. 
  5. That if an obligor requests an administrative review, the issues 
at the administrative review shall be limited to whether the obligor is 
required to pay child support, whether the obligor is in arrears and the 
amount of current support and arrears. 
  6. That if the obligor does not respond to the notice, the department 
shall send the report to the consumer reporting agency. 
§513 - Employer cooperation; violation; classification 
 A. On written request delivered to an employer, payor or self-employed 
person by the department or its agent or the child support enforcement entity of 
any other state or its agent that administers a child support enforcement program 
as required by title IV-D of the social security act or by either party to a 
proceeding for support or maintenance, the employer, payor or self-employed 
person to whom the request is directed within twenty days of delivery shall notify 
the requesting party of the following information that the employer, payor or self-
employed person possesses concerning the person who is obligated to pay support 
or maintenance or against whom this obligation is sought or to whom this 
obligation is owed: 
  1. Complete name. 
  2. Social security number. 
  3. Date and place of birth. 
  4. Present and past employment status. 
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  5. Earnings, income, entitlements or other monies without regard 
to source. 
  6. Current or last known address. 
  7. Assets. 
  8. Availability and description of present or previous health 
insurance coverage for a dependent child. 
  9. Health insurance benefits paid or applied for under a health 
insurance policy for a dependent child. 
  10. Other benefits, including disability payments or payments 
made pursuant to a pension or retirement program. 
 B. The information required pursuant to subsection A, paragraphs 5, 7, 8, 
9 and 10 shall not be requested or provided unless parentage has been established. 
 C. If any legal action is necessary for the requesting party to obtain the 
information requested pursuant to subsection A, the requesting party is entitled to 
receive costs and attorney fees from the employer, payor or self-employed person 
who fails to cooperate as prescribed in subsection A. 
 D. A party shall not request or receive address information protected by an 
order of protection, an injunction against harassment or any other court order in a 
domestic violence matter. The employer, payor or self-employed person is not 
required to determine whether an order of protection, an injunction against 
harassment or any other court order in a domestic violence matter exists before 
releasing the information requested pursuant to subsection A. 
 E. A party other than the department or its agent or the child support 
enforcement entity of any other state or its agent that administers a child support 
enforcement program as required by title IV-D of the social security act may 
make a request for information pursuant to this section not more than once in any 
three month period. 
 F. The department or its agent or the child support enforcement entity of 
any other state or its agent that administers a child support enforcement program 
as required by title IV-D of the social security act may deliver the request allowed 
in subsection A electronically. On request of the department, an employer shall 
provide its last known electronic contact information. 
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 G. A party may request and obtain information pursuant to subsection A 
only for the following purposes: 
  1. To identify and locate a person who is under an obligation to 
pay support. 
  2. To identify and locate a person against whom an obligation is 
sought. 
  3. To identify and locate a person to whom an obligation is owed. 
  4. To identify and locate information pursuant to subsection A, 
paragraphs 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10 relating to a person who is obligated to pay 
support. 
 H. A party who requests or obtains information pursuant to subsection A 
for purposes other than those prescribed in subsection G is guilty of a class 1 
misdemeanor.  
§514 - Priority of action and judgments 
Except as otherwise provided by statute, actions pursuant to this article 
shall be given priority over all other civil actions. Except for judgments 
foreclosing or enforcing prior recorded mortgages, deeds of trust, contracts or 
conveyance of real property, security agreements, or other liens or encumbrances 
upon real or personal property created by the property owner a judgment resulting 
from an action brought for enforcement of child support has priority over all other 
judgments. Such priority shall not arise until a certified copy of the child support 
judgment is recorded with the county recorder.  
§516 - Lien; notice; priority; recording; reciprocity 
 A. Notwithstanding section 25-514, in a title IV-D case if a person 
obligated to pay child support is in arrears for an amount equal to at least two 
months' child support, the unpaid amounts constitute a lien by operation of law on 
all property presently owned and later acquired by the obligor. The department 
may perfect a lien by filing a notice of lien with the county recorder in the county 
in which the obligor has property or with a state agency or a political subdivision 
of this state that files personal property liens for recording on its official record. 
The notice of lien recorded under this section shall specify the nature of the debt, 
the amount, and the name and last known address of the obligor. A liquidated 
judgment is not required to establish a lien. Recordation is constructive notice of 
the lien to the creditors of the owner or subsequent purchasers, against the 
personal or real property presently owned or later acquired. The lien has priority 
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over other liens against this property except for liens arising from mortgages, 
deeds of trust, contracts, conveyances or security agreements created by the 
property owner and previously recorded or filed. 
 B. The department shall notify an obligor who is at least two months in 
arrears in making child support payments, periodic payments on a support 
arrearage or periodic payments pursuant to a court order of support that a notice 
of lien may be filed against the obligor. The department shall notify the obligor by 
first class mail at the obligor's current address, or after a reasonable attempt to 
ascertain the obligor's location, at the obligor's last known address. The notice 
shall state the following: 
  1. The obligor is at least two months in arrears in making child 
support payments. 
  2. The obligor may request in writing an administrative review to 
contest the arrears pursuant to section 25-522. 
  3. The obligor may request in writing an administrative review 
within fifteen days from the date of mailing of the notice. 
  4. If the obligor requests an administrative review, the department 
shall stay further action until a determination has been made at the 
administrative review. 
  5. If the obligor fails to respond to the notice, the department shall 
file a notice of lien against the obligor. 
  6. The address and telephone number of the department. 
  7. The obligor may request a copy of the order. 
 C. If an obligor fails to respond to the notice within fifteen days from the 
date of mailing, the department shall send the obligor a second notice by first 
class mail. The second notice shall include the information under subsection B of 
this section and shall state the following: 
  1. If the obligor fails to contact the department within fifteen days 
from the date of mailing of the second notice, a notice of lien shall be filed 
against the obligor. 
  2. This is the final notice the obligor will receive. 
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 D. If the obligor requests an administrative review pursuant to this section, 
the department shall determine whether to proceed with filing the notice of lien 
based on whether the obligor is required to pay child support, whether the obligor 
is in arrears, and any other information relevant to the case. The decision of the 
department shall be in writing, and the department shall provide a copy to the 
obligor. 
 E. If the department determines that the obligor is at least two months in 
arrears and determines at the administrative review to record a notice of lien 
against the property of the obligor or if the obligor fails to respond to the second 
notice, a notice of lien shall be recorded and a copy sent to the obligor by certified 
mail. 
 F. The department may, at any time, release the property subject to the lien 
from the lien. Notice by the department to the effect that the property had been 
released from the lien is conclusive evidence that the property had been released. 
If any lien imposed pursuant to this section is satisfied and a notice of lien has 
been recorded, the department shall issue a release of the lien to the obligor 
against whom the lien was claimed. The department shall record the lien release 
in any county, agency or political subdivision where the original lien was 
recorded. 
 G. This state shall give a lien recorded in another state full faith and credit 
if the state agency, party or other entity seeking to enforce the lien complies with 
the notice requirements of this section and records the lien pursuant to the 
applicable laws of this state. 
§517 - Title IV-D agency; license suspension; notice; administrative 
review or hearing 
 A. The department or its agent shall notify an obligor who is at least six 
months in arrears in making child support payments, periodic payments on a 
support arrearage or periodic payments pursuant to a court order of support that 
the obligor may be referred to court for a hearing to suspend or deny the obligor's 
driver license or recreational license. The department or its agent shall notify the 
obligor by first class mail at the obligor's current address, or after a reasonable 
attempt to ascertain the obligor's location, at the obligor's last known address. The 
notice shall state the following: 
  1. The obligor has willfully failed to pay child support, willfully 
continues to do so and is at least six months in arrears in making child 
support payments. 
237 
  2. The obligor may request in writing an administrative review 
conducted pursuant to section 25-522 to contest the matter within fifteen 
days from the date of mailing of the notice. 
  3. If the obligor requests an administrative review, the department 
or its agent shall stay the action to refer the obligor to court for the 
suspension or denial of the obligor's recreational or driver license. 
  4. If the obligor fails to respond to the notice, the department or its 
agent shall refer the obligor to court for license suspension or denial 
pursuant to section 25-518. 
  5. The address and telephone number of the department. 
  6. The obligor may request a copy of the child support order. 
 B. If an obligor requests an administrative review pursuant to this section, 
the issues at the review shall be limited to whether the obligor is required to pay 
child support and has willfully failed to pay. The department or its agent shall not 
refer the obligor to court unless the department or its agent determines that the 
obligor is at least six months in arrears and has willfully failed to pay. The 
department or its agent shall make this decision in writing and shall provide a 
copy to the obligor. 
 C. If the department or its agent determines that the obligor is at least six 
months in arrears and has willfully failed to pay, the department shall refer the 
obligor to court for license suspension pursuant to section 25-518. 
 D. Notwithstanding the requirements of this section, if an obligor is at 
least six months in arrears in making child support payments, periodic payments 
on a support arrearage or periodic payments pursuant to a court order of support, 
the title IV-D agency or its agent may issue a notice to the obligor that the 
obligor's professional or occupational license may be suspended. The title IV-D 
agency or its agent shall notify the obligor by first class mail at the obligor's 
current address, or after a reasonable attempt to ascertain the obligor's location, at 
the obligor's last known address. The notice shall state that the obligor has 
willfully failed to pay child support, willfully continues to do so and is at least six 
months in arrears in making child support payments. The notice shall also state 
that within fifteen days after the notice is mailed the obligor may make a written 
request for an administrative review pursuant to section 25-522 to contest the 
matter. 
 E. If the obligor does not respond to the notice prescribed in subsection D 
of this section, the title IV-D agency or its agent shall issue an administrative 
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order of noncompliance to the board or agency to order the suspension of the 
obligor's professional or occupational license. If the obligor requests an 
administrative review, the title IV-D agency or its agent shall stay further action 
until a determination has been made at the administrative review. The issues at the 
review are limited to whether the obligor is required to pay child support and has 
willfully failed to pay. The department or its agent shall make this decision in 
writing and shall provide a copy to the obligor. If the obligor disagrees with the 
final determination, the obligor has a right to a hearing before the suspension of 
the obligor's professional or occupational license. The title IV-D agency or its 
agent must receive a request for a hearing on the determination of noncompliance 
within fourteen days after the date of the determination. 
 F. The title IV-D agency or its agent shall notify the office of 
administrative hearings of a request for a hearing pursuant to subsection E of this 
section within five business days after receipt of the request. The office of 
administrative hearings shall hold a hearing pursuant to title 41, chapter 6, and 
article 10. The issues at the hearing are limited to whether the obligor is required 
to pay child support and has willfully failed to pay. If the administrative law judge 
upholds the department's determination, the title IV-D agency or its agent shall 
issue an administrative order of noncompliance to the board or agency ordering it 
to suspend the obligor's professional or occupational license.  
§518 - Child support arrearage; license suspension; hearing 
 A. A court shall send a certificate of noncompliance to the board or 
agency ordering the suspension or denial of a driver license or recreational license 
if the court finds from the evidence presented at a hearing to enforce a child 
support order that the obligor has willfully failed to pay child support, continues 
after notice pursuant to section 25-517, subsection A to willfully fail to pay child 
support and is at least six months in arrears. 
 B. If the obligor has complied with the support order since the suspension 
or denial, the obligor may petition the court for a hearing. If the obligor 
establishes at the review hearing that the obligor is in compliance with the support 
order or a court ordered plan for payment of arrearages, the court shall send a 
certificate of compliance to the board or agency. Except for licenses issued under 
title 17, the obligor may then apply for license reinstatement and shall pay all 
applicable fees. 
 C. In a title IV-D case, the department or its agent may file with the clerk 
of the superior court an affidavit indicating that the obligor is in compliance with 
the support order or the child support obligation. Within five business days after 
the affidavit is filed, the clerk shall send a notice of compliance to the obligor by 
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first class mail. The clerk shall send a copy of the notice of compliance to the 
department and the licensing board or agency. 
 D. Except for licenses issued under title 17, the board or agency shall 
suspend or deny the license of the licensee within thirty days after receiving the 
notice of noncompliance from the court. The board or agency shall not lift the 
suspension until the board or agency receives a certificate of compliance from the 
court. Notwithstanding section 41-1064, subsection C and section 41-1092.11, 
subsection B, the board or agency is not required to conduct a hearing. The board 
or agency shall notify the department in writing or by any other means prescribed 
by the department of all suspensions within ten days after the suspension. The 
information shall include the name, address, date of birth and social security 
number of the licensee and the license category. 
 E. A certificate of noncompliance without further action invalidates a 
license to take wildlife in this state and prohibits the obligor from applying for a 
license issued by an automated drawing system under title 17. The court shall 
send a copy of the certificate of noncompliance to the department of economic 
security, and the department of economic security shall notify the Arizona game 
and fish department of all obligors against whom a notice of noncompliance has 
been issued and who have applied for a license issued by an automated drawing 
system. 
 F. Notwithstanding this section, the title IV-D agency or its agent may 
send a certificate of noncompliance to a board or agency to order it to suspend an 
obligor's professional or occupational license if the obligor: 
  1. Has willfully failed to pay child support, continues after notice 
pursuant to section 25-517, subsection D to willfully fail to pay child 
support and is at least six months in arrears. 
  2. Requested an administrative review and the determination 
confirms that the obligor is required to pay child support and has willfully 
failed to pay and that either the obligor did not request a hearing on the 
determination or the determination was upheld after a hearing. 
  3. Failed to respond to the notice pursuant to section 25-517, 
subsection D. 
 G. If the obligor has paid all arrearages or if the obligor has entered into a 
written agreement with the title IV-D agency or its agent, the title IV-D agency 
shall issue a notice of compliance to the licensing board or agency.  
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§519 - Regulatory entities; suspension of license 
 The following are subject to the requirements of section 25-518: 
  1. All boards established under title 32. 
  2. The superintendent of financial institutions. 
  3. The registrar of contractors. 
  4. The department of public safety. 
  5. Boards and agencies that provide occupational, recreational and 
professional licenses or certificates pursuant to titles 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 15, 17, 
20, 36 and 41 and title 28, chapter 8. 
§520 - Child support enforcement; administrative subpoena; civil penalty 
 A. In a title IV-D case the department or its agent may issue a subpoena to 
a person or entity believed to have information needed for the establishment of 
parentage or the establishment, modification or enforcement of a child support 
order, requiring appearance before the department or its agent and the production 
of all records or documents related to an investigation or child support 
proceeding. 
 B. The subpoena shall be served in the manner provided under applicable 
law or rules of procedure for the service of subpoenas in a civil action. 
 C. A person or entity that, without reasonable cause, fails to comply with 
the subpoena or that willfully gives false information is subject to a civil penalty 
of not more than two hundred fifty dollars for each violation. 
 D. A civil penalty imposed by the department pursuant to subsection C of 
this section is subject to court review if the person or entity requests a review 
within fifteen business days after the department imposes the penalty. 
 E. A civil penalty imposed by the department on an obligor pursuant to 
this section may be referred to credit reporting agencies for up to seven years after 
the date of the order that imposed the penalty or until collected. The department 
shall not take this action until the time for a court review pursuant to subsection D 
of this section has elapsed. 
 F. A civil penalty imposed by the department operates as a final judgment 
without further action by the department. The department may collect the penalty 
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through all available civil remedies. A civil judgment accrues interest pursuant to 
section 44-1201. 
 G. The department shall deposit, pursuant to sections 35-146 and 35-147, 
monies collected under this section in the state general fund. 
§521 - Levy; seizure of property for collection of support debt; definitions 
 A. If there is a court ordered judgment or if the obligor is in arrears in an 
amount equal to twelve months of support, the department may issue a levy and 
collect the amount owed by the obligor by levy on all property and rights to 
property not exempt under federal or state law. 
 B. The levy extends only to property possessed and obligations existing at 
the time of service or within twenty-one days thereafter, except as to an account 
held in a financial institution in which case the levy extends only to property 
possessed and obligations existing at the time of service. On receipt of a notice of 
levy, a person in possession of property or an interest in property subject to levy 
shall seize and hold nonexempt property until that person receives from the 
department a notice of surrender of property or a notice of release of levy. Within 
three days after receipt, the person served with the notice of levy shall notify the 
obligor and any other individual or entity known or believed to have an interest in 
the property that a levy has occurred. The notice shall specify the amount 
demanded and shall contain, in the case of a seizure of personal property, an 
account of the property levied on, and in the case of real property, a description 
with reasonable certainty of the property levied on. The person served with the 
levy, the obligor or other persons known or believed to have an interest in the 
property may make a written request for an administrative review to contest the 
levy within fifteen days after the date of mailing of the notice. The administrative 
review shall be conducted pursuant to section 25-522, subsection D. The 
administrative review shall include a determination of the interest of the obligor in 
the property subject to levy, including the obligor's contributions to any property 
held by the community. If the request for administrative review is based on a 
mistake in identity, the department shall conduct the review within two business 
days. The administrative review shall be conducted pursuant to section 25-522, 
subsection E. 
 C. Any person in possession of property, or obligated with respect to 
property or rights to property subject to levy, on which a levy has been made, on 
demand by the department shall surrender the property or right to property to the 
department. 
 D. A person who fails or refuses to surrender any property or rights to 
property, subject to levy, on demand by the department, is liable in an amount 
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equal to the value of the property or rights to property not surrendered, but not 
exceeding the amount of the past due support for which the levy has been made. 
 E. If any property or right to property on which a levy has been made 
under subsection A of this section is not sufficient to satisfy the claim of the 
department, the department, as often as necessary, may proceed to levy in like 
manner on any other property subject to levy of the obligor owing support, until 
the amount due is paid in full. 
 F. In any case in which the department may levy on property or rights to 
property, the department may seize and sell the property or rights to the property 
whether real or personal, tangible or intangible in the manner prescribed by law. 
Except as otherwise provided by this section, the notice of sale and sale of 
property seized by the department shall be conducted in the manner and the time 
provided in title 12, chapter 9, article 7, relating to the sale of property under 
execution. Real property may be redeemed in the manner provided by title 12, 
chapter 8, article 11. The department shall notify the obligor of the date, time and 
location of the sale. The notice shall be given in person, left at the dwelling or 
usual place of business of the obligor or sent by first class mail to the obligor's 
last known address, at least ten days before the day of the sale. If the property or 
right to property is perishable, the department shall give notice of the sale to the 
obligor in the manner and within the time limits that are reasonable considering 
the character and condition of the property. 
 G. A person who is in possession of or obligated with respect to property 
or rights to property subject to levy on which a levy has been made and who, on 
demand by the department, surrenders the property or rights to property to the 
department is discharged from any obligation or liability to the obligor with 
respect to the property or rights to property from the surrender on payment. 
 H. A levy issued pursuant to this section has the same force and effect as a 
writ of garnishment, execution or attachment issued by the superior court. 
 I. For purposes of this section: 
  1. "Account" means a demand deposit account, checking or 
negotiable withdrawal order account, savings account, time deposit 
account or money market mutual fund account. 
  2. "Levy" includes the power to restrain and seize by any legal 
means. 
  3. "Person" includes an individual or an officer, employee or agent 
of a corporation, an officer, employee or elected official of this state or its 
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political subdivisions, or any agency or instrumentality of this state or the 
federal government or its political subdivisions, or a member or employee 
of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, agent, elected official or 
member is under a duty to surrender the property or rights to property, or 
to discharge the obligation. 
§522 - Administrative review; notice; determination; judicial review; 
definitions 
 A. An obligor may contest an enforcement action by the department or its 
agent by filing a request for administrative review. An obligee may contest the 
distribution or disbursement of support payments by the department or its agent 
by filing a request for administrative review. The obligor, the obligee or the 
caretaker may contest the disbursement of support to a noncustodial person other 
than the state by filing a request for administrative review pursuant to section 46-
444. The request shall be in writing, shall be signed by the requesting party, shall 
include a residential and mailing address and may be transmitted electronically. 
The request shall state the basis for the dispute and shall include any relevant 
information to assist the department or its agent, including a copy of any order 
issued, documentation of support payments made and any notice sent by the 
department or its agent. 
 B. Within ten business days after receipt of the request for review, the 
department or its agent shall send a notice of acknowledgment of receipt of 
request for administrative review to the person filing the request and shall specify 
any additional information the department or its agent requires to complete the 
review. The department or its agent on its own initiative may also request any 
other additional information it deems necessary to make its determination. The 
department or its agent shall also notify the obligee of the obligor's request for 
review of enforcement actions. 
 C. Except for obligee complaints made under section 46-408 as to 
distribution of support, the department or its agent shall issue a written 
determination within forty-five business days after sending the notice of 
acknowledgment of receipt of request for administrative review, or if additional 
information is required, forty-five business days after receipt of this information. 
If additional information is not received from the requesting party or another 
person within thirty business days after the date of the department's or the agent's 
request for additional information, the department shall issue a final written 
determination within ten business days after the due date for receipt of the 
additional information based on the available information. The final determination 
shall be in writing, and a copy shall be served on all parties by first class mail or 
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may be delivered electronically if electronic contact information is included in the 
request for administrative review. 
 D. Notwithstanding subsections B and C of this section, if the basis for the 
request for review is issuance of an income withholding order by the department 
pursuant to section 25-505.01 or a levy made pursuant to section 25-521, the 
department shall review the request and issue a final determination within ten 
business days after it receives the request for review. The department shall send a 
copy of the final determination by first class mail to all parties. 
 E. Notwithstanding subsections B, C and D of this section, if the basis for 
the request for review is a mistake in identity pursuant to section 25-521, the 
department shall issue a final determination by first class mail to all parties within 
two business days after the receipt of the request. The request shall include 
adequate documentation to affirm the mistake in identity. 
 F. A department determination made pursuant to this section is subject to 
judicial review under title 12, chapter 7, article 6, except that an appeal by an 
obligee of a department determination made pursuant to this section regarding the 
distribution of support payments shall be made pursuant to title 41, chapter 14, 
article 3. 
§523 - Financial institutions data match; nonliability; prohibited 
disclosure; liability; civil liability; definition 
 A. The department shall enter into agreements with financial institutions 
that conduct business in this state to develop and operate a data match system to 
assist the department in the establishment, modification and enforcement of child 
support orders. The data match system shall use automated data exchange 
procedures to the maximum extent possible. 
 B. Data exchanges between financial institutions and the department shall 
occur quarterly and shall include the name, record address, social security number 
or other taxpayer identification number and any other identifying information for 
each obligor who maintains an account at the institution and who owes past due 
support as identified by the department by name and social security number or 
other taxpayer identification number. 
 C. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a financial institution is not 
subject to civil liability for disclosing to the department or its agent a person's 
financial record pursuant to this section or any acts of omission that are 
inadvertent and made in good faith. 
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 D. The department and its agent and any state, its agent or political 
subdivision that administers a child support enforcement program pursuant to title 
IV-D of the social security act and that obtains a person's financial records may 
disclose this information only as is necessary to establish, modify or enforce the 
person's child support obligation. 
 E. An employee of the department, its agent or any state or political 
subdivision that administers a child support enforcement program pursuant to title 
IV-D of the social security act, who knowingly or negligently discloses a person's 
financial records in violation of subsection D is subject to civil liability in an 
amount equal to the greater of either: 
  1. One thousand dollars for each act of unauthorized disclosure of 
a financial record with respect to which the defendant is found liable. 
  2. The sum of the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff as a 
result of the unauthorized disclosure and, in the case of a willful disclosure 
or a disclosure that is the result of gross negligence, punitive damages, 
including costs and attorney fees. 
 F. The department may pay a reasonable fee to a financial institution for 
conducting a data match. The fee shall not exceed the actual costs incurred by the 
financial institution. 
 G. For purposes of this section "financial institution" means state and 
federally chartered banks, trust companies, federal and state savings and loan 
associations, federal and state credit unions, consumer lenders, international 
banking facilities and financial institution holding companies, insurance 
companies, benefit associations, safe deposit companies, money market mutual 
funds and similar institutions authorized to do business in this state and any party 
affiliated with these financial institutions. 
§524 - Financial institutions; surrender of assets; nonliability 
 A. On receipt of a notice of lien or levy a financial institution shall 
encumber or surrender, as appropriate, assets held by the institution on behalf of 
an obligor. 
 B. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a financial institution is not 
subject to civil liability for encumbering or surrendering any assets held by the 
financial institution in response to a notice of lien or levy issued by the 
department or for any action taken in good faith to comply with this section. 
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 C. The remedy provided in this section is limited to collection of past due 
support. 
§525 - Administrative enforcement; interstate cases; definition 
 A. The department or its agent shall respond promptly to a request made 
by a title IV-D agency in another state to enforce a support order. The department 
shall use high volume automated administrative enforcement to the same extent as 
used for intrastate cases in response to a request made by a title IV-D agency in 
another state to enforce support orders and shall promptly report the results of the 
enforcement procedure to the requesting state. 
 B. The department or its agent may transmit a request to a title IV-D 
agency in another state for assistance, by electronic or other means, in a child 
support case involving the enforcement of a support order by high volume 
automated administrative enforcement. The department shall include information 
necessary to enable the state to which the request is transmitted to compare the 
case information with information contained in that state's data base. The 
department's request shall constitute a certification of the amount of arrears under 
the support order and a certification that the department has complied with all 
procedural due process requirements in the case. 
 C. If the department or its agent provides assistance to a title IV-D agency 
in another state pursuant to this section, the department shall not consider the case 
to be transferred to the caseload of the other state. 
 D. The department shall maintain records of the number of requests for 
assistance received by the department or its agent, the number of cases for which 
the department or its agent collects support and the amount of support collected in 
cases pursuant to this section. 
 E. For the purposes of this section, "high volume automated administrative 
enforcement" means the use of automatic data processing to search various state 
data bases to determine if information is available regarding a parent who owes a 
child support obligation. 
§526 - Child support enforcement information; internet posting 
The department of economic security division of child support 
enforcement shall post information on the internet on a quarterly basis that 
identifies no fewer than ten non-payors of child support on whom arrest warrants 
have been issued pursuant to section 25-681. The information shall include a 
photograph of each of these persons. 
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§527 - Child support; overpayment; reimbursement 
 A. An obligor whose obligation to pay support has terminated may file a 
request for reimbursement against the obligee for support payments made in 
excess of the amount ordered. The obligor must file the request with the clerk of 
the superior court within twenty-four months after the termination of the 
obligation. 
 B. The court may enter a judgment for reimbursement against the obligee 
if the court finds that the obligor's obligation to pay support has terminated and 
that all arrearages and interest on arrearages have been satisfied. The court shall 
send a copy of the judgment to the department or its agent for title IV-D cases. 
 C. The obligee must pay the judgment directly to the obligor and not 
through the clerk of the superior court or the support payment clearinghouse. 
 D. A judgment entered pursuant to this section does not constitute a 
support judgment and is enforceable only in the same manner as a civil judgment.  
§528 - Title IV-D recipients; fee 
 A. If a recipient of title IV-D services receives at least five hundred dollars 
of support in a federal fiscal year and the recipient has never received assistance 
under a state or tribal title IV-A program, the department shall charge an annual 
fee of twenty-five dollars to the recipient of title IV-D services. The department 
shall retain the fee from future collections of support once the threshold of five 
hundred dollars has been met. If, after the threshold of five hundred dollars has 
been met, no further support collections are received or less than twenty-five 
dollars is received, the department may charge the fee to the recipient of services 
after notice advising the recipient of the deadline for payment of the fee. If the 
recipient does not pay the fee by the deadline, the department may retain the fee 
from future collections of support. 
 B. Notwithstanding subsection A of this section, if a foreign country has 
requested enforcement of a support order in any title IV-D case, the department 
shall charge the annual fee of twenty-five dollars to the obligor. 
 C. The department shall transmit to the federal government its portion of 
each fee withheld pursuant to subsections A and B of this section and shall 
deposit, pursuant to sections 35-146 and 35-147, the remainder in a child support 
enforcement administration fund.  
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§529 - Title IV-D cases; alternative medical insurance coverage 
The director of the department of economic security may disseminate 
information provided by the department of insurance regarding individual medical 
insurance plans and may enter into agreements with a consortium of other states 
to offer medical insurance coverage to children in title IV-D cases.  
§530 - Spousal maintenance; veterans’ disability benefits 
In determining whether to award spousal maintenance or the amount of 
any award of spousal maintenance, the court shall not consider any federal 
disability benefits awarded to the other spouse for service-connected disabilities 
pursuant to 38 United States Code chapter 11. 
Article 2: Child Medical Support (531 - 535)  
 
§531 - Definitions 
In this article, unless the context otherwise requires: 
  1. "Court or administrative order" means a court or administrative 
agency ruling that requires a parent to provide support for that parent's 
child. 
  2. "Health insurance coverage" means fee for service, health 
maintenance organization, preferred provider organization and other types 
of coverage under which medical services could be provided to the 
dependent children of a noncustodial parent. 
  3. "State IV-D agency" means the department or any other agency 
that is authorized to administer services of the child support enforcement 
program pursuant to the requirements of title IV-D of the social security 
act.  
§532 - Enrollment of child 
 A. An insurer shall not deny a child enrollment under the health plan of 
the child's parent for any of the following reasons: 
  1. The child was born out of wedlock. 
  2. The child is not claimed as a dependent on the parent's federal or 
state tax return. 
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  3. The child does not reside with the parent or in the insurer's 
service area. If the child resides in another state the insurer may vary the 
premium and policy provisions to account for benefit levels and 
experience in that state. 
 B. If the child has health coverage through an insurer of a noncustodial 
parent the insurer shall: 
  1. Provide any information to a custodial parent that may be 
necessary for the child to obtain benefits through the custodial parent's 
insurer. 
  2. Permit a custodial parent or the provider with the custodial 
parent's approval to submit claims for covered services without the 
approval of a noncustodial parent. 
  3. Make payments on claims that are submitted pursuant to 
paragraph 2 of this subsection directly to the custodial parent, the provider 
or the state IV-D agency.  
§533 - Insurer obligations 
 A. If a court or administrative order requires a parent to provide health 
coverage for a child and the parent is eligible for family coverage, the insurer 
shall: 
  1. Permit the parent to enroll the child under the family coverage if 
the child is otherwise eligible for the coverage without regard to any 
enrollment season restrictions. 
  2. If the parent is enrolled in family coverage but fails to enroll the 
child, enroll the child under the family coverage on the application of the 
child's other parent or the state IV-D agency. 
  3. Not refuse to enroll or terminate the coverage of the child unless 
the insurer receives satisfactory written evidence that one of the following 
applies: 
   (a) The court or administrative order is no longer in effect. 
  (b) The child will be enrolled in comparable health 
coverage through another insurer and that coverage will take effect 
not later than the effective date of the termination of coverage. 
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  (c) The employer has eliminated family health coverage for 
all of its employees. 
   (d) Nonpayment of premium. 
 B. An insurer shall not impose any additional requirements on state 
agencies or another parent that are different from the requirements the insurer 
imposes on all other agents or assignees. An insurer shall provide the state or 
other parent with enrollment information and shall process the claims from and 
make payments to the state, another parent or another parent's provider.  
§534 - Employer obligations 
 A. If a court or administrative order requires a parent to provide health 
insurance coverage that is available through an employer doing business in this 
state, the employer shall: 
  1. Allow that parent to enroll the child in the family coverage if the 
child is otherwise eligible for that coverage without regard to any 
enrollment season restrictions. 
  2. If the parent is enrolled in family coverage but fails to enroll the 
child, enroll the child under the family coverage on the application of the 
child's other parent, the child's legal guardian or the state IV-D agency. 
  3. Not allow the employee to refuse to enroll or to terminate the 
coverage of the child unless the employee provides the employer with 
written proof that the court or administrative order is no longer in effect or 
that the child is enrolled in comparable health insurance coverage and that 
coverage will take effect not later than the effective date of the termination 
of coverage. 
  4. Withhold the employee's share, if any, of health insurance 
premiums from the employee's compensation and pay those premiums to 
the insurer. The amount withheld from the employee's compensation shall 
not exceed the maximum amount permitted pursuant to section 33-1131. 
 B. If the employer offers more than one plan, the child shall be enrolled in 
the plan in which the child's parent is enrolled or, if the parent is not enrolled in a 
plan, in the least costly plan that is otherwise available to the parent. 
 C. During the time that the medical support order is in effect, a parent's 
employer shall release to the state IV-D agency or on request from another parent 
any necessary information relating to the health insurance coverage of the parent, 
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including the name and address of the insurer, the policy number and the names 
of the insured. 
 D. Notwithstanding any other law, any information that is reported 
pursuant to this section for the enforcement of an order for medical insurance 
coverage shall be released to the state IV-D agency or another parent. 
 E. If an order for medical insurance coverage is in effect and the 
employment or insurance coverage is terminated or the carrier is changed, within 
ten days after the change the employer shall notify the state IV-D agency and 
another parent of the change and of the last day on which health insurance 
coverage is effective and of any conversion privileges that may be available.  
§535 - Enforcement of health insurance coverage; medical support notice; 
administrative review; service 
 A. In a title IV-D case, a parent who is required by an administrative or 
court order to provide health insurance coverage for a child shall provide the 
department or its agent with the name of the health insurance coverage plan under 
which the child is covered, the effective date of the coverage, a description of the 
coverage, the name of the employer and any other necessary information, forms 
or documents related to the health insurance coverage as provided to all new 
members within thirty days after the support order is established. 
 B. If an administrative or court order requires a parent to obtain health 
insurance coverage for the parent's child, the department or its agent may deliver 
by first class mail or electronic means to the obligated parent's employer a 
medical support notice to enroll the child in an insurance program as prescribed 
by that order. The department or its agent shall use the medical support notice to 
enroll prescribed by the United States secretary of health and human services 
pursuant to 42 United States Code §651. The employer shall deliver or mail by 
first class mail or by electronic means a copy of the medical support notice to 
enroll to the obligated parent within ten days after the employer receives the 
notice. The notice serves to enroll the child in the obligated parent's health 
insurance coverage plan. That parent may contest the notice by filing a written 
request for an administrative review within ten days after the parent receives a 
copy of the notice from the employer. The department shall conduct an 
administrative review pursuant to section 25-522. If a parent contests the notice, 
the department or its agent shall notify the employer by first class mail or 
electronic means that the parent has contested the medical support notice to 
enroll. The employer shall send the employee contributions until the department 
notifies the employer to cease withholding. An administrative review is limited to 
determining if: 
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  1. Medical support is unlawful or inconsistent with an 
administrative or court order. 
  2. A mistaken identity exists. 
  3. The responsible party pursuant to the order provides alternative 
coverage. 
  4. Another parent is already providing medical insurance for the 
child pursuant to court order. 
  5. The cost of the insurance coverage is reasonable as prescribed 
pursuant to section 25-320, subsection J. 
 C. If an employee on whom an income withholding order or order of 
assignment and notice is served is a new employee who is entered into the state 
directory of new hires pursuant to section 23-722.01, the department or its agent 
shall provide the medical support notice to enroll to the obligated parent's 
employer within two days after the date of entry in the state directory of new hires 
unless the responsible party pursuant to the order provides alternative coverage. 
 D. If the obligated parent who is required by a court or an administrative 
order to obtain health insurance coverage changes employment and the new 
employer is known to the department or its agent, the department or its agent shall 
use the medical support notice to enroll to transfer notice to the new employer. 
Within thirty days after the obligated parent changes employment the obligated 
parent shall provide the department or its agent with the name of the health 
insurance coverage plan under which the child is covered, the effective date of the 
coverage, a description of the coverage, the name of the employer and any other 
necessary information, forms or documents related to the health insurance 
coverage as provided to all new members. Within twenty business days after it 
receives the medical support notice to enroll the employer shall transfer the notice 
to the appropriate health insurance plan that provides coverage for which the child 
is eligible. 
 E. A medical support notice to enroll has the same effect as an enrollment 
application that is signed by the parent. 
 F. If the employer does not have existing dependent coverage when it 
receives the medical support notice to enroll, the employer is not required to 
create this coverage. The employer shall notify the department or its agent of this 
fact within ten days after receiving the medical support notice to enroll. 
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 G. Service by mail as authorized in this section is complete as to the 
employer when the mailing is received. Service by electronic means as authorized 
in this section is complete on transmission to the employer. 
Article 3: Spousal Maintenance Enforcement (§§551 - 553)  
 
§551 - Clerk of the court 
The clerk of the court may provide services to assist a person to collect 
spousal maintenance. These services may include providing information 
regarding collection and enforcement procedures, intercepting a taxpayer's state 
income tax refund for collection purposes, providing assistance in the preparation 
of forms and instructions necessary to initiate an enforcement action and 
providing information and referrals regarding services related to spousal 
maintenance and debt collection and enforcement.  
§552 - Jurisdiction; priority of action 
 A. The superior court has original jurisdiction in proceedings brought by 
this state or a person who is owed spousal maintenance to establish, enforce or 
modify a spousal maintenance obligation. 
 B. Notwithstanding any other statute, actions pursuant to this article have 
priority over all other civil actions except for child support actions pursuant to 
section 25-514 or judicial authorization pursuant to section 36-2152.  
§553 - Request for arrearages; deadline 
A. The person to whom the spousal maintenance obligation is owed may 
file a request for judgment for spousal maintenance arrearages not later than three 
years after the date the spousal maintenance order terminates. In that proceeding 
there is no bar to establishing a money judgment for all of the unpaid spousal 
maintenance arrearages. 
B. Notwithstanding any other law, formal written judgments for spousal 
maintenance and for associated costs and attorney fees are exempt from renewal 
and are enforceable until paid in full.  
C. If termination of the spousal maintenance order is disputed, this section 
shall be liberally construed to effect its intention of diminishing the limitation on 
the collection of spousal maintenance arrearages.  
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§681 - Child support arrest warrant; definition 
 A. In any action or proceeding pursuant to section 25-502, on motion of a 
party or on its own motion the court may issue a child support arrest warrant if the 
court finds that all of the following apply to the person for whom the warrant is 
sought: 
  1. The person was ordered by the court to appear personally at a 
specific time and location. 
  2. The person received actual notice of the order, including a 
warning that the failure to appear might result in the issuance of a child 
support arrest warrant. 
  3. The person failed to appear as ordered. 
 B. The judicial officer shall order the child support arrest warrant and the 
clerk shall issue the warrant. The warrant shall contain the name of the person to 
be arrested and other information required to enter the warrant in the Arizona 
criminal justice information system. The warrant shall command that the named 
person be arrested and either remanded to the custody of the sheriff or brought 
before the judicial officer or, if the judicial officer is absent or unable to act, the 
nearest or most accessible judicial officer of the superior court in the same county. 
A warrant that is issued pursuant to this section remains in effect until it is 
executed or extinguished by the court. 
 C. The court shall determine and the warrant shall state the amount the 
arrested person shall pay in order to be released from custody. 
 D. For the purposes of this article, "child support arrest warrant" means an 
order that is issued by a judicial officer in a noncriminal child support matter and 
that directs a peace officer in this state to arrest the person named in the warrant 
and bring the person before the court. 
§682 - Time and manner of execution; information 
 A. A child support arrest warrant is executed by the arrest of the person 
named in the warrant. The warrant may be executed at any time. 
 B. When making an arrest pursuant to a child support arrest warrant, the 
arresting officer shall inform the person named in the warrant that the arresting 
officer has a child support arrest warrant unless: 
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  1. The named person flees or forcibly resists before the arresting 
officer has an opportunity to inform the named person. 
  2. Providing this information will imperil the arrest. 
 C. In order to execute a child support arrest warrant, the arresting officer 
may use reasonable force to enter any building in which the person named in the 
warrant is or is reasonably believed to be. 
 D. The arresting officer does not have to possess the warrant at the time of 
the arrest. If after the arrest the arrested person requests to see the warrant, the 
arresting officer shall show the arrested person a copy of the warrant as soon as 
practicable. 
 E. The arrested person shall be brought before the issuing judicial officer 
as soon as possible or, if that judicial officer is absent or unable to act, the nearest 
or most accessible judicial officer of the superior court in the same county. In any 
event, the arrested person shall be brought before a judicial officer of the superior 
court in the issuing county or the county of arrest within twenty-four judicial 
business hours of the execution of the warrant. If the person is arrested in a county 
other than the county in which the warrant was issued, the arresting officer shall 
notify the sheriff and the local title IV-D agency, if applicable, in the county in 
which the warrant was issued that the person has been arrested. As soon as 
practicable, the sheriff of the county in which the warrant was issued shall take 
custody of and transport the arrested person to the issuing judicial officer or a 
judicial officer of the superior court in the county in which the warrant was 
issued. If the arrested person is not taken into custody and transported within 
seventy-two hours after arrest, the arrested person shall be released and issued a 
written notice directing the arrested person to appear at a specified date and time 
in the superior court in the county in which the warrant was issued. The notice 
shall have the same force and effect as an order of the superior court. The notice 
shall state that if the arrested person fails to appear as directed a child support 
arrest warrant may be issued. A copy of this notice shall be sent to the court and 
the local title IV-D agency, if applicable, in the county in which the warrant was 
issued. 
§683 - Procedure after arrest; payment for release from custody 
 A. When a person who is arrested pursuant to a child support arrest 
warrant is brought before the court, the judicial officer shall advise the arrested 
person of the nature of the proceedings and shall set a date for the next court 
appearance. The arrested person may be released from custody pending the 
hearing if the arrested person pays the amount set by the court pursuant to section 
25-681 or a larger amount as the court determines. The court shall not reduce the 
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amount ordered to be paid. The arrested person shall not be released from custody 
without paying the amount unless the court finds in writing or on the record that a 
compelling reason exists to release the arrested person. Monies received pursuant 
to this subsection shall be deposited and credited pursuant to section 25-502, 
subsection I. 
 B. If the arrested person pays the full amount set forth in the warrant 
before the arrested person is brought before a judicial officer, the arrested person 
may be released after receiving a notice to appear in the superior court in the 
county in which the warrant was issued pursuant to the procedure prescribed in 
section 25-682, subsection E. If the arrested person fails to appear as directed, a 
child support arrest warrant may be issued. 
 C. The arresting agency shall forward all amounts that are paid by the 
arrested person for release pursuant to this subsection to the clerk of the superior 
court in the county in which the warrant was issued or the support payment 
clearinghouse for deposit and credit pursuant to section 25-502, subsection I. 
§684 - Preexisting warrants 
A civil arrest warrant that is issued before the effective date of this section 
for the failure to appear in a child support enforcement proceeding under this 
chapter or chapter 3 of this title automatically becomes a child support arrest 
warrant after the effective date of this section. This article applies to all 
procedures under the warrant, unless the agency that is responsible for child 
support enforcement in a county elects not to convert warrants issued in that 
county. 
§685 - Entry into criminal information system 
Child support arrest warrants shall be entered in the wanted person file of 
the Arizona criminal justice information system. 
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Article 1: General Provisions (§§1001 - 1013)  
 
§1001 Short title 
This chapter may be cited as the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement act. 
§ 1002 Definitions 
In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires: 
1. "Abandoned" means left without provision for reasonable and 
necessary care or supervision. 
2. "Child" has the same meaning prescribed in section 1-215. 
3. "Child custody determination": 
  (a) Means any judgment, decree or other order of a court, 
including a permanent, temporary, initial and modification order, 
for legal custody, physical custody or visitation with respect to a 
child.  
  (b) Does not include an order relating to child support or 
any other monetary obligation of an individual. 
4. "Child custody proceeding": 
  (a) Means a proceeding, including a proceeding for divorce, 
separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, parentage, 
termination of parentage and protection from domestic violence, in 
which legal custody, physical custody or visitation with respect to 
a child is an issue or in which that issue may appear. 
  (b) Does not include a proceeding involving juvenile 
delinquency, contractual emancipation or enforcement under 
article 3 of this chapter. 
5. "Commencement" means the filing of the first pleading in a 
proceeding. 
6. "Court" means an entity authorized under the law of a state to 
establish, enforce or modify a child custody determination. 
7. "Home state" means: 
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  (a) The state in which a child lived with a parent or a 
person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months 
immediately before the commencement of a child custody 
proceeding, including any period during which that person is 
temporarily absent from that state.  
  (b) If a child is less than six months of age, the state in 
which the child lived from birth with a parent or person acting as a 
parent, including any period during which that person is 
temporarily absent from that state. 
8. "Initial determination" means the first child custody 
determination concerning a particular child. 
9. "Issuing court" means the court that makes a child custody 
determination for which enforcement is sought under this chapter. 
10. "Issuing state" means the state in which a child custody 
determination is made. 
11. "Modification" means a child custody determination that 
changes, replaces, supersedes or is otherwise made after a previous 
determination concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the 
court that made the previous determination. 
12. "Person" means an individual, corporation, business trust, 
estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint 
venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency or 
instrumentality, or public corporation or any other legal or commercial 
entity. 
13. "Person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a 
recognized parent, who meets both of the following requirements: 
  (a) Has physical custody of the child or has had physical 
custody for a period of six consecutive months, including any 
temporary absence, within one year immediately before the 
commencement of a child custody proceeding. 
  (b) Has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a 
right to legal custody under the law of this state. 
14. "Physical custody" means the physical care and supervision of 
a child. 
260 
15. "State" means a state of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands or any territory or 
insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
16. "Tribe" means an Indian tribe or band or Alaskan native village 
that is recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged by a state. 
17. "Visitation" includes parenting time as defined in section 25-
402. 
18. "Warrant" means an order issued by a court authorizing law 
enforcement officers to take physical custody of a child. 
§1003 Proceeding governed by other law 
This chapter does not govern an adoption proceeding or a proceeding 
pertaining to the authorization of emergency medical care for a child. 
§1004 - Application to Indian tribes 
 A. A child custody proceeding that pertains to an Indian child as defined 
in the Indian child welfare act (25 United States Code section 1903) is not subject 
to this chapter to the extent that it is governed by the Indian child welfare act. 
 B. A court of this state shall treat a tribe as if it were a state of the United 
States for the purpose of applying this article and article 2 of this chapter. 
 C. A child custody determination made by a tribe under factual 
circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this 
chapter must be recognized and enforced under article 3 of this chapter. 
§1005 - International application of chapter 
 A. A court of this state shall treat a foreign country as if it were a state of 
the United States for the purpose of applying this article and article 2 of this 
chapter. 
 B. Except as otherwise provided in subsection C, a child custody 
determination made in a foreign country under factual circumstances in 
substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this chapter must be 
recognized and enforced under article 3 of this chapter. 
 C. A court of this state is not required to apply this chapter if the child 
custody law of a foreign country violates fundamental principles of human rights. 
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§1006 - Effect of child custody determination 
A child custody determination made by a court of this state that had 
jurisdiction under this chapter binds all persons who have been served in 
accordance with the laws of this state or notified pursuant to section 25-1008 or 
who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and who have been given an 
opportunity to be heard. As to those persons, the determination is conclusive as to 
all decided issues of law and fact except to the extent the determination is 
modified.  
§1007 - Priority 
If a question of existence or exercise of jurisdiction under this chapter is 
raised in a child custody proceeding, on request of a party, the question must be 
given priority on the calendar and handled expeditiously. 
§1008 - Notice to persons outside this state 
 A. Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction if a person is outside this 
state may be given in a manner prescribed by the law of this state for service of 
process or by the law of the state in which the service is made. Notice must be 
given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice but may be by 
publication if other means are not effective. 
 B. Proof of service may be made in the manner prescribed by the law of 
this state or by the law of the state in which the service is made. 
 C. Notice is not required for the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to a 
person who submits to the jurisdiction of the court. 
§1009 - Appearance and limited immunity 
 A. A party to a child custody proceeding, including a modification 
proceeding, or a petitioner or respondent in a proceeding to enforce or register a 
child custody determination, is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this state for 
another proceeding or purpose solely by reason of having participated, or of 
having been physically present for the purpose of participating, in the proceeding. 
 B. A person who is subject to personal jurisdiction in this state on a basis 
other than physical presence is not immune from service of process in this state. A 
party who is present in this state and who is subject to the jurisdiction of another 
state is not immune from service of process allowable under the laws of that state. 
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 C. The immunity granted by subsection A does not extend to civil 
litigation based on acts unrelated to the participation in a proceeding under this 
chapter and committed by an individual while present in this state. 
§1010 - Communication between courts; definition 
 A. A court of this state may communicate with a court in another state 
concerning a proceeding arising under this chapter. 
 B. The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If 
the parties are not able to participate in the communication, they must be given 
the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on 
jurisdiction is made. 
 C. Communication between courts on schedules, calendars, court records 
and similar matters may occur without informing the parties. A record need not be 
made of the communication. 
 D. Except as otherwise provided in subsection C, a record must be made 
of a communication under this section. The parties must be informed promptly of 
the communication and granted access to the record. 
 E. For the purposes of this section, "record" means information that is 
inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in any electronic or other medium 
and that is retrievable in perceivable form. 
§1011 - Taking testimony in another state 
 A. In addition to other procedures available to a party, a party to a child 
custody proceeding may offer testimony of witnesses who are located in another 
state, including testimony of the parties and the child, by deposition or other 
means allowable in this state for testimony taken in another state. The court on its 
own motion may order that the testimony of a person be taken in another state and 
may prescribe the manner in which and the terms on which the testimony is taken. 
 B. A court of this state may permit an individual residing in another state 
to be deposed or to testify by telephone, audiovisual means or other electronic 
means before a designated court or at another location in that state. A court of this 
state shall cooperate with courts of other states in designating an appropriate 
location for the deposition or testimony. 
 C. Documentary evidence transmitted from another state to a court of this 
state by technological means that do not produce an original writing shall not be 
excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means of transmission. 
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§1012 - Cooperation between courts; preservation of records 
 A. A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state 
to: 
  1. Hold an evidentiary hearing. 
  2. Order a person to produce or give evidence pursuant to 
procedures of that state. 
  3. Order that an evaluation be made with respect to the custody of 
a child involved in a pending proceeding. 
  4. Forward to the court of this state a certified copy of the 
transcript of the record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise presented 
and any evaluation prepared in compliance with the request. 
  5. Order a party to a child custody proceeding or any person 
having physical custody of the child to appear in the proceeding with or 
without the child. 
 B. On request of a court of another state, a court of this state may hold a 
hearing or enter an order described in subsection A. 
 C. Travel and other necessary and reasonable expenses incurred under 
subsections A and B may be assessed against the parties according to the law of 
this state. 
 D. A court of this state shall preserve the pleadings, orders, decrees, 
records of hearings, evaluations and other pertinent records with respect to a child 
custody proceeding until the child attains eighteen years of age. On appropriate 
request by a court or law enforcement official of another state, the court shall 
forward a certified copy of those records. 
§1013 - Military deployment; home state 
Notwithstanding section 25-1002, if this state is the home state of a child 
at the time of the military deployment of that child's custodial parent outside of 
the United States and the child is relocated outside of the United States during the 
deployment, this state remains the home state of the child until the deployment 
ends.  
264 
Article 2: Jurisdiction (§§1031 - 1040) 
§1031 Initial child custody jurisdiction 
 A. Except as otherwise provided in section 25-1034, a court of this state 
has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if any of the 
following is true: 
  1. This state is the home state of the child on the date of the 
commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child 
within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the 
child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent 
continues to live in this state. 
  2. A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under 
paragraph 1 or a court of the home state of the child has declined to 
exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate 
forum under section 25-1037 or 25-1038 and both of the following are 
true: 
  (a) The child and the child's parents, or the child and at 
least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant 
connection with this state other than mere physical presence. 
  (b) Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning 
the child's care, protection, training and personal relationships. 
  3. All courts having jurisdiction under paragraph 1 or 2 have 
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is 
the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under 
section 25-1037 or 25-1038. 
  4. A court of any other state would not have jurisdiction under the 
criteria specified in paragraph 1, 2 or 3. 
 B. Subsection A of this section is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for 
making a child custody determination by a court of this state. 
 C. Physical presence of or personal jurisdiction over a party or a child is 
not necessary or sufficient to make a child custody determination. 
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§1032 Exclusive continuing jurisdiction 
 A. Except as otherwise provided in section 25-1034, a court of this state 
that has made a child custody determination consistent with section 25-1031 or 
25-1033 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until either 
of the following is true: 
  1. A court of this state determines that neither the child, nor the 
child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a 
significant connection with this state and that substantial evidence is no 
longer available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, 
training and personal relationships. 
  2. A court of this state or a court of another state determines that 
the child, the child's parents and any person acting as a parent do not 
presently reside in this state. 
 B. A court of this state that has made a child custody determination and 
does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify 
that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under 
section 25-1031. 
§1033 - Jurisdiction to modify determination 
Except as otherwise provided in section 25-1034, a court of this state shall 
not modify a child custody determination made by a court of another state unless 
a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under section 
25-1031, subsection A, paragraph 1 or 2 and either of the following is true: 
1. The court of the other state determines that it no longer has 
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under section 25-1032 or that a court of 
this state would be a more convenient forum under section 25-1037. 
2. A court of this state or a court of the other state determines that 
the child, the child's parents and any person acting as a parent do not 
presently reside in the other state. 
§1034 - Temporary emergency jurisdiction 
 A. A court of this state has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is 
present in this state and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an 
emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the 
child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse. 
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 B. If there is no previous child custody determination that is entitled to be 
enforced under this chapter and a child custody proceeding has not been 
commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under section 25-1031, 25-
1032 or 25-1033, a child custody determination made under this section remains 
in effect until an order is obtained from a court of a state having jurisdiction under 
section 25-1031, 25-1032 or 25-1033. If a child custody proceeding has not been 
or is not commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under section 25-
1031, 25-1032 or 25-1033, a child custody determination made under this section 
becomes a final determination, if it so provides and this state becomes the home 
state of the child. 
 C. If there is a previous child custody determination that is entitled to be 
enforced under this chapter or a child custody proceeding has been commenced in 
a court of a state having jurisdiction under section 25-1031, 25-1032 or 25-1033, 
any order issued by a court of this state under this section must specify in the 
order a period that the court considers adequate to allow the person seeking an 
order to obtain an order from the state having jurisdiction under section 25-1031, 
25-1032 or 25-1033. The order issued in this state remains in effect until an order 
is obtained from the other state within the period specified or the period expires. 
 D. A court of this state that has been asked to make a child custody 
determination under this section, on being informed that a child custody 
proceeding has been commenced in, or a child custody determination has been 
made by, a court of a state having jurisdiction under section 25-1031, 25-1032 or 
25-1033, shall immediately communicate with the other court. A court of this 
state that exercises jurisdiction pursuant to section 25-1031, 25-1032 or 25-1033, 
on being informed that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a 
child custody determination has been made by, a court of another state under a 
statute similar to this section, shall immediately communicate with the court of 
that state to resolve the emergency, protect the safety of the parties and the child 
and determine a period for the duration of the temporary order. 
§1035 - Notice; opportunity to be heard; joinder 
 A. Before a child custody determination is made under this chapter, notice 
and an opportunity to be heard pursuant to section 25-1008 must be given to all 
persons entitled to notice under the law of this state as in child custody 
proceedings between residents of this state, any parent whose parental rights have 
not been previously terminated and any person having physical custody of the 
child. 
 B. This chapter does not govern the enforceability of a child custody 
determination made without notice or an opportunity to be heard. 
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 C. The obligation to join a party and the right to intervene as a party in a 
child custody proceeding under this chapter are governed by the law of this state 
as in child custody proceedings between residents of this state. 
§1036 Simultaneous proceedings 
 A. Except as otherwise provided in section 25-1034, a court of this state 
shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this article if, at the time of the 
commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning the custody of the 
child has been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction 
substantially in conformity with this chapter, unless the proceeding has been 
terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because a court of this state 
is a more convenient forum under section 25-1037. 
 B. Except as otherwise provided in section 25-1034, a court of this state, 
before hearing a child custody proceeding, shall examine the court documents and 
other information supplied by the parties pursuant to section 25-1039. If the court 
determines that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in a court in 
another state that has jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this chapter, the 
court of this state shall stay its proceeding and communicate with the court of the 
other state. If the court of the state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance 
with this chapter does not determine that the court of this state is a more 
appropriate forum, the court of this state shall dismiss the proceeding. 
 C. In a proceeding to modify a child custody determination, a court of this 
state shall determine whether a proceeding to enforce the determination has been 
commenced in another state. If a proceeding to enforce a child custody 
determination has been commenced in another state, the court may do any of the 
following: 
  1. Stay the proceeding for modification pending the entry of an 
order of a court of the other state enforcing, staying, denying or dismissing 
the proceeding for enforcement. 
  2. Enjoin the parties from continuing with the proceeding for 
enforcement. 
  3. Proceed with the modification under conditions it considers 
appropriate. 
§1037 - Inconvenient forum 
 A. A court of this state that has jurisdiction under this chapter to make a 
child custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if 
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it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a 
court of another state is a more appropriate forum. The issue of inconvenient 
forum may be raised on motion of a party, the court's own motion or request of 
another court. 
 B. Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, a court of this 
state shall consider whether it is appropriate for a court of another state to exercise 
jurisdiction. For this purpose, the court shall allow the parties to submit 
information and shall consider all relevant factors including: 
  1. Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to 
continue in the future and which state could best protect the parties and the 
child. 
  2. The length of time the child has resided outside this state. 
  3. The distance between the court in this state and the court in the 
state that would assume jurisdiction. 
  4. The relative financial circumstances of the parties. 
  5. Any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume 
jurisdiction. 
  6. The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the 
pending litigation, including testimony of the child. 
  7. The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue 
expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence. 
  8. The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and 
issues in the pending litigation. 
 C. If a court of this state determines that it is an inconvenient forum and 
that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum, it shall stay the 
proceedings on condition that a child custody proceeding be promptly 
commenced in another designated state and may impose any other condition the 
court considers just and proper. 
 D. A court of this state may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this 
chapter if a child custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or 
another proceeding while still retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other 
proceeding. 
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§1038 - Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct 
 A. Except as otherwise provided in section 25-1034, if a court of this state 
has jurisdiction under this chapter because a person seeking to invoke its 
jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to 
exercise its jurisdiction unless any of the following is true: 
  1. The parents and all persons acting as parents have acquiesced in 
the exercise of jurisdiction. 
  2. A court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction under section 
25-1031, 25-1032 or 25-1033 determines that this state is a more 
appropriate forum under section 25-1037. 
  3. A court of any other state would not have jurisdiction under the 
criteria specified in section 25-1031, 25-1032 or 25-1033. 
 B. If a court of this state declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to 
subsection A of this section, it may fashion an appropriate remedy to ensure the 
safety of the child and prevent a repetition of the unjustifiable conduct, including 
staying the proceeding until a child custody proceeding is commenced in a court 
having jurisdiction under section 25-1031, 25-1032 or 25-1033. 
 C. If a court dismisses a petition or stays a proceeding because it declines 
to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to subsection A of this section, it shall assess 
against the party seeking to invoke its jurisdiction necessary and reasonable 
expenses including costs, communication expenses, attorney fees, investigative 
fees, expenses for witnesses, travel expenses and child care during the course of 
the proceedings, unless the party from whom fees are sought establishes that the 
assessment would be clearly inappropriate. The court shall not assess fees, costs 
or expenses against this state unless authorized by law other than this chapter. 
§1039 - Information to be submitted to court 
 A. In a child custody proceeding, each party, in its first pleading or in an 
attached affidavit, shall give information, if reasonably ascertainable, under oath 
as to the child's present address or whereabouts, the places where the child has 
lived during the last five years and the names and present addresses of the persons 
with whom the child has lived during that period. The pleading or affidavit must 
state whether the party: 
  1. Has participated, as a party or witness or in any other capacity, 
in any other proceeding concerning the custody of or visitation with the 
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child and, if so, shall identify the court, the case number and the date of 
the child custody determination, if any. 
  2. Knows of any proceeding that could affect the current 
proceeding, including proceedings for enforcement and proceedings 
relating to domestic violence, protective orders, termination of parental 
rights and adoptions and, if so, shall identify the court, the case number 
and the nature of the proceeding. 
  3. Knows the names and addresses of any person who is not a party 
to the proceeding and who has physical custody of the child or claims 
rights of legal custody or physical custody of, or visitation with, the child 
and, if so, the names and addresses of those persons. 
 B. If the information required by subsection A is not furnished, the court, 
on motion of a party or on its own motion, may stay the proceeding until the 
information is furnished. 
 C. If the declaration as to any of the items described in subsection A, 
paragraph 1, 2 or 3 is in the affirmative, the declarant shall give additional 
information under oath as required by the court. The court may examine the 
parties under oath as to details of the information furnished and other matters 
pertinent to the court's jurisdiction and the disposition of the case. 
 D. Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any proceeding 
in this or any other state that could affect the current proceeding. 
 E. If a party alleges in an affidavit or a pleading under oath that the health, 
safety or liberty of a party or child would be jeopardized by disclosure of 
identifying information, the information must be sealed and may not be disclosed 
to the other party or the public unless the court orders the disclosure to be made 
after a hearing in which the court takes into consideration the health, safety or 
liberty of the party or child and determines that the disclosure is in the interest of 
justice. 
§1040 Appearance of parties and child 
 A. In a child custody proceeding in this state, the court may order a party 
to the proceeding who is in this state to appear before the court in person with or 
without the child. The court may order any person who is in this state and who 
has physical custody or control of the child to appear in person with the child. 
 B. If a party to a child custody proceeding whose presence is desired by 
the court is outside this state, the court may order that a notice given pursuant to 
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section 25-1008 include a statement directing the party to appear in person with or 
without the child and informing the party that failure to appear may result in a 
decision adverse to the party. 
 C. The court may enter any orders necessary to ensure the safety of the 
child and of any person ordered to appear under this section. 
 D. If a party to a child custody proceeding who is outside this state is 
directed to appear under subsection B of this section or desires to appear 
personally before the court with or without the child, the court may require 
another party to pay reasonable and necessary travel and other expenses of the 
party so appearing and of the child. 
Article 3: Enforcement (§§1051 - 1067)  
 
§105 - Definitions 
In this article, unless the context otherwise requires: 
1. "Petitioner" means a person who seeks enforcement of an order 
for return of a child under the Hague convention on the civil aspects of 
international child abduction or enforcement of a child custody 
determination. 
2. " Respondent" means a person against whom a proceeding has 
been commenced for enforcement of an order for return of a child under 
the Hague convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction 
or enforcement of a child custody determination. 
§1052 - Enforcement under Hague convention 
Under this article a court of this state may enforce an order for the return 
of the child made under the Hague convention on the civil aspects of international 
child abduction as if it were a child custody determination. 
 §1053 - Duty to enforce 
 A. A court of this state shall recognize and enforce a child custody 
determination of a court of another state if the latter court exercised jurisdiction in 
substantial conformity with this chapter or the determination was made under 
factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of this chapter and the 
determination has not been modified in accordance with this chapter. 
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 B. A court of this state may use any remedy available under any other law 
of this state to enforce a child custody determination made by a court of another 
state. The remedies provided in this article are cumulative and do not affect the 
availability of other remedies to enforce a child custody determination 
§1054 - Temporary visitation 
 A. A court of this state that does not have jurisdiction to modify a child 
custody determination may issue a temporary order enforcing: 
  1. A visitation schedule made by a court of another state. 
  2. The visitation provisions of a child custody determination of 
another state that does not provide for a specific visitation schedule. 
 B. If a court of this state makes an order under subsection A, paragraph 2, 
it shall specify in the order a period that it considers adequate to allow the 
petitioner to obtain an order from a court having jurisdiction under the criteria 
specified in article 2 of this chapter. The order remains in effect until an order is 
obtained from the other court or the period expires. 
 
§1055 - Registration of child custody determination 
 A. A child custody determination issued by a court of another state may be 
registered in this state, with or without a simultaneous request for enforcement, by 
sending to the appropriate court in this state all of the following: 
  1. A letter or another document requesting registration. 
  2. Two copies, including one certified copy, of the determination 
sought to be registered and a statement under penalty of perjury that to the 
best of the knowledge and belief of the person seeking registration the 
order has not been modified. 
  3. Except as otherwise provided in section 25-1039, the name and 
address of the person seeking registration and any parent or person acting 
as a parent who has been awarded custody or visitation in the child 
custody determination sought to be registered. 
 B. On receipt of the documents required by subsection A of this section, 
the registering court shall: 
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  1. Cause the determination to be filed as a foreign judgment, 
together with one copy of any accompanying documents and information, 
regardless of their form. 
  2. Serve notice on the persons named pursuant to subsection A, 
paragraph 3 of this section and provide them with an opportunity to 
contest the registration in accordance with this section. 
 C. The notice required by subsection B, paragraph 2 of this section must 
state that: 
  1. A registered determination is enforceable as of the date of the 
registration in the same manner as a determination issued by a court of this 
state. 
  2. A hearing to contest the validity of the registered determination 
must be requested within twenty days after service of notice. 
  3. Failure to contest the registration shall result in confirmation of 
the child custody determination and preclude further contest of that 
determination with respect to any matter that could have been asserted. 
 D. A person seeking to contest the validity of a registered order must 
request a hearing within twenty days after service of the notice. At that hearing, 
the court shall confirm the registered order unless the person contesting 
registration establishes any of the following: 
  1. The issuing court did not have jurisdiction under article 2 of this 
chapter. 
  2. The child custody determination sought to be registered has 
been vacated, stayed or modified by a court having  
  3. The person contesting registration was entitled to notice, but 
notice was not given in accordance with the standards of section 25-1008, 
in the proceedings before the court that issued the order for which 
registration is sought. 
 E. If a timely request for a hearing to contest the validity of the 
registration is not made, the registration is confirmed as a matter of law and the 
person requesting registration and all persons served must be notified of the 
confirmation. 
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 F. Confirmation of a registered order, whether by operation of law or after 
notice and a hearing, precludes further contest of the order with respect to any 
matter that could have been asserted at the time of registration. 
§1056 - Enforcement of registered determination 
 A. A court of this state may grant any relief normally available under the 
law of this state to enforce a registered child custody determination made by a 
court of another state. 
 B. A court of this state shall recognize and enforce, but shall not modify, 
except in accordance with article 2 of this chapter, a registered child custody 
determination of a court of another state. 
§1057 - Simultaneous proceedings 
If a proceeding for enforcement under this article is commenced in a court 
of this state and the court determines that a proceeding to modify the 
determination is pending in a court of another state having jurisdiction to modify 
the determination under article 2 of this chapter, the enforcing court shall 
immediately communicate with the modifying court. The proceeding for 
enforcement continues unless the enforcing court, after consultation with the 
modifying court, stays or dismisses the proceeding. 
§1058 - Expedited enforcement of child custody determination 
 A. A petition under this article must be verified. Certified copies of all 
orders sought to be enforced and of any order confirming registration must be 
attached to the petition. A copy of a certified copy of an order may be attached 
instead of the original. 
 B. A petition for enforcement of a child custody determination must state: 
  1. Whether the court that issued the determination identified the 
jurisdictional basis it relied on in exercising jurisdiction and, if so, what 
the basis was. 
  2. Whether the determination for which enforcement is sought has 
been vacated, stayed or modified by a court whose decision must be 
enforced under this chapter and, if so, shall identify the court, the case 
number and the nature of the proceeding. 
  3. Whether any proceeding has been commenced that could affect 
the current proceeding, including proceedings relating to domestic 
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violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights and adoptions 
and, if so, shall identify the court, the case number and the nature of the 
proceeding. 
  4. The present physical address of the child and the respondent, if 
known. 
  5. Whether relief in addition to the immediate physical custody of 
the child and attorney fees is sought, including a request for assistance 
from law enforcement officials and, if so, the relief sought. 
  6. If the child custody determination has been registered and 
confirmed under section 25-1055, the date and place of registration. 
 C. On the filing of a petition, the court shall issue an order directing the 
respondent to appear in person with or without the child at a hearing and may 
enter any order necessary to ensure the safety of the parties and the child. The 
hearing must be held on the next judicial day after service of the order unless that 
date is impossible. In that event, the court shall hold the hearing on the first 
judicial day possible. The court may extend the date of the hearing at the request 
of the petitioner. 
 D. An order issued under subsection C of this section must state the time 
and place of the hearing and advise the respondent that at the hearing the court 
will order that the petitioner may take immediate physical custody of the child 
and the payment of fees, costs and expenses under section 25-1062 and may 
schedule a hearing to determine whether further relief is appropriate, unless the 
respondent appears and establishes that either of the following is true: 
  1. The child custody determination has not been registered and 
confirmed under section 25-1055 and that any of the following is true: 
  (a) The issuing court did not have jurisdiction under article 
2 of this chapter. 
  (b) The child custody determination for which enforcement 
is sought has been vacated, stayed or modified by a court having 
jurisdiction to do so under article 2 of this chapter. 
  (c) The respondent was entitled to notice, but notice was 
not given in accordance with section 25-1008, in the proceedings 
before the court that issued the order for which enforcement is 
sought. 
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  2. The child custody determination for which enforcement is 
sought was registered and confirmed under section 25-1054, but has been 
vacated, stayed or modified by a court of a state having jurisdiction to do 
so under article 2 of this chapter. 
§1059 - Service of petition and order 
Except as otherwise provided in section 25-1061, the petition and order 
must be served on the respondent and any person who has physical custody of the 
child by any method authorized by this state. 
§1060 - Hearing and order 
 A. Unless the court issues a temporary emergency order in accordance 
with section 25-1034, on a finding that a petitioner is entitled to immediate 
physical custody of the child, the court shall order that the petitioner may take 
immediate physical custody of the child unless the respondent establishes that 
either of the following is true: 
  1. The child custody determination has not been registered and 
confirmed under section 25-1053 and that any of the following is true: 
  (a) The issuing court did not have jurisdiction under article 
2 of this chapter. 
  (b) The child custody determination for which enforcement 
is sought has been vacated, stayed or modified by a court of a state 
having jurisdiction to do so under article 2 of this chapter. 
  (c) The respondent was entitled to notice, but notice was 
not given in accordance with section 25-1008, in the proceedings 
before the court that issued the order for which enforcement is 
sought. 
  2. The child custody determination for which enforcement is 
sought was registered and confirmed under section 25-1055 but has been 
vacated, stayed or modified by a court of a state having jurisdiction to do 
so under article 2 of this chapter. 
 B. The court shall award the fees, costs and expenses authorized under 
section 25-1062, may grant additional relief, including a request for the assistance 
of law enforcement officials, and may set a further hearing to determine whether 
additional relief is appropriate. 
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 C. If a party called to testify refuses to answer on the ground that the 
testimony may be self-incriminating, the court may draw an adverse inference 
from the refusal. 
 D. A privilege against disclosure of communications between spouses and 
a defense of immunity based on the relationship of husband and wife or parent 
and child shall not be invoked in a proceeding under this article. 
§1061 - Warrant to take physical custody of child 
 A. On the filing of a petition seeking enforcement of a child custody 
determination, the petitioner may file a verified application for the issuance of a 
warrant to take physical custody of the child if the child is immediately likely to 
suffer serious physical harm or be removed from this state. 
 B. If on the testimony of the petitioner or any other witness, the court finds 
that the child is imminently likely to suffer serious physical harm or be removed 
from this state, it may issue a warrant to take physical custody of the child. The 
petition must be heard on the next judicial day after the warrant is executed unless 
that date is impossible. In that event, the court shall hold the hearing on the first 
judicial day possible. The application for the warrant must include the statements 
required by section 25-1058, subsection B. 
 C. A warrant to take physical custody of a child must do all of the 
following: 
  1. Recite the facts on which a conclusion of imminent serious 
physical harm or removal from the jurisdiction is based. 
  2. Direct law enforcement officers to take physical custody of the 
child immediately. 
  3. Provide for the placement of the child pending final relief. 
 D. The respondent must be served with the petition, warrant and order 
immediately after the child is taken into physical custody. 
 E. A warrant to take physical custody of a child is enforceable throughout 
this state. If the court finds on the basis of the testimony of the petitioner or other 
witness that a less intrusive remedy is not effective, it may authorize law 
enforcement officers to enter private property to take physical custody of the 
child. If required by exigent circumstances of the case, the court may authorize 
law enforcement officers to make a forcible entry at any hour. 
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 F. The court may impose conditions on placement of a child to ensure the 
appearance of the child and the child's custodian 
§1062 - Costs, fees and expenses 
 A. The court shall award the prevailing party, including a state, necessary 
and reasonable expenses incurred by or on behalf of the party, including costs, 
communication expenses, attorney fees, investigative fees, expenses for 
witnesses, travel expenses and child care during the course of the proceedings, 
unless the party from whom fees or expenses are sought establishes that the award 
is clearly inappropriate. 
 B. The court shall not assess fees, costs or expenses against a state unless 
authorized by law other than this chapter. 
§1063 - Recognition and enforcement 
A court of this state shall accord full faith and credit to an order that is 
issued by another state, that is consistent with this chapter and that enforces a 
child custody determination by a court of another state unless the order has been 
vacated, stayed or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under article 2 
of this chapter. 
§1064 - Appeals 
An appeal may be taken from a final order in a proceeding under this 
article in accordance with expedited appellate procedures in other civil cases. 
Unless the court enters a temporary emergency order under section 25-1034, the 
enforcing court shall not stay an order enforcing a child custody determination 
pending appeal. 
§1065 - Role of attorney general 
 A. In a case that arises under this chapter or that involves the Hague 
convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction, the attorney 
general may take any lawful action, including resorting to a proceeding under this 
article or any other available civil proceeding, to locate a child, obtain the return 
of a child or enforce a child custody determination if there is any of the following: 
  1. An existing child custody determination. 
  2. A request to do so from a court in a pending child custody 
proceeding. 
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  3. A reasonable belief that a criminal statute has been violated. 
  4. A reasonable belief that the child has been wrongfully removed 
or retained in violation of the Hague convention on the civil aspects of 
international child abduction. 
 B. The attorney general acting pursuant to this section acts on behalf of the 
court and shall not represent any party. 
§1066 Role of law enforcement 
At the request of the attorney general who acts pursuant to section 25-
1065, a law enforcement officer may take any lawful action reasonably necessary 
to locate a child or a party to assist the attorney general. 
§1067 - Costs and expenses 
If the respondent is not the prevailing party, the court may assess against 
the respondent all direct expenses and costs incurred by the attorney general and 
law enforcement officers who act pursuant to section 25-1065 and 25-1066. 
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STATUTES 
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Chapter 9 Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (Article 1 - 8) 
Article 1: General Provisions (§§1201 - 1204)  
 
§ 1201 Short title 
This chapter may be cited as the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.  
§ 1202 Definitions 
In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires: 
1. "Child" means an individual, whether over or under the age of 
majority, who is or is alleged to be owed a duty of support by the 
individual's parent(s) or who is or is alleged to be the beneficiary of a 
support order directed to the parent. 
2. "Child support order" means a support order for a child, 
including a child who has attained the age of majority under the law of the 
issuing state. 
3. "Duty of support" means an obligation imposed or imposable by 
law to provide support for a child, spouse or former spouse, including an 
unsatisfied obligation to provide support. 
4. "Home state" means the state in which a child lived with a 
parent or a person acting as parent for at least six consecutive months 
immediately preceding the time of filing a petition or a comparable 
pleading for support and, if a child is less than six months old, the state in 
which the child lived from birth with any of them. A period of temporary 
absence of any of them is counted as part of the six month or other period. 
5. "Income" includes earnings or other periodic entitlements to 
money from any source including any other property subject to 
withholding for support under the laws of this state. 
6. "Income withholding order" means an order or other legal 
process directed to an obligor's employer or other debtor to withhold 
support from the income of the obligor. 
7. "Initiating state" means a state from which a proceeding is 
forwarded or in which a proceeding is filed for forwarding to a responding 
state under this chapter or a law or procedure substantially similar to this 
chapter.  
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8. "Initiating tribunal" means the authorized tribunal in an 
initiating state. 
9. "Issuing state" means the state in which a tribunal issues a 
support order or renders a judgment determining parentage. 
10. "Issuing tribunal" means the tribunal that issues a support order 
or renders a judgment determining parentage. 
11. "Law" includes decisional and statutory law and rules and 
regulations having the force of law. 
12. "Obligee" means any of the following: 
  (a) An individual to whom a duty of support is or is alleged 
to be owed or in whose favor a support order has been issued or a 
judgment determining parentage has been rendered. 
  (b) A state or political subdivision to which the rights under 
a duty of support or support order have been assigned or that has 
independent claims based on financial assistance provided to an 
individual obligee. 
  (c) An individual who seeks a judgment determining 
parentage of the individual's child. 
13. "Obligor" means an individual or the estate of a decedent that 
meets any of the following conditions: 
   (a) Owes or is alleged to owe a duty of support. 
  (b) Is alleged but has not been adjudicated to be a parent of 
a child. 
   (c) Is liable under a support order. 
14. "Person" has the same meaning prescribed in section 1-215. 
15. "Petition" includes a complaint. 
16. "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible 
medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and that is 
retrievable in perceivable form. 
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17. "Register" means to file a support order or judgment 
determining parentage in superior court. 
18. "Registering tribunal" means a tribunal in which a support 
order is registered. 
19. "Responding state" means a state in which a proceeding is filed 
or to which a proceeding is forwarded for filing from an initiating state 
under this chapter or a law substantially similar to this chapter. 
§1204 - Remedies cumulative 
 A. Remedies provided by this chapter are cumulative and do not affect the 
availability of remedies under other law, including the recognition of a support 
order of a foreign country or political subdivision on the basis of comity. 
 B. This chapter does not: 
  1. Provide the exclusive method of establishing or enforcing a 
support order under the laws of this state. 
  2. Grant a tribunal of this state jurisdiction to render judgment or 
issue an order relating to access and parenting times in a proceeding under 
this chapter.  
Article 2: Jurisdiction (§§1221 - 1231)  
 
§1221 - Bases for jurisdiction over nonresident 
 A. In a proceeding to establish or enforce a support order or to determine 
parentage, a tribunal of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident individual or the individual's guardian or conservator if any of the 
following is true: 
  1. The individual is personally served within this state. 
  2. The individual submits to the jurisdiction of this state by 
consent, by entering a general appearance or by filing a responsive 
document having the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction. 
  3. The individual resided with the child in this state. 
  4. The individual resided in this state and provided prenatal 
expenses or support for the child. 
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  5. The child resides in this state as a result of the acts or directives 
of the individual. 
  6. The individual engaged in reproductive conduct in this state and 
the child may have been conceived by that act or conduct. 
  7. The individual asserted parentage on a birth certificate filed in 
this state. 
  8. There is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of this 
state and the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 
 B. The bases of personal jurisdiction prescribed in subsection A of this 
section or in any other law of this state may not be used to acquire personal 
jurisdiction for a tribunal of this state to modify a child support order of another 
state unless the requirements of section 25-1311 or 25-1315 are met.  
§1222 - Duration of personal jurisdiction 
Personal jurisdiction acquired by a tribunal of this state in a proceeding 
under this chapter or another law of this state relating to a support order continues 
as long as the tribunal of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify 
its order or continuing jurisdiction to enforce its order pursuant to sections 25-
1225, 25-1226 and 25-1231 
§1223 - Initiating and responding tribunal of state 
Under this chapter, a tribunal of this state may serve as an initiating 
tribunal to forward proceedings to another state and as a responding tribunal for 
proceedings initiated in another state.  
§1224 - Simultaneous proceedings 
 A. A tribunal of this state may exercise jurisdiction to establish a support 
order if the petition or comparable pleading is filed after a pleading is filed in 
another state only if all of the following are true: 
  1. The petition or comparable pleading in this state is filed before 
the expiration of the time allowed in the other state for filing a responsive 
pleading challenging the exercise of jurisdiction by the other state. 
  2. The contesting party timely challenges the exercise of 
jurisdiction in the other state. 
  3. If relevant, this state is the home state of the child. 
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 B. A tribunal of this state may not exercise jurisdiction to establish a 
support order if the petition or comparable pleading is filed before a petition or 
comparable pleading is filed in another state if all of the following are true: 
  1. The petition or comparable pleading in the other state is filed 
before the expiration of the time allowed in this state for filing a 
responsive pleading challenging the exercise of jurisdiction by this state. 
  2. The contesting party timely challenges the exercise of 
jurisdiction in this state. 
  3. If relevant, the other state is the home state of the child.  
 
§1225 - Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify child support order 
 A. A tribunal of this state that has issued a support order consistent with 
the law of this state has and shall exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to 
modify its child support order if the order is the controlling order and either: 
  1. At the time of the filing of a request for modification this state is 
the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee or the child for whose 
benefit the support order is issued. 
  2. If this state is not the residence of the obligor, the individual 
obligee or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued, the 
parties consent in a record or in open court that the tribunal of this state 
may continue to exercise jurisdiction to modify its order. 
 B. A tribunal of this state that has issued a child support order consistent 
with the law of this state shall not exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to 
modify the order if either: 
  1. All of the parties who are individuals file consent in a record 
with the tribunal of this state that a tribunal of another state that has 
jurisdiction over at least one of the parties who is an individual or that is 
located in the state of residence of the child may modify the order and 
assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. 
  2. Its order is not the controlling order. 
 C. If a tribunal of another state has issued a child support order pursuant to 
the uniform interstate family support act or a law substantially similar to that act 
and that modifies a child support order of a tribunal of this state, tribunals of this 
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state shall recognize the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal of the 
other state. 
 D. A tribunal of this state that lacks continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to 
modify a child support order may serve as an initiating tribunal to request a 
tribunal of another state to modify a support order issued in that state.  
 E. A temporary support order issued ex parte or pending resolution of a 
jurisdictional conflict does not create continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in the 
issuing tribunal.  
§1226 - Continuing jurisdiction to enforce child support order 
 A. A tribunal of this state that has issued a child support order consistent 
with the laws of this state may serve as an initiating tribunal to request a tribunal 
of another state to enforce:  
  1. The order if the order is the controlling order and has not been 
modified by a tribunal of another state that assumed jurisdiction pursuant 
to the uniform interstate family support act. 
  2. A money judgment for arrears of support and interest on the 
order accrued before a determination that an order of another state is the 
controlling order. 
 B. A tribunal of this state having continuing jurisdiction over a support 
order may act as a responding tribunal to enforce the order.  
 
§1227 - Determination of controlling child support order 
 A. If a proceeding is brought under this chapter and only one tribunal has 
issued a child support order, the order of that tribunal is controlling and shall be 
recognized. 
 B. If a proceeding is brought under this chapter and two or more child 
support orders have been issued by tribunals in this state or another state with 
regard to the same obligor and the same child, a tribunal of this state having 
personal jurisdiction over both the obligor and individual obligee shall apply the 
following rules and by order shall determine which order controls: 
  1. If only one of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction under this chapter, the order of that tribunal is controlling and 
shall be recognized. 
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  2. If more than one of the tribunals would have continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction under this chapter, an order issued by a tribunal in 
the current home state of the child is controlling. If an order has not been 
issued in the current home state of the child, the order most recently issued 
is controlling. 
  3. If none of the tribunals would have continuing exclusive 
jurisdiction under this chapter, the tribunal of this state shall issue a child 
support order that is controlling. 
 C. If two or more child support orders have been issued for the same 
obligor and the same child, on request of a party that is an individual or a support 
enforcement agency, a tribunal of this state having personal jurisdiction over both 
the obligor and the obligee who is an individual shall determine which order 
controls under subsection B of this section. The request may be filed with a 
registration for enforcement or registration for modification pursuant to article 6 
of this chapter. 
 D. A request to determine which is the controlling order must be 
accompanied by a copy of every child support order in effect and the applicable 
record of payments. The requesting party shall give notice of the request to each 
party whose rights may be affected by the determination. 
 E. The tribunal that issued the order that is recognized as controlling under 
subsection A, B or C of this section has continuing jurisdiction to the extent 
provided pursuant to section 25-1225 or 25-1226. 
 F. A tribunal of this state that determines the order that is the controlling 
child support order under subsection B, paragraph 1 or 2 of this section or 
subsection C of this section or that issues a new controlling child support order 
under subsection B, paragraph 3 of this section shall state in that order: 
  1. The basis on which the tribunal made its determination. 
  2. The amount of prospective support, if any. 
  3. The total amount of consolidated arrears and accrued interest, if 
any, under all of the orders after all payments made are credited pursuant 
to section 25-1229. 
 G. Within thirty days after issuance of an order determining the 
controlling order, the party obtaining the order shall file a certified copy of the 
order in each tribunal that had issued or registered an earlier order of child 
support. A party or support enforcement agency that obtains the controlling order 
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but fails to file a certified copy is subject to appropriate sanctions by a tribunal in 
which the issue of failure to file arises. The failure to file does not affect the 
validity or enforceability of the controlling order. 
 H. An order that has been determined to be the controlling order or a 
judgment for consolidated arrears of support and interest, if any, made pursuant to 
this section must be recognized in proceedings under this chapter.  
§1228 - Child support orders for two or more obligees 
In responding to registrations or petitions for enforcement of two or more 
child support orders in effect at the same time with regard to the same obligor and 
different individual obligees, at least one of which was issued by a tribunal of 
another state, a tribunal of this state shall enforce those orders in the same manner 
as if the orders had been issued by a tribunal of this state 
§1229 - Credit for payments 
A tribunal of this state shall credit amounts collected for a particular 
period pursuant to any child support order against the amounts owed for the same 
period under any other child support order for support of the same child issued by 
a tribunal of this state or any other state.  
§1230 - Application of chapter to nonresident subject to personal 
jurisdiction 
A tribunal of this state exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
in a proceeding under this chapter or other laws of this state relating to a support 
order, or recognizing a support order of a foreign country or political subdivision 
on the basis of comity, may receive evidence from another state pursuant to 
section 25-1256, communicate with a tribunal of another state pursuant to section 
25-1257 and obtain discovery through a tribunal of another state pursuant to 
section 25-1258. In all other respects, articles 3 through 7 of this chapter do not 
apply and the tribunal shall apply the procedural and substantive law of this state.  
§1231 - Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify spousal support order 
 A. A tribunal of this state issuing a spousal support order consistent with 
the laws of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the spousal 
support order throughout the existence of the support obligation. 
 B. A tribunal of this state may not modify a spousal support order issued 
by a tribunal of another state having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over that 
order under the laws of that state. 
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 C. A tribunal of this state that has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a 
spousal support order may serve as either: 
  1. An initiating tribunal of another state to enforce the spousal 
support order issued in that state. 
  2. A responding tribunal to enforce or modify its own spousal 
support order.  
Article 3: Civil Provisions of General Application (§§1241 - 1259) 
 
§1241 - Proceedings under this chapter 
 A. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, this article applies to all 
proceedings under this chapter.  
 B. An individual petitioner or a support enforcement agency may initiate a 
proceeding authorized under this chapter by filing a petition in an initiating 
tribunal for forwarding to a responding tribunal or by filing a petition or a 
comparable pleading directly in a tribunal of another state that has or can obtain 
personal jurisdiction over the respondent.  
§1242 - Proceeding by minor parent 
A minor parent or a guardian or other legal representative of a minor 
parent may maintain a proceeding on behalf of or for the benefit of the minor's 
child.  
§1243 - Application of law of state 
Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, a responding tribunal of this 
state shall: 
  1. Apply the procedural and substantive law generally applicable to 
similar proceedings originating in this state and may exercise all powers 
and provide all remedies available in those proceedings. 
  2. Determine the duty of support and the amount payable in 
accordance with the law and support guidelines of this state.  
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§1244 - Duties of initiating tribunal 
 A. On the filing of a petition authorized by this chapter, an initiating 
tribunal of this state shall forward the petition and its accompanying documents 
either: 
  1. To the responding tribunal or the appropriate support 
enforcement agency in the responding state. 
  2. If the identity of the responding tribunal is unknown, to the state 
information agency of the responding state with a request that the petition 
be forwarded to the appropriate tribunal and that receipt be acknowledged. 
 B. If requested by the responding tribunal, a tribunal of this state shall 
issue any certificate or other document and may make findings required by the 
law of the responding state. If the responding state is a foreign country or political 
subdivision, on request the tribunal shall specify the amount of support sought, 
convert that amount into the equivalent amount in the foreign currency under 
applicable official or market exchange rate as publicly reported, and provide any 
other documents necessary to satisfy the requirements of the responding state.  
§1245 - Duties and powers of responding tribunal 
 A. When a responding tribunal of this state receives a petition or 
comparable pleading from an initiating tribunal or directly pursuant to section 25-
1241, subsection B, it shall file the petition or pleading and notify the petitioner of 
where and when it was filed. 
 B. A responding tribunal of this state, to the extent not prohibited by other 
law, may do one or more of the following: 
  1. Issue or enforce a support order, modify a child support order, 
determine the controlling child support order or determine parentage. 
  2. Order an obligor to comply with a support order, specifying the 
amount and the manner of compliance. 
  3. Order income withholding. 
  4. Determine the amount of any arrearages and specify a method of 
payment. 
  5. Enforce orders by civil or criminal contempt, or both. 
  6. Set aside property for satisfaction of the support order. 
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  7. Place liens and order execution on the obligor's property. 
  8. Order an obligor to keep the tribunal informed of the obligor's 
current residential address, telephone number, employer, address of 
employment and telephone number at the place of employment. 
  9. Issue a civil arrest warrant for an obligor who has failed after 
proper notice to appear at a hearing ordered by the tribunal and enter the 
civil arrest warrant in any local and state computer systems for criminal 
warrants. 
  10. Order the obligor to seek appropriate employment by specified 
methods. 
  11. Award reasonable attorney fees and other fees and costs. 
  12. Grant any other available remedy. 
 C. A responding tribunal of this state shall include in a support order 
issued under this chapter or in the documents accompanying the order the 
calculations on which the support order is based. 
 D. A responding tribunal of this state may not condition the payment of a 
support order issued under this chapter on compliance by a party with provisions 
for visitation. 
 E. If a responding tribunal of this state issues an order under this chapter, 
the tribunal shall send a copy of the order to the petitioner and the respondent and 
to the initiating tribunal, if any. 
 F. If requested to enforce a support order, arrears or judgment or modify a 
support order stated in a foreign currency, a responding tribunal of this state shall 
convert the amount stated in the foreign currency to the equivalent amount in 
dollars under the applicable official or market exchange rate as publicly reported.  
§1246 - Inappropriate tribunal 
If a petition or comparable pleading is received by an inappropriate 
tribunal of this state, the tribunal shall forward the pleading and accompanying 
documents to an appropriate tribunal in this state or another state and notify the 
petitioner where and when the pleading was sent.  
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§1247 - Duties of support enforcement agency 
 A. A support enforcement agency of this state, on request, shall provide 
services to a petitioner in a proceeding under this chapter. 
 B. A support enforcement agency of this state that is providing services to 
the petitioner shall: 
  1. Take all steps necessary to enable an appropriate tribunal in this 
state or another state to obtain jurisdiction over the respondent. 
  2. Request an appropriate tribunal to set a date, time and place for 
a hearing. 
  3. Make a reasonable effort to obtain all relevant information, 
including information as to income and property of the parties. 
  4. Within two days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and other 
legal holidays, after receipt of a written notice in a record from an 
initiating, responding or registering tribunal, send a copy of the notice by 
first class mail to the petitioner. 
  5. Within two days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and other 
legal holidays, after receipt of a written communication in a record from 
the respondent or the respondent's attorney, send a copy of the 
communication by first class mail to the petitioner. 
  6. Notify the petitioner if jurisdiction over the respondent cannot 
be obtained. 
 C. A support enforcement agency of this state that requests registration of 
a child support order in this state for enforcement or for modification shall make 
reasonable efforts to either: 
  1. Ensure that the order to be registered is the controlling order. 
  2. If two or more child support orders exist and the identity of the 
controlling order has not been determined, ensure that a request for such a 
determination is made in a tribunal having jurisdiction to do so. 
 D. A support enforcement agency of this state that requests registration 
and enforcement of a support order, arrears or judgment stated in a foreign 
currency shall convert the amounts stated in the foreign currency into the 
293 
equivalent amounts in dollars under the applicable official or market exchange 
rate as publicly reported. 
 E. A support enforcement agency of this state shall request a tribunal of 
this state to issue a child support order and an income withholding order that 
redirect payment of current support, arrears and interest if requested to do so by a 
support enforcement agency of another state pursuant to section 25-1259. 
 F. This chapter does not create or negate a relationship of attorney and 
client or other fiduciary relationship between a support enforcement agency or the 
attorney for the agency and the individual being assisted by the agency.  
§1248 - Duty of the attorney general 
 A. If the attorney general determines that the support enforcement agency 
is neglecting or refusing to provide services to an individual, the attorney general 
may order the agency to perform its duties under this chapter or may provide 
those services directly to the individual. 
 B. The attorney general may determine that a foreign country or political 
subdivision has established a reciprocal arrangement for child support with this 
state and take appropriate action for notification of the determination.  
§1249 - Private counsel 
An individual may employ private counsel to represent the individual in 
proceedings authorized by this chapter.  
§1250 - Duties of department of economic security 
 A. The department of economic security is the state information agency 
under this chapter. 
 B. The department shall: 
  1. Compile and maintain a current list, including addresses, of the 
tribunals in this state that have jurisdiction under this chapter and any 
support enforcement agencies in this state and transmit a copy to the state 
information agency of every other state. 
  2. Maintain a register of tribunals and support enforcement 
agencies received from other states. 
  3. Forward to the appropriate tribunal in the county in this state in 
which the obligee or the obligor resides or in which the obligor's property 
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is believed to be located all documents concerning a proceeding under this 
chapter received from an initiating tribunal or the state information agency 
of the initiating state. 
  4. Obtain information concerning the location of the obligor and 
the obligor's property within this state not exempt from execution, by such 
means as postal verification, federal or state locator services, examination 
of telephone directories, requests for the obligor's address from employers 
and examination of governmental records, including to the extent not 
prohibited by other law those relating to real property, vital statistics, law 
enforcement, taxation, motor vehicles, driver licenses and social security.  
§1251 - Pleadings and accompanying documents 
 A. In a proceeding under this chapter, a petitioner seeking to establish a 
support order, determine parentage or register and modify a support order of 
another state must file a petition. Unless otherwise ordered under section 25-1252, 
the petition or accompanying documents shall provide, as far as known, the name, 
residential address and social security number of the obligor and the obligee and 
the name, sex, residential address, social security number and date of birth of each 
child for whose benefit support is sought or whose parentage is to be determined. 
Any social security numbers may be redacted and filed separately pursuant to 
section 25-501, subsection G. Unless filed at the time of registration, the petition 
must be accompanied by a copy of any support order known to have been issued 
by another tribunal. The petition may include any other information that may 
assist in locating or identifying the respondent. 
 B. The petition shall specify the relief sought. The petition and 
accompanying documents shall conform substantially with the requirements 
imposed by the forms mandated by federal law for use in cases filed by a support 
enforcement agency.  
§1252 - Nondisclosure of information in exceptional circumstances 
If a party alleges in an affidavit or a pleading under oath that the health, 
safety or liberty of a party or child would be jeopardized by disclosure of specific 
identifying information, that information must be sealed and shall not be disclosed 
to the other party or to the public. After a hearing in which a tribunal takes into 
consideration the health, safety or liberty of the party or child, the tribunal may 
order disclosure of information that the tribunal determines to be in the interest of 
justice.  
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§1253 - Costs and fees 
 A. The petitioner shall not pay a filing fee or other costs. 
 B. If an obligee prevails, a responding tribunal may assess against an 
obligor filing fees, reasonable attorney fees, other costs and necessary travel and 
other reasonable expenses incurred by the obligee and the obligee's witnesses. 
The tribunal shall not assess fees, costs or expenses against the obligee or the 
support enforcement agency of either the initiating or the responding state, except 
as provided by other law. Attorney fees may be taxed as costs and may be ordered 
paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the order in the attorney's own 
name. Payment of support owed to the obligee has priority over fees, costs and 
expenses. 
 C. The tribunal shall order the payment of costs and reasonable attorney 
fees if it determines that a hearing was requested primarily for delay. In a 
proceeding under article 6 of this chapter for the enforcement and modification of 
a support order after registration, a hearing is presumed to have been requested 
primarily for delay if a registered support order is confirmed or enforced without 
change.  
§1254 - Limited immunity of petitioner 
 A. Participation by a petitioner in a proceeding before a responding 
tribunal, whether in person, by private attorney or through services provided by 
the support enforcement agency, does not confer personal jurisdiction over the 
petitioner in another proceeding. 
 B. A petitioner is not amenable to service of civil process while physically 
present in this state to participate in a proceeding under this chapter. 
 C. The immunity granted by this section does not extend to civil litigation 
based on acts unrelated to a proceeding under this chapter committed by a party 
while present in this state to participate in the proceeding.  
§1255 - Nonparentage as defense 
A party whose parentage of a child has been previously determined by or 
pursuant to law shall not plead nonparentage as a defense to a proceeding under 
this chapter.  
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§1256 - Special evidence and procedure 
 A. The physical presence of a nonresident party who is an individual in a 
tribunal proceeding of this state is not required for the establishment, enforcement 
or modification of a support order or the rendition of a judgment determining 
parentage. 
 B. An affidavit, a document substantially complying with federally 
mandated forms or a document incorporated by reference in any affidavit or 
mandated form that would not be excluded under the hearsay rule if given in 
person is admissible in evidence if given under penalty of perjury by a party or 
witness residing in another state. 
 C. A copy of the record of child support payments certified as a true copy 
of the original by the custodian of the record may be forwarded to a responding 
tribunal. The copy is evidence of facts asserted in it and is admissible to show 
whether payments were made. 
 D. Copies of bills for testing for parentage and for prenatal and postnatal 
health care of the parent and child furnished to the adverse party at least ten days 
before trial are admissible in evidence to prove the amount of the charges billed 
and that the charges were reasonable, necessary and customary. 
 E. Documentary evidence transmitted from another state to a tribunal of 
this state by telephone, fax or other means that do not provide an original record 
shall not be excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means of 
transmission. 
 F. In a proceeding under this chapter, a tribunal of this state shall permit a 
party or witness residing in another state to be deposed or to testify by telephone, 
audiovisual means or other electronic means at a designated tribunal or other 
location in that state. A tribunal of this state shall cooperate with tribunals of other 
states in designating an appropriate location for the deposition or testimony. 
 G. If a party called to testify at a civil hearing refuses to answer on the 
ground that the testimony may be self-incriminating, the trier of fact may draw an 
adverse inference from the refusal. 
 H. A privilege against disclosure of communications between spouses 
does not apply in a proceeding under this chapter. 
 I. The defense of immunity based on the relationship of husband and wife 
or parent and child does not apply in a proceeding under this chapter. 
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 J. A voluntary acknowledgment of parentage, certified as a true copy, is 
admissible to establish parentage of the child.  
§1257 - Communications between tribunals 
A tribunal of this state may communicate with a tribunal of another state 
or a foreign country or political subdivision in a record or by telephone or other 
means to obtain information concerning the laws, the legal effect of a judgment, 
decree or order of that tribunal and the status of a proceeding in the other state or 
the foreign country or political subdivision. A tribunal of this state may furnish 
similar information by similar means to a tribunal of another state or a foreign 
country or political subdivision.  
§1258 - Assistance with discovery 
A tribunal of this state may: 
1. Request a tribunal of another state to assist in obtaining 
discovery. 
2. On request, compel a person over whom it has jurisdiction to 
respond to a discovery order issued by a tribunal of another state.  
§1259 - Receipt and disbursement of payments 
 A. A support enforcement agency or tribunal of this state shall disburse 
promptly any amounts received pursuant to a support order, as directed by the 
order. The agency or tribunal shall furnish to a requesting party or tribunal of 
another state a certified statement by the custodian of the record of the amounts 
and dates of all payments received. 
 B. If neither the obligor, the obligee who is an individual nor the child 
resides in this state, on request from the support enforcement agency of this state 
or another state, a tribunal of this state shall: 
  1. Direct that the support payment be made to the support 
enforcement agency in the state in which the obligee is receiving services. 
  2. Issue and send to the obligor's employer a conforming income 
withholding order or an administrative notice of change of payee, 
reflecting the redirected payments. 
 C. The support enforcement agency of this state receiving redirected 
payments from another state pursuant to a law similar to subsection B shall 
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furnish to a requesting party or tribunal of the other state a certified statement by 
the custodian of the record of the amount and dates of all payments received.  
Article 4: Establishment of Support Order (§1271)  
§1271 - Petition to establish support order 
 A. If a support order entitled to recognition under this chapter has not been 
issued, a responding tribunal of this state may issue a support order if either: 
  1. The individual seeking the order resides in another state. 
  2. The support enforcement agency seeking the order is located in 
another state. 
 B. The tribunal may issue a temporary child support order if the tribunal 
determines that such an order is appropriate and the individual ordered to pay is: 
  1. A presumed parent of the child. 
  2. Petitioning to have parentage adjudicated. 
  3. Identified as a parent of the child through genetic testing or 
rebuttal to such. 
  4. An alleged father who has declined to submit to genetic testing. 
  5. Shown by clear and convincing evidence to be a parent of the 
child. 
  6. An acknowledged parent as provided pursuant to section 36-
322. 
  7. The parent of the child. 
  8. An individual who has been ordered to pay child support in a 
previous proceeding and the order has not been reversed or vacated. 
 C. On finding, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, that an obligor 
owes a duty of support, the tribunal shall issue a support order directed to the 
obligor and may issue other orders pursuant to section 25-1245.  
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Article 5: Enforcement of Order of Another State without Registration (§§1281 - 
1287)  
 
§1281 - Employer's receipt of income withholding order of another state 
An income withholding order issued in another state may be sent by or on 
behalf of the obligee or by the support enforcement agency to the person defined 
as the obligor's employer under the income withholding laws of this state without 
first filing a petition or comparable pleading or registering the order with a 
tribunal of this state.  
§1282 - Employer's compliance with income withholding order of another 
state 
 A. On  receipt of an income withholding order, the obligor's employer 
shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the obligor. 
 B. The employer shall treat an income withholding order issued in another 
state that appears regular on its face as if it had been issued by a tribunal of this 
state. 
 C. Except as provided by subsection D of this section and section 25-1283, 
the employer shall withhold and distribute the funds as directed in the withholding 
order by complying with the terms of the order that specify: 
  1. The duration and the amount of periodic payments of current 
child support, stated as a sum certain. 
  2. The person designated to receive payments and the address to 
which the payments are to be forwarded. 
  3. Medical support, whether in the form of periodic cash payment, 
stated as a sum certain, or ordering the obligor to provide health insurance 
coverage for the child under a policy available through the obligor's 
employment. 
  4. The amount of periodic payments of fees and costs for a support 
enforcement agency, the issuing tribunal and the obligee's attorney, stated 
as sums certain. 
  5. The amount of periodic payments of arrears and interest on 
arrears, stated as sums certain. 
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 D. The employer shall comply with the law of the state of the obligor's 
principal place of employment for withholding from income with respect to: 
  1. The employer's fee for processing an income withholding order. 
  2. The maximum amount permitted to be withheld from the 
obligor's income. 
  3. The time within which the employer shall implement the 
withholding order and forward the child support payment.  
§1283 Employer's compliance with two or more income withholding 
orders 
If the obligor's employer receives two or more orders to withhold support 
from the earnings, income, entitlements or other monies of the same obligor, the 
employer is deemed to have satisfied the terms of the orders if the employer 
complies with the law of the state of the obligor's principal place of employment 
to establish the priorities for withholding and allocating income withheld for two 
or more child support obligees.  
§1284 Immunity from civil liability 
An employer who complies with an income withholding order issued in 
another state in accordance with this article is not subject to civil liability to an 
individual or agency with regard to the employer's withholding of child support 
from the obligor's income.  
 
§1285 - Penalties for noncompliance 
An employer who willfully fails to comply with an income withholding 
order issued by another state and received for enforcement is subject to the same 
penalties that may be imposed for noncompliance with an order issued by a 
tribunal of this state.  
§1286 - Contest by obligor 
 A. An obligor may contest the validity or enforcement of an income 
withholding order issued in another state and received directly by an employer in 
this state by registering the order in a tribunal of this state and filing a contest to 
that order as provided in article 6 of this chapter or otherwise contesting the order 
in the same manner as if the order had been issued by a tribunal of this state. 
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 B. The obligor shall give notice of the contest to: 
  1. A support enforcement agency providing services to the obligee. 
  2. Each employer that has directly received an income withholding 
order. 
  3. The person designated in the income withholding order to 
receive payments, or if no person is designated, to the obligee.  
 
§1287 - Administrative enforcement of orders 
 A. A party or support enforcement agency seeking to enforce a support 
order or an income withholding order, or both, issued by a tribunal of another 
state may send the documents required for registering the order to a support 
enforcement agency of this state. 
 B. On receipt of the documents, the support enforcement agency, without 
initially seeking to register the order, shall consider and, if appropriate, use any 
administrative procedure authorized by the laws of this state to enforce a support 
order or an income withholding order, or both. If the obligor does not contest 
administrative enforcement, the order need not be registered. If the obligor 
contests the validity or administrative enforcement of the order, the support 
enforcement agency shall register the order pursuant to this chapter.  
Article 6: Registration, Enforcement and Modification of Support Order (25-1301 
- 25-1315)  
 
§1301 - Registration of order for enforcement 
A support order or an income withholding order issued by a tribunal of 
another state may be registered in this state for enforcement.  
§1302 - Procedure to register order for enforcement 
 A. A support order or income withholding order of another state may be 
registered in this state by sending the following documents and information to the 
appropriate tribunal in this state: 
  1. A letter of transmittal to the tribunal requesting registration and 
enforcement. 
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  2. Two copies, including one certified copy, of the order to be 
registered, including any modification of the order. 
  3. A sworn statement by the person requesting registration or a 
certified statement by the custodian of the records showing the amount of 
any arrearage. 
  4. The name of the obligor and, if known: 
  (a) The obligor's address and social security number. The 
obligor's social security number may be redacted and filed 
separately pursuant to section 25-501, subsection G. 
  (b) The name and address of the obligor's employer and 
any other source of income of the obligor. 
  (c) A description and the location of property of the obligor 
in this state not exempt from execution. 
  5. Except as otherwise provided in section 25-1252, the name and 
address of the obligee and, if applicable, the person to whom support payments 
are to be remitted. 
 B. On receipt of a request for registration, the registering tribunal shall 
cause the order to be filed as a foreign judgment, together with one copy of the 
documents and information, regardless of their form. 
 C. If two or more orders are in effect, the person requesting registration 
shall: 
  1. Furnish to the tribunal a copy of every support order asserted to 
be in effect in addition to the documents specified in this section. 
  2. Specify the order alleged to be the controlling order, if any. 
  3. Specify the amount of consolidated arrears, if any. 
 D. A request for a determination of which is the controlling order may be 
filed separately or with a request for registration and enforcement or for 
registration and modification. The person requesting registration shall give notice 
of the request to each party whose rights may be affected by the determination.  
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§1303 - Effect of registration for enforcement 
 A. A support order or income withholding order issued in another state is 
registered when the order is filed in the registering tribunal of this state. 
 B. A registered order issued in another state is enforceable in the same 
manner and is subject to the same procedures as an order issued by a tribunal of 
this state. 
 C. Except as otherwise provided in this article, a tribunal of this state shall 
recognize and enforce, but may not modify, a registered order if the issuing 
tribunal had jurisdiction.  
§1304 - Choice of law 
 A. Except as otherwise provided in subsection D, the law of the issuing 
state governs: 
  1. The nature, extent, amount and duration of current payments 
under a registered support order. 
  2. The computation and payment of arrearages and accrual of 
interest on the arrearages under the order. 
  3. The existence and satisfaction of other obligations under the 
support order. 
 B. In a proceeding for arrears under a registered support order, the statute 
of limitation of this state or of the issuing state, whichever is longer, applies. 
 C. A responding tribunal of this state shall apply the procedures and 
remedies of this state to enforce current support and collect arrears and interest 
due on a support order of another state registered in this state. 
 D. After a tribunal of this or another state determines which is the 
controlling order and issues an order consolidating arrears, if any, a tribunal of 
this state shall prospectively apply the law of the state issuing the controlling 
order, including its law on interest on arrears, on current and future support and 
on consolidated arrears. 
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§1305 - Notice of registration of order 
 A. When a support order or income withholding order issued in another 
state is registered, the registering tribunal shall notify the nonregistering party. 
Notice shall be given by first class or registered mail or by any means of personal 
service authorized by the law of this state. The notice shall be accompanied by a 
copy of the registered order and the documents and relevant information 
accompanying the order. 
 B. A notice shall inform the nonregistering party: 
  1. That a registered order is enforceable as of the date of 
registration in the same manner as an order issued by a tribunal of this 
state. 
  2. That a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of the 
registered order must be requested within twenty days after the date of 
mailing or personal service of the notice. 
  3. That failure to contest the validity or enforcement of the 
registered order in a timely manner will result in confirmation of the order 
and enforcement of the order and the alleged arrearages and precludes 
further contest of that order with respect to any matter that could have 
been asserted. 
  4. Of the amount of any alleged arrearages. 
 C. If the registering party asserts that two or more orders are in effect, a 
notice must also: 
  1. Identify the two or more orders and the order alleged by the 
registering person to be the controlling order and the consolidated arrears, 
if any. 
  2. Notify the nonregistering party of the right to a determination of 
which is the controlling order. 
  3. State that the procedures provided in subsection B of this section 
apply to the determination of which is the controlling order. 
  4. State that failure to contest the validity or enforcement of the 
order alleged to be the controlling order in a timely manner may result in 
confirmation that the order is the controlling order. 
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 D. On registration of an income withholding order for enforcement, the 
registering tribunal shall serve the obligor's employer with a wage assignment 
subject to the provisions of section 25-504 or 25-506.  
§1306 Procedure to contest validity or enforcement of registered order 
 A. A nonregistering party seeking to contest the validity or enforcement of 
a registered order in this state shall request a hearing within twenty days after the 
date of mailing or personal service of notice of the registration. The 
nonregistering party may seek to vacate the registration, to assert any defense to 
an allegation of noncompliance with the registered order or to contest the 
remedies being sought or the amount of any alleged arrearages pursuant to section 
25-1307. 
 B. If the nonregistering party fails to contest the validity or enforcement of 
the registered order in a timely manner, the order is confirmed by operation of 
law. 
 C. If a nonregistering party requests a hearing to contest the validity or 
enforcement of the registered order, the registering tribunal shall schedule the 
matter for a hearing and give notice to the parties by first class mail of the date, 
time and place of the hearing.  
§1307 - Contest of registration or enforcement 
 A. A party contesting the validity or enforcement of a registered order or 
seeking to vacate the registration has the burden of proving one or more of the 
following defenses: 
  1. The issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the 
contesting party. 
  2. The order was obtained by fraud. 
  3. The order has been vacated, suspended or modified by a later 
order. 
  4. The issuing tribunal has stayed the order pending appeal. 
  5. There is a defense under the law of this state to the remedy 
sought. 
  6. Full or partial payment has been made. 
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  7. The statute of limitation applicable under section 25-1304 
precludes enforcement of some or all of the arrearages. 
  8. The alleged controlling order is not the controlling order. 
 B. If a party presents evidence establishing a full or partial defense under 
subsection A of this section, a tribunal may stay enforcement of the registered 
order, continue the proceeding to permit production of additional relevant 
evidence and issue other appropriate orders. An uncontested portion of the 
registered order may be enforced by all remedies available under the laws of this 
state. 
 C. If the contesting party does not establish a defense under subsection A 
of this section to the validity or enforcement of the order, the registering tribunal 
shall issue an order confirming the order.  
§1308 - Confirmed order 
Confirmation of a registered order, whether by operation of law or after 
notice and a hearing, precludes further contest of the order with respect to any 
matter that could have been asserted at the time of registration.  
§1309 - Procedure to register child support order of another state for 
modification 
A party or support enforcement agency seeking to modify, or to modify 
and enforce, a child support order issued in another state shall register that order 
in this state in the same manner as provided in this article if the order has not been 
registered. A petition for modification may be filed at the same time as a request 
for registration or later. The pleading shall specify the grounds for modification.  
§1310 - Effect of registration for modification 
A tribunal of this state may enforce a child support order of another state 
registered for purposes of modification in the same manner as if the order had 
been issued by a tribunal of this state, but the registered order may be modified 
only if the requirements of section 25-1311, 25-1313 or 25-1315 of this section 
have been met.  
§1311 - Modification of child support order of another state 
 A. If section 25-1313 does not apply and except as provided in section 25-
1315, on petition, a tribunal of this state may modify a child support order issued 
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in another state that is registered in this state if, after notice and a hearing, it finds 
that any of the following is true: 
  1. The following requirements are met: 
  (a) Neither the child, the obligee who is an individual nor 
the obligor resides in the issuing state. 
  (b) A petitioner who is a nonresident of this state seeks 
modification. 
  (c) The respondent is subject to the personal jurisdiction of 
the tribunal of this state. 
  2. This state is the state of residence of the child, or a party who is 
an individual is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this 
state, and all of the parties who are individuals have filed consents in the 
record in the issuing tribunal for a tribunal of this state to modify the 
support order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.  
 B. Modification of a registered child support order is subject to the same 
requirements, procedures and defenses that apply to the modification of an order 
issued by a tribunal of this state, and the order may be enforced and satisfied in 
the same manner. 
 C. Except as otherwise provided in section 25-1315, a tribunal of this state 
may not modify any aspect of a child support order that may not be modified 
under the laws of the issuing state, including the duration of the obligation of 
support. If two or more tribunals have issued child support orders for the same 
obligor and child, the order that is controlling and recognized under section 25-
1227 establishes the aspects of the support order that are nonmodifiable. 
 D. In a proceeding to modify a child support order, the law of the state that 
is determined to have issued the initial controlling order governs the duration of 
the obligation of support. The obligor's fulfillment of the duty of support 
established by that order precludes imposition of a further obligation of support 
by a tribunal of this state. 
 E. On issuance of an order by a tribunal of this state modifying a child 
support order issued in another state, the tribunal of this state becomes the tribunal 
having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.  
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§1312 - Recognition of order modified in another state 
If a child support order issued by a tribunal of this state is modified by a 
tribunal of another state that assumed jurisdiction pursuant to the uniform 
interstate family support act, a tribunal of this state: 
  1. May enforce the order that was modified only as to arrears and 
interest accruing before the modification. 
  2. May provide appropriate relief for violations of its order that 
occurred before the effective date of the modification. 
  3. Shall recognize the modifying order of the other state, on 
registration, for the purpose of enforcement.  
§1313 - Jurisdiction to modify child support order of another state if 
individual parties reside in this state 
 A. If all of the individual parties reside in this state and the child does not 
reside in the issuing state, a tribunal of this state has jurisdiction to enforce and 
modify the issuing state's child support order in a proceeding to register that 
order. 
 B. A tribunal of this state exercising jurisdiction as provided in this section 
shall apply the provisions of this article and articles 1 and 2 of this chapter to the 
enforcement or modification proceeding. Articles 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of this chapter 
do not apply, and the tribunal shall apply the procedural and substantive laws of 
this state.  
§1314 - Notice to issuing tribunal of modification 
Within thirty days after issuance of a modified child support order, the 
party obtaining the modification shall file a certified copy of the order with the 
issuing tribunal that had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the earlier order 
and in each tribunal in which the party knows the earlier order has been 
registered. A party that obtains the order and fails to file a certified copy is subject 
to appropriate sanctions by a tribunal in which the issue of failure to file arises. 
The failure to file does not affect the validity or enforceability of the modified 
order of the new tribunal of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.  
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§1315 Jurisdiction to modify child support order of foreign country or 
political subdivision 
 A. If a foreign country or political subdivision that is a state will not or 
may not modify its order pursuant to its laws, a tribunal of this state may assume 
jurisdiction to modify the child support order and bind all individuals subject to 
the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal whether or not the consent to modification 
of a child support order otherwise required of the individual pursuant to section 
25-1311 has been given or whether the individual seeking modification is a 
resident of this state or of the foreign country or political subdivision. 
 B. An order issued pursuant to this section is the controlling order.  
Article 7: Determination of Parentage (25-1331)  
 
§1331 - Proceeding to determine parentage 
A court of this state authorized to determine parentage of a child may 
serve as a responding tribunal in a proceeding to determine parentage.  
Article 8: Interstate Rendition (§§1341 - 1342)  
 
§1341 - Grounds for rendition 
 A. The governor of this state may: 
  1. Demand that the governor of another state surrender an 
individual found in the other state that is charged criminally in this state 
with having failed to provide for the support of an obligee. 
  2. On the demand of the governor of another state, surrender an 
individual found in this state who is charged criminally in the other state 
with having failed to provide for the support of an obligee. 
 B. A provision for extradition of individuals not inconsistent with this 
chapter applies to the demand even if the individual whose surrender is demanded 
was not in the demanding state when the crime was allegedly committed and has 
not fled from that state.  
§1342 - Conditions of rendition 
 A. Before making a demand that the governor of another state surrender 
an individual, the governor of this state may require a prosecutor of this state to 
demonstrate that at least sixty days previously the obligee had initiated 
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proceedings for support pursuant to this chapter or that the proceeding would be 
of no avail. 
 B. If under this chapter or a law substantially similar to this chapter, the 
uniform reciprocal enforcement of support act or the revised uniform reciprocal 
enforcement of support act, the governor of another state makes a demand that the 
governor of this state surrender an individual charged criminally in that state with 
having failed to provide for the support of a child or other individual to whom a 
duty of support is owed, the governor may require a prosecutor to investigate the 
demand and report whether a proceeding for support has been initiated or would 
be effective. If it appears that a proceeding would be effective but has not been 
initiated, the governor may delay honoring the demand for a reasonable time to 
permit the initiation of a proceeding. 
 C. If a proceeding for support has been initiated and the individual whose 
rendition is demanded prevails, the governor may decline to honor the demand. If 
the petitioner prevails and the individual whose rendition is demanded is subject 
to a support order, the governor may decline to honor the demand if the individual 
is complying with the support order.  
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